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VIII 
Abstract 
The pressing need for increased sustainability in the energy system combined 
with underinvestment in new energy technology demonstrates the need for 
government initiatives to drive innovation in the energy sector. In this thesis, we 
have investigated how design characteristics of a government agency intended 
to support market focused energy technology innovation affect the projects in its 
portfolio, and consequently suggested considerations that should be made in the 
design of such an agency on the basis of our findings. 
Our focus is on the level of individual projects being supported by such 
programs. An embedded single-case research design was chosen, where the 
units of analysis were projects supported by the U.S. agency ARPA-E. The 
primary source of data was semi-structured, open-ended interviews with 
representatives from 13 projects in California.  
Following our research, the following findings emerge: The innovation process of 
projects within early-stage, transformative high-risk energy technology is 
affected by design characteristics related to the program design, project 
selection process and the support provided by an active management model in 
the agency. The organizational structure of the agency and the quality of its 
managing officials are important moderators of these factors. 
As guidance to policy makers, we establish the order of importance of design 
considerations to be made in the creation of such an agency. This thesis 
contributes to theory by presenting an integrative framework of interlinked 
factors describing these effects, as well as a cohesive portfolio of rationales for 
government intervention in energy sector innovation. 
  
IX 
Sammendrag 
Det presserende behovet for økt bærekraft i energisystemet, kombinert med 
underinvestering i ny energiteknologi, demonstrerer behovet for statlige initiativ 
for å drive innovasjon i energisektoren. I denne oppgaven har vi undersøkt 
hvordan utformingen av en offentlig etat ment å støtte markedsrettet innovasjon 
innen energiteknologi påvirker prosjektene i dens portefølje, og på bakgrunn av 
våre funn fremheve hensyn som bør tas i utformingen av et slikt organ. 
Vårt fokus ligger på prosjekter som blir støttet av slike programmer. 
Forskningsdesignet er en enkeltsaksstudie, hvor analyseenhetene var prosjekter 
som er støttet av det amerikanske byrået ARPA-E. Hovedkilden til data var 
semistrukturerte, åpne intervjuer med representanter fra 13 prosjekter i 
California. 
I løpet av våre undersøkelser har vi funnet følgende: Innovasjonsprosessen i 
tidlig-stadie, høyrisiko, transformative innovasjonsprosjekter innen energi-
teknologi påvirkes av de byråets designegenskaper knyttet til design av 
støtteprogrammer, prosjektutvelgelsesprosessen og støtten som tilbys i en aktiv 
forvaltningsmodell. Den organisatoriske strukturen i byrået og kvaliteten på dets 
administrerende tjenestemenn er viktige moderatorer av disse faktorene. 
Som veiledning til beslutningstakere, etablerer vi prioriteringsrekkefølgen av 
designhensyn som bør tas i etableringen av et slikt organ. Denne avhandlingen 
bidrar til teorien ved å presentere en integrert rammeverk av sammenkoblede 
faktorer som beskriver disse effektene, samt en oversikt over begrunnelser for 
offentlige inngrep innen innovasjon i energisektoren.  
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1 Introduction 
The growing concern about the consequences of increased pollution and global 
climate change has led to a common agreement that there is a need for 
innovations in energy technology (Christiansen, 2002). Immediate, cost effective 
’quick fixes’ to the environmental problem will not be enough to mitigate these 
problems in the long run, and it is necessary to develop cleaner energy 
technologies in order to reach the goals of a sustainable energy system (e.g. 
Buen, 2006; Christiansen, 2002; Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005; Loiter & 
Norberg-Bohm, 1999).  
It is widely recognized that relying on free market processes alone will result in 
underinvestment in research and development compared to the socially optimal 
level (e.g. Martin & Scott, 2000; Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002), and most 
economists agree that it is desirable that governments support activities leading 
to technological innovations (Jänicke & Jacob, 2004; Klette, Møen, & Griliches, 
2000). There is hence a need for government support and public policies to 
stimulate technological change through innovations in new energy technologies 
(Jaffe et al., 2005).  
There are several types of innovation policies “intended to influence the behavior 
of both public and private organizations in the development and 
commercialization of new technologies” (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002, p. 184) that 
a government can implement to target these challenges. These include direct 
regulation, economic instruments, university research, government labs, science 
parks, technology advisory services, R&D support, and demonstration programs 
(Christiansen, 2002; Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de La Potterie, 2003; Storey & 
Tether, 1998), and can be classified mainly as driving technological change 
through technology-push or demand-pull (e.g. Buen, 2006; Christiansen, 2002; 
Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999; Roessner, 1984). 
Government funding through public research programs can take many forms, 
from the way funds are granted to how projects are monitored and supported 
upon receiving funding. The results of these programs are important for many 
parties, and as such it is important to understand how such programs can be 
designed to create the proper incentives for all actors involved, especially due to 
the large variations in historical successfulness (Foxon & Pearson, 2008; Jaffe, 
Newell, & Stavins, 2001). It has also been recognized that there is a need for 
more practical guidelines for policy makers designing a sustainable innovation 
policy regime (Foxon & Pearson, 2008). 
The overarching aim of this study is therefore firstly to investigate how the 
design of a government research agency can affect the innovation process of 
the individual projects it supports. Secondly, to use these results to form a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the considerations that should be made when 
creating agencies intended to stimulate energy technology innovation by 
supporting early-stage, transformative, high-risk projects. 
In order to answer our research question we start by identifying the challenges 
to developing and commercializing new high-risk energy technology, and 
highlight the potential failures in the innovation system inhibiting innovation of 
new energy technologies. We subsequently apply this context to propose 
different roles research programs can take to promote innovation of new energy 
technology. The U.S. governmental research agency ARPA-E is then used as a 
practical example of a functioning research program. We seek to understand the 
complex effects on the innovation process through an embedded single case 
study of the interaction between ARPA-E and the projects it supports. 
In order to delimit our thesis, we do not seek to investigate whether innovation 
programs like this are in fact able to increase the number of new energy 
technologies that are successfully commercialized. Nor do we question whether 
such programs can contribute to reach advances that would not have happened 
if the task was left to private investments, as these issues have been dealt with 
by other researchers (Brown, 2001; Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de La Potterie, 
2003; Jaffe et al., 2005; Klette et al., 2000; Martin & Scott, 2000; Mazzucato, 
2011) 
Public research programs and government funding schemes typically have the 
mandate to support only parts of the innovation process from basic research to 
commercialization of a technology. In order to increase the applicability of our 
findings for public policy and to make the study practically feasible to undertake, 
we delineate our research to programs supporting the early innovation stages 
from applied research to pre-commercial technologies. Some of the findings of 
our study might however be relevant for programs supporting other stages of the 
innovation process.  
We have contributed to research by identifying and developing an integrative 
system of interlinked factors that affect the projects’ abilities to reach their end 
goals. As a foundation for this research we have also developed a cohesive 
framework of rationales for government intervention in the energy sector. We 
believe this framework can be useful for future researchers embarking on 
investigating other research agencies with the same intended purpose, as well 
as a guideline for practitioners aiming to stimulate energy technology innovation 
by supporting early-stage, transformative, high-risk projects.  
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2 Rationales for government intervention in the energy 
industry 
Innovation is a prerequisite for economic growth, and can provide technologies 
that have the potential to realize environmental benefits (Foxon et al., 2005). As 
stated by Jaffe et al. (2001, p. 5) “New technologies may create or facilitate 
increased pollution, or may mitigate or replace existing polluting activities”. In 
order to understand what government agencies can do to stimulate the 
development of new energy technologies it is necessary to understand the 
conditions under which innovation occurs in a market economy and how those 
relate to the energy industry. More specifically we believe it is necessary to 
identify how and why the private actors in the energy system fail to deliver these 
technologies on their own. By understanding these failures or challenges we can 
further identify the necessary roles a research program should take in an effort 
to mitigate them.  
The views on what position a government should take in fostering innovation 
through public policy intervention spans from the ’laissez-faire’-style argument 
that the free market forces will drive innovation with the government only laying 
the foundation for this to occur, to the belief of an ’Entrepreneurial State’ which 
proactively invests in radical, growth-enhancing innovations (Mazzucato, 2011). 
Since the objective of this thesis is not to debate the overall role of the 
government in fostering innovation, nor provide an exhaustive list of potential 
rationales for government intervention, we draw on the argument by Edquist 
(2001) which neatly summarizes what these views have in common. According 
to Edquist (2001) two conditions are necessary to justify public policy 
intervention in a market economy. Firstly, the market mechanisms and firms 
must fail to achieve the socially defined objectives, which in our case is to create 
new sustainable energy innovations. Secondly, the government and its public 
agencies must be able to solve or mitigate these problems.  
In the following sections we identify the conditions leading to a failure to meet 
the socially defined objectives of innovation in the energy industry. We then 
describe roles a government research agency should take in response to these 
issues. 
 
 The energy sector as a CELS 2.1
According to Weiss and Bonvillian (2011) the energy sector is one of the so 
called Complex Established Legacy sectors (CELS). Innovations within these 
sectors must overcome an array of well-established and well-defended 
paradigms that are favorable for existing technology. Although some 
technologies, like light emitting diodes (LEDs) have been successfully launched 
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into niche markets and later advanced into more established ones, new entrants 
must launch into “occupied territory”, where conflicts with incumbent firms with 
established technologies will be frequent and inevitable (Bonvillian & van Atta, 
2011). According to Bonvillian and van Atta (2011) actors in the energy sector 
therefore need to find first adopters or initial markets in order to cope with the 
barriers of especially commercialization.  
Narayanamurti, Anadon, and Sagar (2009) also argued that the innovation 
process of energy technologies is especially complex, because the new 
technology eventually has to take on strong incumbent technologies while 
overcoming network and infrastructure effects upon its integration into the 
existing energy system, as well as dealing with the challenge of limited and 
uncertain market signals for energy R&D.  
For this reason most new energy technologies to date have been, and still are, 
more reliant on favorable government regulation and subsidies compared to new 
technologies that can create new markets. New energy technology effectively 
must be able to directly compete with the incumbents in the current market. This 
essentially means that disruptive technologies must meet strict cost 
requirements both in early development and immediately upon market entry.  
 
 Market failures  2.2
There are several different ’Market failures’ that can be associated with 
underinvestment in energy technology innovation, giving rise to the need for 
government funding of such activities. Market failures can be defined as “the 
conditions under which the amount of funding allocated to R&D by market forces 
is less than what is socially optimal (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002, p. 187). Three 
such market failures can be identified to have an impact on the level of 
innovation in energy technologies; financial market failure (Jaffe et al., 2001, 
2005; Martin & Scott, 2000), the positive externalities of knowledge (Foxon & 
Pearson, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2001, 2005; Martin & Scott, 2000; Salmenkaita & 
Salo, 2002) and the negative externalities of pollution (Foxon & Pearson, 2008; 
Jaffe et al., 2005). 
2.2.1 Capital market failure 
The first issue that arises in the view of R&D as an investment activity, is its 
particular risk characteristic, which distinguishes it from investments in tangible 
assets (Jaffe et al., 2001). The uncertainty associated with return to investment 
in innovation is often larger (Jaffe et al., 2005). While its success often has a 
high value associated with it, the probability of success is low (Jaffe et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the asset produced by an R&D investment is specialized, sunk and 
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intangible. The high risk combined with resulting products commonly being 
confined to particular niches makes the R&D effort challenging to finance using 
capital market mechanisms (Foxon et al., 2005; Jaffe et al., 2001).  
The process of raising funds for technology research investments is additionally 
challenged by the market failures related to asymmetric information, as the 
researcher often will be in a better position to understand the potential value of 
the technology than outside investors (Jaffe et al., 2005). These market failures, 
commonly denoted as financial market failures, are an indication that “a strict 
reliance on a market system will result in an underinvestment in innovation, 
relative to the socially desirable level” (Martin & Scott, 2000, p. 438).  
For innovations in energy technology specifically, there is additional uncertainty 
related to the impact of climate change, and any associated policy responses 
(Jaffe et al., 2005). Many of the technologies currently being developed to 
increase the sustainability of the energy system are reliant upon favorable 
government regulations or subsidies to survive in the market, due of the reasons 
stated in section 2.1. Such technologies include for example electric vehicles, 
CO2 capture and several technologies using renewable energy sources. These 
subsidies and regulations can be unpredictable due to political changes, e.g. 
from one government to the next or changes in the political climate. Policies and 
subsidies of new energy technologies can therefore greatly affect early adoption 
by stimulating initial markets (Moniz, 2012).  
Including the challenges of developing and launching new energy technologies 
in the existing markets, as discussed in section 2.1, all of these hurdles easily 
make development and refinement of risky and potentially revolutionary 
innovations within energy technology a daunting task, far out of reach for most 
private sources of funding. 
While it is a far too vast subject to include in this thesis, this need for subsidies is 
arguably not lessened by continued subsidies of fossil energy technologies, e.g. 
with Coal, Natural Gas and Petroleum Liquids receiving approximately 15.5% of 
the electricity production subsidies in the United States according to the Energy 
Information Administration (2011, p. xviii). 
2.2.2 Appropriability problem: the positive externality of 
knowledge 
Another aspect distinctive to investment in R&D is that the asset produced, 
knowledge, is hard to exclude others form using (Foxon & Pearson, 2008; Jaffe 
et al., 2001). It is also difficult to sell, because a purchaser cannot determine the 
value of the knowledge before receiving it, after which he has little need to pay 
for it (Arrow, 1962). The innovator will hence not be able to keep all the benefits 
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from the produced knowledge for herself, i.e. prevent others from reaping 
benefits from the same knowledge.  
This knowledge spillover represents a positive externality to society, which infers 
that the innovator sees a lower appropriable return on her R&D investment than 
its return to society as a whole, implying that the attractiveness of the R&D 
investment is lower for the innovator than for the society as a whole. This 
suggests that private firms might underinvest in R&D relative to the social 
optimum, and provides a rationale for public support for R&D (Foxon & Pearson, 
2008; Martin & Scott, 2000; Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002).  
In the case of new energy technologies, these positive externalities can 
obviously be linked to innovations that e.g. increase the energy security and help 
alleviate problems of pollution and climate change, but one cannot expect 
private firms to make large investments in high-risk R&D just because of the 
societal benefits which may result from that work.  
2.2.3 Negative externalities of pollution 
In addition to the positive externality of knowledge, for the case of new 
sustainable energy technologies, there will be a negative externality of pollution 
(Foxon & Pearson, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2005). The unregulated polluter does not 
pay the full cost of undertaking activities that have negative impacts on the 
environment. This cost is therefore absorbed by the society as a whole, e.g. bad 
air quality in in densely populated cities due to emissions from traffic or climate 
change due to polluting activities. By not being liable for these costs, there is a 
lack of incentive for the polluter to decrease his emissions, for example by 
investing in cleaner technologies. This suggests that the free market will allow 
too much pollution if left to its own devices (Jaffe et al., 2005), and provides an 
argument for government intervention to internalize the externalities (Foxon & 
Pearson, 2008).  
However, such an internalization mechanism would be external to the research 
agency itself, and is consequently beyond the scope of this thesis. We therefore 
leave this subject as informational background for the market failures 
contributing to underinvestment in energy technology innovation. 
 
 Structural rigidities, path-dependence and lock-in 2.3
Another problem for the development and commercialization of new energy 
technologies are the difficulties for complete systems, in this case the energy 
system, to adapt to new technological paradigms. This is known as ’Lock-in 
failures’ (Foxon & Pearson, 2008; Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005) 
or ’Structural rigidities’ (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002). 
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The premise behind this argument is that technological development exhibits 
path dependence, and that the dominance of incumbent technologies creates 
barriers to the adoption of new technologies. Incumbent technologies have 
benefits such as economies of scale, learning effects, adaptive expectations and 
network effects, which create barriers to the adoption of new technologies. 
Institutions supporting the existing technological systems have similar increasing 
returns to its adoption, adding on to the lock-in of the system. Because of this 
interdependence of technologies to their social and economic environment, new 
technologies must compete with both the incumbents and the system they are 
embedded in (Foxon & Pearson, 2008).  
In addition, technologies often follow paradigms, as the actors in the innovation 
system build upon and develop expertise on a given path (Salmenkaita & Salo, 
2002). This can be seen in the energy system, where the exploitation of fossil 
fuels is continuously refined (Foxon & Pearson, 2008).  
A potential role for a government agency can therefore be to create variation and 
flexibility in the innovation system by promoting new alternative energy 
technologies and funding efforts to build new areas of expertise, and at the 
same time recognize that new technologies need a system of supporting 
technologies and institutions in order to be sustainable. However, it is important 
that the government agency has the ability to identify possible technological 
directions if this position is to be taken (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002).  
  
 Systemic and weak network failure 2.4
Innovation occurs in a system of institutions including universities, research 
centers and firms, where the innovative performance is influenced by the 
interactions of the actors involved (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002).  
One reason interactions in the innovation system influences innovative 
performance is related to ’weak network failures’, where a lack of linkages 
between actors in the innovation system results in insufficient use of 
complementarities, less interactive learning and fewer new ideas (Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). Different priorities for each actor in the innovation system 
might inhibit collaboration. Salmenkaita and Salo (2002) referred to this as 
’systemic failures’, which occurs “if the practices, incentives and priorities are 
optimal at the level of individual organizations while the overall innovative 
performance of the system is sub-optimal” (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002, p. 188). 
Government agencies can mitigate such failures by creating incentives that 
encourage collaboration between actors in the innovation system.  
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Systemic failures can also occur if the innovation process is viewed as a linear 
set of phases, and the feedback mechanisms between these phases are not 
accounted for. In this view innovation occurs only at the research phase, and 
input from the later stages of product development and commercialization is not 
included. A potential role for a government agency can here be to facilitate 
network connections and knowledge transfer between actors in the system who 
are at different stages in the innovation process (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002). 
 
 The roles of a research agency in fostering innovation 2.5
As highlighted by the previous sections, there are failures and challenges in a 
market economy that lead to a need for government intervention in order to 
obtain a socially optimal level of innovation. Most industrialized countries 
therefore employ policies designed to stimulate innovation and technological 
development (Jaffe et al., 2001). Salmenkaita and Salo (2002, p. 184) define 
innovation policies as “policies that are intended to influence the behavior of 
both public and private organizations in the development and commercialization 
of new technologies.” 
In relation to innovation policies targeting the energy industry, government 
initiatives may play a particularly important role due to the negative externalities 
of pollution on one end and the positive externalities from more environmentally 
benign energy technologies such as renewables on the other (Jaffe et al., 2001), 
as discussed in section 2.2.3 and 2.2.2. The successfulness of such policies has 
however been debated (Mazzucato, 2011), as the effects of a policy design are 
complex to quantify. There are also no clear directions for what elements policies 
should include and how they should be implemented (Salmenkaita & Salo, 
2002). There does however seem to be a consensus that for the case of radical 
innovation, there is a need for a combination of initiatives that promote the 
development of new technologies, i.e. ’technology push’, and measures that 
stimulate the development of new markets, i.e. ’demand pull’ (Foxon & Pearson, 
2008).  
One government policy intended to stimulate technological innovation is the 
establishment of research agencies. The primary role of such agencies is to 
provide funding for R&D projects in private firms, universities or research 
institutes, in order to mitigate the challenges to innovation related to market 
failures (Salmenkaita & Salo, 2002), as presented in section 2.2. Such agencies 
can also take on a multitude of additional roles in an effort to mitigate the other 
previously discussed challenges. These roles can alternatively be considered 
preemptive efforts to help the supported projects realize their full potential. 
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In the following subsections we propose potential roles of a research agency 
based on their connection to the failures and challenges presented in sections 
2.2 through 2.4 and how these roles can affect the outcomes of funded projects. 
2.5.1 Funding role 
For projects trying to develop new energy technologies, the capital market failure 
is a tremendous challenge, as discussed in section 2.2.1. R&D in transformative 
energy technologies is especially risky, because the technology must compete 
with a system of incumbent technologies, in addition to the long timeframe of 
bringing the innovation to market and realizing returns. This is amplified by the 
low cost profile less environmentally benign incumbent technologies can have if 
their negative effects (i.e. environmental impact) are not factored into their cost, 
as discussed in section 2.2.3. Correspondingly, the cost profile of the new 
energy technology may not factor in the positive externalities created by being 
more sustainable than the incumbent, as discussed in section 2.2.2. 
In the face of competition from less risky and potentially less time/capital 
intensive R&D projects, these issues present an obvious barrier against private 
financing of high-risk innovation projects. Government research agencies should 
therefore provide funds for the R&D of potentially groundbreaking energy 
technology innovations that otherwise would not get funded.  
The funding role of a research agency also provides an opportunity to mitigate 
structural rigidities. As discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.3, new energy 
technologies must either fit in the existing system of interconnected 
technologies, or be supplemented by new complementing technologies to be 
feasibly applicable for its potential users. By funding a set of complementary 
technologies, the research agency can support the development of a whole new 
system of technologies, which might increase both the long-term sustainability of 
the system as a whole, and ease the path to commercialization for each 
individual technology/project.  
2.5.2 Legitimator role 
An important reason for the capital market failure lies in the uncertainty 
connected to R&D projects. As research agencies decide which projects to fund, 
they should not only give them the financial means to go through with the 
projects, they should also be prominent enough to give them legitimacy towards 
potential investors. Having the project go through a competitive and diligent 
selection process where it is deemed promising enough to be awarded 
government funds may reduce the risk perceived by the potential investors or 
prospective strategic partners. In his study of the Canadian triple-helix 
intermediate Precarn, Johnson (2008) emphasized this legitimizing role as an 
asset the supported projects can use to attract further venture capital.  
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The role as a legitimator can also be related to weak network failures in the 
innovation system. For a relatively unknown start-up, having the ’quality stamp’ 
and publicity provided by a research agency might open doors to potential 
collaboration partners. This legitimacy can bring together actors that otherwise 
would have been unlikely to collaborate (Johnson, 2008), mitigating failures 
related to a weak network. From the point of the particular project, the legitimacy 
that comes with being chosen for a research program can therefore translate 
into more opportunities to attract investment, form new partnerships, and draw 
on the complementary knowledge of others.  
2.5.3 Network role 
The role as a networker most obviously targets the failures related to a weak 
network.  
In order to increase the use of complementarities and knowledge transfer, a 
research agency can exploit its position as a central link between all the projects 
connected to it. Because the agency has an overview of all the projects, it can 
see areas where there are potential synergies between the projects and act by 
connecting them (Johnson, 2008). We believe this would be especially useful if 
the research agency funds projects developing similar or related technologies 
with potentially similar challenges, as it then can contribute to the knowledge 
transfer by sharing relevant lessons learned and solutions that might be 
beneficial for more projects (Foxon et al., 2005; Johnson, 2008). For the 
individual projects, this means that they can learn from insights other projects 
have made, and possibly avoid making the same mistakes or doing redundant 
work by pursuing previously investigated technical paths.  
A research agency can also provide its projects with access to outside expert 
knowledge to the project. The can be done either by connecting them to external 
experts (given the necessary scientific network) or by utilizing its overview of all 
funded projects within the agency to connect them to internal experts. Such 
activities can provide the individual projects with necessary knowledge they do 
not possess themselves, reducing the need to explore research outside of their 
core expertise.  
Efforts to network R&D projects with industry actors and potential strategic 
partners or customers can also prove worthwhile (Foxon et al., 2005; Foxon & 
Pearson, 2008; Suvinen, Konttinen, & Nieminen, 2010). Connecting the various 
actors can help align the incentives and priorities between them, for example by 
adjusting the R&D efforts to the needs of a customer or strategic partner, 
reducing the impact from systemic failures. Additionally, on the level of the 
individual projects, having connections with industry actors and customers might 
enable the development of solutions that are better aligned with the demand in 
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the market, potentially increasing their chance of success. If relationships are 
formed with strategic partners or potential investors, the networking role of the 
research agency can also contribute to the project securing additional resources, 
mitigating market failures.  
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3 ARPA-E: Background and design description 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) is a U.S. 
government research agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), mandated 
to advance transformational new energy technologies. It is acclaimed to offer a 
new innovation institutional model to meet energy technology challenges 
(Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011) and identified by Hernes, Brunvoll, and Løvdal 
(2014) as likely to be the most interesting agency of its kind. It was therefore 
chosen as the model research program for our study.  
ARPA-E was established with explicit intention of creating commercial success 
in complement and cooperation with the capital markets, permeating the 
features of its design: “(…) ARPA-E funded projects that are successful in 
reaching the marketplace stand to benefit the U.S. greatly through the creation 
of new industries and jobs, access to more cost-effective energy 
technologies, and an accelerated timeframe for achieving the Nation’s 
energy goals.” (ARPA-E, 2011, p. 1) 
In the following sections, we present background information on ARPA-E 
relevant for understanding the premises for how the agency interacts with and 
supports its projects.  
 
 Establishment 3.1
Congress requested in 2005 that the National Academics should “identify the 
most urgent challenges the U.S. faces in maintaining leadership in key areas of 
science and technology” (ARPA-E, 2011, p. 9). The report recognized the need 
to develop reliable and clean energy technologies that are cost effective 
compared to the dominating incumbents coal, oil and gas. A new government 
agency was created in order to pursue this goal, the ARPA-E. Modeled after the 
successful defense program, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), ARPA-E was formally authorized by Congress as part of the America 
COMPETES Act, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush in 
August 2007. However, ARPA-E was not funded until 2009, when Congress 
appropriated and President Barack Obama allocated USD400m to fund it 
(ARPA-E, 2013b). 
From April 2009 to February 2014, ARPA-E has invested over USD900m in 362 
potentially transformational energy technology projects. Accounting for USD95m 
of ARPA-E’s investments, technical and commercial achievements in 22 ARPA-E 
projects had attracted more than USD625m in follow-on private sector funding, 
with a further 24 projects continuing the technological development by forming 
new firms (ARPA-E, 2014a).  
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 Purpose and targeted stage of technological 3.2
development 
ARPA-E’s main goal is to accelerate the development of transformational energy 
technologies. The main obstacle to transformational energy innovation is 
insufficient private sector funding, as total spending on energy research and 
development (R&D) in the U.S. private sector was only 0.3% of revenues in 
2010 (Wurzelmann, 2012).  
In its first Annual Report, ARPA-E (2011, p. 1) delineated its commercial and 
political purpose eloquently: “ARPA-E invests in and manages the development 
of only transformational energy technologies that hold the potential to radically 
shift our Nation’s energy reality. Transformational technologies are by definition 
those that disrupt the status quo. They do not seek evolutionary improvements – 
they drive revolutionary ones. They do not merely outperform current 
technologies – they make those technologies obsolete. 
ARPA-E ensures its funding programs have commercial relevance – first, by 
considering potential market impact when developing new programs, and 
second, by incorporating market-relevant cost and performance criteria into each 
funding solicitation and the subsequent review and selection process” 
ARPA-E uses a nine-point Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale (replicated 
in the Appendix, section 12.1) to assess the maturity of new technology, which is 
an important metric for which projects it is intended to support. While most of the 
projects funded by ARPA-E have ranged in maturity from TRL levels 2 through 4 
prior to receiving funding, it has also funded projects ranging in maturity from 
TRL 1 through 6, usually progressing projects to a maturity on TRL 5 to 7 by the 
end of the support period (ARPA-E, 2011). 
In these early stages of development, the high risk associated with these 
projects tends to discourage investments from private investors and other public 
sector entities. This is further outlined in section 2.2.1. However, ARPA-E 
support is justified by the potentially high rewards from technological 
breakthroughs in the most promising projects (ARPA-E, 2011). ARPA-E uses a 
’hybrid’ model, which means that it can support projects undertaken by a wide 
range of entities from small companies and academic researchers in 
universities, to high-risk endeavors in the R&D departments of large 
corporations (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). 
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 ARPA-E’s structure 3.3
There are several agencies that operate under the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), and ARPA-E is only one of them. In order to avoid conflict with the other 
parties in the DOE, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, recommended 
ARPA-E to focus on four objectives1 that should distinguish them from current 
activities in the Department (Stine, 2011). Bonvillian and van Atta (2011) 
highlighted that ARPA-E should also work on building internal connections within 
the DOE and turn them into allies and supporters. Since ARPA-E is targeting 
projects early in the technological development, it could work as an intermediate 
that accelerates projects from basic concepts through initial validation and 
prototyping, and later hand them over to more applied agencies in the DOE for 
later stage development and operational demonstration.  
ARPA-E has an agile and adaptive structure that makes it possible for the 
agency to quickly develop and execute new programs when there is a need 
(ARPA-E, 2013e). It aims to actively recruit highly talented and experienced 
persons, and is even allowed to hire people on a different basis than other 
federal organizations to achieve that goal (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011; "America 
COMPETES Act," 2007). The ARPA-E organization can be considered to be 
fairly flat and non-hierarchical, as the senior leadership consists of only three 
people including the ARPA-E Director, overseeing 14 Program Directors2. The 
Program Directors have the responsibility to design and manage their own 
program, including the authority to make the final judgment on funding awards 
(ARPA-E, 2014a, 2014c; Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). All ARPA-E projects are 
                                                     
1 As referenced in (Stine, 2011, p. 2): “1. Bring a freshness, excitement, and sense of 
mission to energy research that will attract many of our best and brightest minds—those 
of experienced scientists and engineers, and, especially, those of students and young 
researchers, including those in the entrepreneurial world. 2. Focus on creative, out-of-the-
box, potentially transformational research that industry cannot or will not support.3. Utilize 
an ARPA-like organization that is flat, nimble, and sparse, yet capable of setting goals 
and making decisions that will allow it to sustain for long periods of time those projects 
whose promise is real, and to phase out programs that do not prove to be productive or 
as promising as anticipated. 4. Create a new tool to bridge the troubling gaps between 
basic energy research, development, and industrial innovation. It can serve as a model 
for how to improve science and technology transfer in other areas that are essential to 
our future prosperity.” 
2  The wording ’Program Manager’ was in Section 904 of the ’America COMPETES 
Reauthorization Act’ changed to ’Program Director’ ("America COMPETES 
Reauthorization Act," 2010). This updated wording is used throughout the thesis. 
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also provided financial, technical and commercialization assistance through 
specialized teams within the organization (ARPA-E, 2011). 
Amadi-Echendu and Rasetlola (2011) highlighted that skilled employees and 
experienced managers are a necessary factor to successfully commercialize 
new technology. This is also recognized by ARPA-E, which recruits leading 
professionals with solid experience from universities, industry and national 
laboratories. However, in order for ARPA-E to provide an up-to-date perspective 
on the technology and market conditions, it uses a short employment model 
requiring employees to ’cycle out’ of the agency after three to four years of 
service (ARPA-E, 2013e). 
 
 Program creation  3.4
ARPA-E has two different types of programs. Most of the projects it supports are 
part of a ‘focused’ program, targeted programs “which are developed by 
Program Directors to address a specific energy challenge” (ARPA-E, 2013e, p. 
2). Projects not appropriate for any of the targeted efforts can be proposed in the 
’open’ project solicitations “which seek applications for any idea that has the 
potential to produce game-changing breakthroughs in energy technology” 
(ARPA-E, 2013e, p. 2). 
ARPA-E’s focused programs draw on the latest scientific discoveries and 
envision the commercialization path to market for the technology (ARPA-E, 
2013e). They are designed to fill gaps where “high-impact, high-potential 
investment by ARPA-E could lead to transformational technologies enabling 
entirely new ways to generate, store, and use energy” (ARPA-E, 2013e, p. 2). 
The focused programs are developed through a vigorous process that takes into 
account the needs in the energy sector, the readiness level of the technologies 
that fit in the program (Wurzelmann, 2012) and the commercialization process of 
the technologies (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). Firstly, the needs in energy is 
explored through technical workshops with experts on current and emerging 
energy technology solutions (Wurzelmann, 2012) from diverse science and 
technology communities (ARPA-E, 2013e). These workshops focus on 
technologies that can bridge basic science and early stage technology, and their 
path to market (ARPA-E, 2013e; Wurzelmann, 2012). The program proposal 
then have to go through rounds of brainstorming and vetting with the other 
Program Directors, to ensure its technical and economic viability (ARPA-E, 
2013e; Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). The program proposal must then be signed 
off by the ARPA-E Director (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011).  
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The objective of the open project solicitations is to ensure that potentially 
transformative ideas that are outside the scope of the focused programs are also 
considered for funding. These projects should pursue novel approaches to 
energy innovation, and meet technical needs not addressed by other agencies 
or the private industry (ARPA-E, 2013e). 
Upon the creation of a new program, ARPA-E will formally announce it to the 
public and solicit proposals by issuing a Funding Opportunity Announcement 
(FOA) (Wurzelmann, 2012). ARPA-E has so far funded 18 different focused 
programs, two open programs, and two upcoming programs were announced in 
late April 2014 (ARPA-E, 2014a)3. 
 
 Project application, screening and selection process 3.5
The process of screening and selecting projects to an ARPA-E program is 
divided into several steps. The applicant responds to the FOA by submitting a 
short pre-proposal in the form of a 4-page concept paper on the idea through 
ARPA-E’s online application portal, eXCHANGE. ARPA-E then performs an 
independent preliminary review of the conceptual idea, to determine whether the 
application fulfills the criteria for that particular FOA. The practice of having the 
applicants submit short pre-proposals first is consequently an effort to spare 
applicants from spending the time and expenses required for a full application 
unlikely to be selected for award negotiations (ARPA-E, 2014b). 
If the criteria for the FOA are fulfilled, ARPA-E encourages the award applicant to 
submit an extensive and highly detailed full application (ARPA-E, 2013d). After 
ARPA-E has processed the full proposal, the applicant receives feedback on its 
proposal, and then has the opportunity to reply to the comments of the reviewers 
(ARPA-E, 2014b; Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). According to Bonvillian and van 
Atta (2011), this two-stage screening process has resulted in several 
applications being reconsidered, possibly improving ARPA-E’s project portfolio.  
The decision to fund a project is ultimately taken by the Program Director, who is 
supported in her decision by the opinion of a peer review panel and discussions 
with fellow colleagues. The conservatism and caution that generally characterize 
projects being selected only through peer review is therefore avoided, which is 
                                                     
3 Please refer to the Appendix for program descriptions, section 12.4 
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suitable given ARPA-E’s mandate to fund high-risk, high-impact projects 
(Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011).  
When ARPA-E’s vetting process is completed and the agency has made their 
decision about who to fund, they publicly announce the projects (e.g. ARPA-E, 
2014a). This announcement makes the projects visible through press releases, 
the ARPA-E website or other media channels that find it interesting (e.g.Lane, 
2013; Morris, 2013; Olson, 2012). 
ARPA-E’s first FOA received approximately 3,700 applications, of which 312 
were encouraged to submit a full proposal, resulting in the selection of 37 
projects (Majumdar, 2009).  
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4 ARPA-E: Design characteristics 
ARPA-E has special design characteristics intended to enhance its projects’ 
ability to develop transformational energy technologies. These characteristics 
are highlighted in ARPA-E’s Strategic Vision for 2013 (ARPA-E, 2013e): 
“ARPA-E focuses on energy technologies that can be meaningfully advanced 
with a small investment over a defined period of time. ARPA-E’s rigorous 
program design, competitive project selection process, and hands-on 
engagement, ensure thoughtful expenditures while empowering America’s 
energy researchers with funding, technical assistance, and market awareness.” 
(ARPA-E, 2013e, p. 1, our emphasis) 
In other words, the design of the ARPA-E programs and how projects get 
selected for ARPA-E funds, as described in sections 3.4 and 3.5, and how the 
ARPA-E officers manage and support the projects are highlighted as 
characteristics that empower the agency and its projects in advancing 
transformational energy technologies. 
In the following sections, we discuss how some of these characteristics, as 
presented in Figure 1, are manifested through the roles presented earlier in 
section 2.5, before discussing how specific operational characteristics of 
ARPA-E affect the individual projects.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Design Characteristics of ARPA-E 
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 The roles of ARPA-E 4.1
As discussed in section 2.5, a research agency can mitigate the failures and 
challenges to innovating in the energy system by funding and legitimizing high-
risk, high-reward R&D efforts, and by building up a network around these efforts. 
In this section, we present and discuss how ARPA-E takes on these roles, and 
subsequently propose how we believe these roles affect the innovation process 
of its projects. 
4.1.1 Funding role 
ARPA-E takes on the funding role by funding projects developing potentially 
transformative energy technologies that are proven to be too risky to be taken on 
by private industry (ARPA-E, 2013e; Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011; Wurzelmann, 
2012). We therefore propose that ARPA-E is filling the ‘funding gap’ arising from 
capital market failures, as explained in section 2.2.1 and 2.5.1, and that the 
projects would have been unlikely to be realized without funding from ARPA-E. 
The funds are provided through a cost share model, where the awardee is 
obliged to pay a cost share as a percentage of the total cost of the project 
(ARPA-E, 2014b). The exact percentage of cost share depends on the kind of 
entity that receives the award, where educational institutions, public laboratories 
and non-profit entities generally pay a lower portion than larger profit-seeking 
entities (ARPA-E, 2013d). Depending on the FOA and the classification of the 
entity receiving the award, the cost share generally varies from 0 to 20 percent, 
although large businesses are strongly encouraged to provide more than that 
(ARPA-E, 2014b). The project may provide the cost share as cash outlays in the 
project or as in-kind contributions. In-kind contributions include e.g. personnel 
costs, indirect costs, facilities and administrative costs, rental value of buildings 
or equipment, the value of a service or other resource, or even contributions 
from a third party. ARPA-E specifies that the cost share may not be covered by 
federal funds (funding duplication) or expected future revenues (ARPA-E, 
2014b).  
Since projects that receive ARPA-E support are too risky for private investment 
by design, attracting investors or strategic partners to provide resources for the 
cost share might be a challenge. In addition, providing the cost share internally 
might be especially challenging for start-ups and small companies that may 
simply not have enough assets or cash to provide the cost share themselves or 
for educational institutions and government laboratories if most of their internal 
funds are derived from federal sources. 
The program design and project selection process, as described in 3.4 and 3.5, 
may mitigate systemic failures, as the focused programs are developed in a way 
that take account of the needs in the energy sector in consideration of the 
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commercialization path of the technologies. Before a project is selected to 
receive a grant, the implementation process for the technology is considered 
(Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011), reducing the risk of funding projects that are 
unlikely to make it to market regardless of funding. Additionally, structural 
rigidities may be avoided by funding related technologies that complement each 
other, in order to launch a self-supportive system of technologies. We believe 
ARPA-E is trying to meet this challenge by funding projects in relatively focused 
programs. 
The project application process, as described in section 3.5 may be important for 
the Agency’s ability to fulfill the funding role. Writing a full proposal is an 
extensive process, and the resources put into it are inherently sunk. This might 
be especially demanding for resource-constrained or inexperienced entities that 
have a hard time justifying allocating the time and resources required by a full 
proposal, especially without indication of whether ARPA-E considers their ideas 
to be worth pursuing. Allowing the applicants to first submit only a pre-proposal 
might therefore attract a higher number of suitable project applications due to 
the relatively low effort required for the initial part of the process. Additionally, by 
allowing the applicant to elaborate on points that perhaps were unclear or 
outright misunderstood by the reviewers, fewer projects should be discarded due 
to the reviewers failing to understand the technology.  
4.1.2 Legitimator role 
As presented in section 3.5, applicants to ARPA-E have to go through a diligent 
and competitive process before being granted an award, indicating that the risk 
perceived by potential investors or prospective strategic partners could be 
reduced.  
Bonvillian and van Atta (2011) called this the ’Halo effect’, and pointed out that 
ARPA-E consciously takes advantage of having private investors and firms 
consider its process of selecting projects as diligent and rigorous. They therefore 
claimed that having the ARPA-E ’stamp of approval’ and related publicity from 
the announcement increases the visibility and credibility of the project towards 
venture capitalists (VCs) and potential commercial partners. While these parties 
would still conduct their due diligence processes, ARPA-E’s vetting process and 
publicity help them identify and validate the projects as potential investment 
candidates. We argue that presence at the Energy Innovation Summit should 
further add to this visibility for ongoing projects, as presented in section 4.1.3 
below. 
We therefore believe ARPA-E have a legitimizing effect on the projects it funds, 
reducing investors perception of the projects’ risk. We also argue that it 
generates visibility along with this credibility which can be leveraged in 
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networking. The increased visibility and credibility may for instance prove helpful 
when trying to build connections with external parties such as potential future 
customers, hence reducing consequences of weak network failures.  
We also believe this increased credibility towards prospective private investors 
and strategic partners can have a positive effect on the projects’ ability to raise 
funds or other resources for their developments efforts, reducing the challenges 
of capital market failure.  
4.1.3 Networking role 
We believe ARPA-E takes on the networking role on two different levels, within 
its project portfolio and by facilitating the connection with external parties.  
By funding similarly focused projects within each program, these projects are 
likely to have overlapping and related areas of expertise, creating opportunities 
for exploiting synergies between them. Having one Program Director for each 
program should facilitate this role, as he will have oversight over all the projects 
in his portfolio, permitting easier identification of which projects could benefit 
from collaborating or exchanging experiences. In ARPA-E’s case, we assume 
that this would be most relevant in its focused programs, as the projects funded 
through the Open FOAs are likely to be considered too disparate to find much 
common ground. 
As a way of connecting projects together and networking them towards private 
investors or strategic partners, ARPA-E holds an annual Energy Innovation 
Summit with its awardees. According to Bonvillian and van Atta (2011), this has 
helped create a community around advanced energy technologies, and has 
increased the understanding and visibility of emerging energy technologies 
among private investors and firms. The network benefits of such conferences 
was also highlighted by Johnson (2008), who pointed out that they can be a 
good opportunity for various experts to interact and for building valuable linkages 
between different actors.  
As discussed in section 2.5.3, such networking activities towards external parties 
such as industry actors or customers might help align the product development 
process with the needs of the market. This might further increase the chance of 
commercial success for the developed technologies, especially if prosperous 
relationships are made, and hence reduce weak network failures. Connecting 
with investors could also help reduce the challenge of raising additional later-
stage funding. In line with Bonvillian and van Atta (2011), we believe that 
ARPA-E may facilitate the hand-off to later-stage funding by assisting awardees 
in connecting with other government entities, as highlighted in section 3.3. 
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 Operational characteristics of ARPA-E  4.2
In addition to the roles taken on by ARPA-E as presented above, it possesses a 
set of operational characteristics that are proposed to affect the performance of 
the individual projects in terms of developing and commercializing new energy 
technologies. These factors are presented in the following sections.  
4.2.1 The role of the Program Director 
The Program Directors have a central role in the management and support of 
the projects. In this section we will discuss how this, combined with their 
experience and expertise affects the projects.  
4.2.1.1 Experience and expertise of the Program Directors 
The ARPA-E Program Directors are highly respected experienced individuals 
within the technical area of their programs (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). They 
typically possess both scientific expertise from academic research and 
commercial experience from larger firms or start-ups (Bonvillian & van Atta, 
2011). Being responsible for all the projects within their program, their technical 
expertise and practical experience is useful when reviewing and assisting 
awardees with technical issues (ARPA-E, 2013e), as well as helping the 
awardees understand possible commercialization paths and how to move their 
technologies to market (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011).  
Having a solid technical and practical foundation enables the Program Director 
to better understand the technology being developed and potential challenges in 
the R&D process than a layman, which we assume can improve the quality of 
the dialogue between the Program Director and the project team.  
The networking role of the agency can also be better executed by leveraging 
any real-world industrial experience the Program Director may have, especially 
with regards to professional network. Connections within academia could also 
help in this regard. Having a pre-existing network in industry or academic fields 
relevant for the program should intuitively help the Program Director make 
relevant introductions for the projects in her portfolio.  
However, excessive amounts of specific, expert knowledge might work to the 
program’s disadvantage. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, a Program 
Director with much in-depth knowledge within the technical area of the particular 
project might end up micro-managing the project team or driving them in a 
certain direction. This might feel suffocating for the project’s team members and 
also harm the progress and end results of the project if the direction set by the 
Program Director proves to be flawed. Very result oriented Program Directors 
might force the project teams to leave potentially prosperous opportunities 
unexplored.  
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4.2.1.2 Responsibilities of the Program Director 
The Program Directors are responsible for developing the area of inquiry for 
their programs, as well as selecting the projects for their program in cooperation 
with the ARPA-E Director. They can exercise a significant amount of flexibility 
and control over their project portfolios, and hence stand accountable for the 
results of the projects they decide to fund. There are no formal personnel 
evaluation of the Program Directors, so they are incentivized by the prestige of 
having their portfolios produce results and succeed (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). 
The Program Directors are thus heavily invested in their projects, and are likely 
to put a lot of effort into driving the projects forward. 
Since the Program Directors have so much freedom when it comes to 
developing and selecting projects for their own programs, it is obvious that they 
need a high level of relevant experience and expertise. These aspects can also 
impact the funding and legitimator roles of the agency. The funding role is 
directly affected by the Program Directors’ abilities to employ technical and 
commercial rigor when designing appropriate programs and selecting the most 
promising projects. We argued in section 4.1.2 that the screening and vetting 
process is connected to ARPA-E’s abilities as a legitimator. We therefore assert 
that these abilities and diligent processes should contribute to the legitimacy 
associated with ARPA-E as well.  
4.2.2 Management and support of projects in ARPA-E 
ARPA-E has opted for a highly involved project management and support 
regime. In the following two sections we accentuate how aspects of this regime 
can impact the supported projects.  
4.2.2.1 Support and monitoring: A part of the project team 
Another design aspect particular to ARPA-E is the approach used in the 
interaction between its officials and the projects. As opposed to most research 
agencies, where the role of the agency primarily is to select the projects to be 
funded, the ARPA-E Program Directors have a hands-on relationship with their 
award recipients during the entire support period (ARPA-E, 2013e; Bonvillian & 
van Atta, 2011). 
This hands-on relationship starts already when negotiating the award. After 
ARPA-E has selected its projects, the prospective awardees enter a negotiation 
process to set deliverables, technical milestones and budget. ARPA-E typically 
pushes for ambitious milestones and an aggressive deadline for the completion 
of the negotiation process, usually 60 to 90 days after selection (ARPA-E, 
2013a). An obvious negotiation challenge for the prospective projects will be to 
balance the trade-off between agreeing to tough milestones to keep the interest 
of ARPA-E, while making sure that the plan is feasible to execute.  
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The milestones are clearly defined, and progress is tracked against the 
milestones in regular meetings and on-site visits (ARPA-E, 2013e). These visits 
are also an arena where the Program Directors can support the progress of their 
projects by e.g. discussing and working on technical challenges or establishing 
helpful contacts (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). The experience and expertise of 
the Program Directors, as previously discussed in section 4.2.1.1 above is 
therefore an important enabling factor for the Program Directors to be able to 
take on this kind of ’project portfolio manager role’.  
The hands-on, high-involvement project management style ARPA-E has elected 
to use seems to include a set of benefits and drawbacks. We argue that the 
frequent on-site visits and meetings can prove beneficial for the projects by 
allowing the ARPA-E teams to more closely assess the needs of each project 
and contribute with appropriate support. Examples can for instance be providing 
productive technical feedback, suggestions on technical issues or suggesting 
network opportunities. However, as highlighted in 4.2.1.1, we believe that 
exercising too much influence over the projects could be counterproductive, as 
the awardees should be the experts on whatever the projects are trying to 
develop.  
We view flexibility on the timing and content of the original milestones as a 
potential issue. As the project progresses, discoveries may for instance suggest 
a completely different direction in order to reach its overarching goal. Being 
bound to milestones with little relevance may in such a situation impede the 
performance of the project, or even lead to its failure. We therefore argue that 
exercising reasonable flexibility to change milestones when justified by the 
scientific or commercial nature of the project could be potentially decisive in the 
continued success or failure of a project, and that the Program Director has an 
important role in this regard. 
With a project duration of only three years, ARPA-E must focus on projects that 
can advance from technology concept to a scalable prototype in a relatively 
short timeframe (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). This can amplify the drawbacks of 
a narrow result-oriented focus, as discussed in section 4.2.1. As a project 
develops over time, new interesting paths might be discovered or one might 
meet unexpected challenges. Without additional time to deal with these issues, 
the project might be less successful, possibly constraining the potential to create 
radically new technologies.  
Intuitively, there are overhead issues to consider in the choice of a high-
involvement project management model, issues that ultimately require spending 
time and resources which could otherwise be spent doing development work. In 
addition to spending the time on the reviews, we believe that the frequent 
monitoring and reporting schedule might be considered cumbersome and 
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intrusive for some groups, especially academic researchers accustomed to basic 
research environments without much focus on commercial aspects and 
deliverables. We also argue that the administrative overhead associated with 
reporting could prove to be a significant burden for smaller organizations, 
especially those without preexisting financial reporting infrastructure or financial 
strength to hire dedicated staff for reporting, such as start-ups or small firms. 
4.2.2.2 Commercialization focus: Bringing the technology to market 
The ability to commercialize new technology is indisputably critical for its 
success in the marketplace. This is especially true for the energy sector, since it 
serves a broad and diverse public and private market (Stine, 2011), with 
established incumbents and strict cost restrictions due to the usually fungible 
nature of its basic products (e.g. electrical energy).  
ARPA-E incorporates a focus on commercialization throughout the entire life of 
its projects. Firstly, in order to ensure that there are a plausible pathway to 
adoption in the market, the commercial viability of all projects are considered 
before being awarded funding (Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). Secondly, ARPA-E 
has implemented a Technology-to-Market function (ARPA-E, 2013e) with 
dedicated officers who work full time to promote the implementation and 
commercialization of the technologies within ARPA-E-supported projects 
(Bonvillian & van Atta, 2011). The Technology-to-Market function provides the 
funded projects with both practical training and business information to give 
them a better understanding of the market needs, subsequently enabling an 
alignment of the technology development to market demand (ARPA-E, 2013e).  
All projects are required to create a Technology-to-Market plan before being 
granted an ARPA-E award (ARPA-E, 2013e). The objective of this plan is to 
increase the likelihood of a successful commercialization of the technology 
(Wurzelmann, 2012). The project team can also work together with the ARPA-E 
Technology-to-Market advisors throughout the project lifetime to develop 
customer strategies. In addition, ARPA-E facilitates networking activities with 
entities which may potentially help the awardees moving their technologies 
towards commercialization as part of the Technology-to-Market support (ARPA-
E, 2013e).  
We argue that this early commercialization focus, brought on by the Technology-
to-Market requirements the projects have to fulfill, and the commercialization 
support they receive will have a positive impact on the projects’ ability to adapt 
their products to the needs of the market, hence reducing systemic failures. We 
believe an especially important aspect of this are the incentives and support for 
talking to industry stakeholders and potential customers to get a comprehensive 
understanding of what they are interested in. The efficacy of such activities might 
however vary depending on what stage in the development process the projects 
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are in, as potential customers for example might have difficulties evaluating the 
value of a technology that is only at a concept stage. 
The need for a Technology-to-Market support function might also vary depending 
on the type of organization that is hosting the project. For project teams without 
much commercial experience, such as university researchers or first-time 
entrepreneurs, this commercialization support might be critical to successfully 
transition projects from ARPA-E to private investors or commercial partners at 
the end of ARPA-E’s funding period. Having projects succeed in that hand-off 
can be critical for bringing the developed technologies to market, and is hence 
very important for the success of ARPA-E itself. As outlined above, ARPA-E 
therefore has a strong focus on commercialization, and requires the project 
teams to assess and act on the potential paths to market from the very inception 
through to the end of their projects.  
 
 Summary of the proposed effects  4.3
Given the large amount of proposed direct, indirect and interrelated effects on 
the supported projects, we summarize these relations in Figure 2 in an effort to 
maintain overview for the following chapters. We note that Figure 2 is not 
exhaustive, as we have left out some moderating or secondary effects to the 
individual factors (e.g. potential difficulties of raising the cost share) to maintain 
some level of clarity for the reader. Additionally, we highlight the direct impact of 
the funding aspect on the existence of the project, and therefore its 
performance, with a solid line. The dashed, black lines indicate moderating 
factors on the project’s ability to reach its end goals. 
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Figure 2 - Proposed effects and interrelations between the project and active 
design characteristics of ARPA-E 
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5 Method 
 Rationale for research method and research design 5.1
Our research question addresses the potential benefits and limitations of direct 
government support of entities working on commercialization of new, high-risk 
energy technology. This necessitates investigating entities which have been 
supported by such programs. The U.S. agency ARPA-E has through a 
preliminary review carried out by The Norwegian Research Council emerged as 
the most interesting institution to research in this relation (Hernes et al., 2014), 
and was therefore chosen as the focus of our research. A further delimitation of 
the scope of our research is that we are focused on the individual projects being 
supported by such programs, and the subsequent effects they experience in 
their innovation processes as a result of having support from such an agency. 
We have therefore chosen an empirical study using the case study method. 
Since our research question is a ’How’ question of an explanatory nature, the 
number of variables are too many to be covered by a more quantitative method, 
such as surveys, which would not sufficiently describe the phenomenon (Yin, 
2014). Additionally, due to the relatively young age of ARPA-E, the sample of 
firms that have gone through a full or partial cycle of support would arguably be 
too limited to permit any meaningful quantitative analysis. 
We therefore opted for an embedded single-case research design, where the 
units of analysis were projects which are or have been supported by ARPA-E. 
The primary source of data was semi-structured, open-ended interviews with 13 
Project Managers/Principal Investigators, conducted in California during three 
weeks in mid-March through early April 2014. We also intended to interview 
strategically important representatives from ARPA-E, most notably Program 
Directors, but our interview requests were unfortunately denied by ARPA-E 
officials. 
 
 Preparation and collection of data 5.2
In preparation of the data collection phase we developed a case study protocol, 
including an overview of the case study, the data collection procedure and the 
data collection questions, as advised by Yin (2014), in addition to a project plan 
with all our planned deliverables and milestones. This was sent to our 
stakeholder, the Norwegian Research Council, to ensure we had a common 
understanding as to how we would conduct our research. 
The data collection and preparation phase followed a stepwise process akin to 
the procedures outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990). 
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We first identified potential interviewees and their contact information using 
ARPA-E’s publicly available repository of supported projects (ARPA-E, 2014e). 
In order to make the study practically feasible within our travel and budget 
limitations, we limited the initial sample of potential interviewees to Project 
Managers for ARPA-E supported projects in California. As a backup, we would 
expand the sample to neighboring states if needed. The initial sample was then 
trimmed by eliminating duplicate project entries and additional projects with the 
same Project Manager. One project was also removed due to being mislabeled 
as Californian. This left us with a gross initial sample of 63 Project Managers to 
contact. 
The identified Project Managers were then requested to contribute to our 
research via e-mail. The e-mail and the request letter from The Norwegian 
Research Council can be found in their complete forms in the appendix (section 
0). The request e-mails were sent in two batches; the first consisting of ten 
randomly selected candidates from the sample. The first batch was sent out a 
few days in advance of the remaining e-mails. In order to maximize the efficacy 
of the request letter, we subsequently revised the language of the letter based 
on questions we received in the responses from the initial batch. The revised 
letter included clarifications with regards to the location of the interviews and that 
the interview would be held in English.  
After getting responses from the contacted Project Managers on whether they 
would participate in our study, we prepared fact-sheets on all of the interviewees 
that had agreed to participate. This was used as a preparation for the interviews 
to get a general understanding of the project and the program it belonged to, in 
order to be able to adapt the interview accordingly.  
Table 1 - Interviewee sample 
Response # Relative share 
Gross sample in Californian repository 68 100.0 % 
Additional project/duplicates 4 5.9 % 
Mislabeled entries 1 1.5 % 
Gross sample contacted 63 92.6 % 
Undelivered/unreachable 4 5.9 % 
No response 42 61.8 % 
Negative response 4 5.9 % 
Net sample (Positive responses) 13 19.1 % 
 
The interviews were scheduled in three batches according to the time and place 
of convenience for the interviewees. Our initial interview topics were based on 
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our theoretical and empirical foundation, as presented in Chapters 2–4. In order 
to allow the interviewees time for sufficient preparation, the interview topics 
(included in appendix, section 12.3) were prepared and sent to each interviewee 
approximately one week ahead of the scheduled interview. We initially sent the 
topics to and interviewed four Project Managers in the third week of March 2014. 
After each interview, we reassessed the relevance of each topic according to the 
learning experience and analytical cues obtained up to that point of the interview 
process, and incorporated that knowledge in following interviews, as 
recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Following the first batch of 
interviews, the written topics were then refined based on this learning 
experience, and sent out to the remaining nine Project Managers, which were 
interviewed in the two weeks following the initial interviews. 
According to Yin (2014), the case study researcher should follow a line of inquiry 
guided by his case study protocol, while framing the questions in an unbiased 
and conversational manner. In order to ease the conversation for the interviewee 
and to avoid talking over each other, one member of the group acted as the 
primary interviewer in all of the interviews, supported by attentive listening and 
follow-up questions from the two others. While remaining cognizant of framing 
each question in an unprejudiced manner, this allowed continuous refinement of 
the questions from each interview to the next as our understanding of each issue 
improved, while retaining the flexibility to adapt the line of inquiry to the live 
situation. The end result was a fairly coherent line of inquiry which was tailored 
to each specific conversation.  
Before conducting each interview, we also asked the interviewee about his/her 
confidentiality preferences, as well as requesting permission to record the audio 
in order to ensure completeness and accuracy of the resulting transcripts.  
Following the interview process, every audio file was transcribed following a two-
step process. After initial transcription, each transcript was then reviewed and 
revised by at least one of the other authors in order to ensure accuracy and 
acceptable quality of the transcribed interview. The finished transcripts were then 
returned to the respective interviewees to allow potential revision of any factual 
errors made in the interview or other inconsistencies. Upon approval, two minor 
typing errors were corrected, both of non-critical nature to our thesis. 
 
 Analytical approach 5.3
Following Strauss and Corbin (1990), the coding process was guided by the 
conceptual categories we had formed on the basis of our theoretical and 
empirical analysis, as presented in Chapters 2–4. More specifically, our 
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analytical approach was based on a combination of the axial coding process 
with the iterative nature of the open coding process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
This work was primarily completed using a combination of the highlighting and 
commenting tools in Microsoft Word for initial labeling of comparable concepts, 
and subsequently manually structured, compared and grouped into relevant 
code groups in Microsoft Excel. Following this initial sorting, all three members 
of the group reviewed the code groups for accuracy and consistency, after which 
they were developed into larger categories corresponding to the anticipated 
categories in the presented theoretical and empirical background, again 
comparable to the procedures recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1990). 
When processing this material into the final results, statements pertaining to 
specific ‘facts’ were validated against appropriate documentation whenever 
possible, cf. the importance of data triangulation according to Yin (2014). An 
example of this was the verification of specific cost share levels against FOAs 
issued by ARPA-E. 
During this work, it became clear that many of the data points had links to 
several parts of the theoretical and empirical background, or suggested 
interrelations between the identified categories. As recommended by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990), we honed in on these issues as they emerged during the 
interview process in an effort to collect as much data on these relationships as 
possible. We then continued to investigate these relationships in a structured 
manner during our data analysis, by noting which and in what way elements 
were influencing or interrelating with other elements. 
 
 Description of the interviewee sample 5.4
In this section we present some background information on our interviewee 
sample in order to provide helpful context for our results, while retaining the 
anonymity of our interviewees and their projects. The net sample resulting from 
our inquiry consisted of Project Managers or Principal Investigators from 13 
different projects, of which one alumnus, one suspended and 11 active. Overall, 
the projects were spread across several different programs and varied in age, 
organization type and size of their awards. 
The projects were relatively dispersed, with only two of the ARPA-E support 
programs being represented with more than one project in our group, as shown 
in Figure 3. In addition to representing a wide array of technologies, the majority 
of our interviewees therefore had different Program Directors as well, which 
could be useful for understanding diverging results due to individual attitudes in 
the ARPA-E teams. 
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Figure 3 - Visual representation of the project dispersion across ARPA-E programs 
With the exception of two projects, all of the projects represented in our sample 
were currently receiving support at the time of the interview. One project had 
finished ahead of our research, and one project had been suspended at the time 
of the interview. Ten of the remaining eleven projects had completed 30-80% of 
their project periods. 
 
Figure 4 - Relative time passed in each project out of the total duration supported 
by ARPA-E at the time of the interview  
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Our interview sample consisted of a majority of private firms, of which five 
considered themselves to be start-ups more or less dedicated to the project; four 
were medium to large firms where the ARPA-E project accounts for a minor part 
of operations, two projects were connected to universities and two to national 
labs. 
Table 2 - Interviewees by organization and project status 
Interviewee Small firm / Start-up 
Medium / 
Large firm University 
National 
Lab 
Project 
status 
PM1 X Active 
PM2 X Active 
PM3 X Active 
PM4 X Active 
PM5 X Alumni 
PM6 X Active 
PM7 X Active 
PM8 X Active 
PM&PI9 X Suspended 
PM10 X Active 
PM11 X Active 
PM12 X Active 
PM13 X Active 
 
Our interviewees had been awarded varying amounts of funding. The average 
award size was USD3.1m, whereas the median was approximately USD3.5m. In 
order to protect confidentiality we can only show limited information, however we 
do note that there seemed to be a clustering of projects in the USD1.5-2.5m 
range on the low end and in the USD4-5m range on the high end, with few 
projects in between. 
 
Figure 5 - Award sizes in our interviewee sample 
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6 Results  
The resulting material from our interviews was structured and sorted into groups 
corresponding to the suggested roles and important design characteristics as 
predicted by our theoretic and empirical analysis. The results are therefore 
presented here following the same structure as Chapter 4, incorporating the 
theoretical background from Chapter 2. 
 
 Funding role 6.1
 
In this section we present results dealing with ARPA-E in the funding role. The 
recurring themes in this context were anchored in the market failure of securing 
funding and challenges associated with the cost share. Another important 
subject emerging from our interviews with Project Managers and Principal 
Investigators in various projects was the importance of the size of the awarded 
funding. 
6.1.1 Market failure: ARPA-E’s role in overcoming the funding gap 
Several informants expressed that ARPA-E seemed like the only funding source 
willing to accept the necessary risk and commitment to make their projects 
happen, proving essential to their existence.  
The projects funded using resources internal to the company or raised from VC 
owners also stressed that ARPA-E involvement allowed them to take on high-risk 
projects that they otherwise would not have been able to fund themselves, 
indicating that the ARPA-E support alleviated some of the concerns their senior 
management and/or investors would otherwise have had. 
6.1.1.1 Overcoming the funding gap: ARPA-E considered an enabling 
force of high-risk innovation projects 
Many of our interviewees explicitly focused on the importance of ARPA-E for the 
existence of their projects and consequentially in the development of their 
technologies.  
PM4 found ARPA-E to be the enabler of their project: “We had a lot of interest 
doing this project, but to VCs in the area and everyone else we showed it to, it 
seemed so outlandish that everyone said "that would be really interesting if it 
could work, but all you have to show is a concept of what you think could work, 
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and it's so different from the norm". We made a bunch of prototypes here, but for 
the particular project we actually really needed funding in order to make a proper 
prototype that would actually prove out the concept. ARPA-E gave us a couple of 
years of funding to do this, and it has been interesting. They understood that if 
we could do what we said, then it would be really disruptive. But unlike someone 
like a VC or a project developer, they didn't have to know for sure that that was 
true. [ARPA-E] giving us that money has enabled us to make our prototypes, and 
now when we show that prototype to the same people, they get it in a way they 
didn't get it before.” PM4 concluded that “if you're working on energy, even if 
you're really convinced you have an incredible idea, not everyone wants to fund 
you before you have a really compelling prototype.(...) [ARPA-E] definitely 
bridged the gap from concept to realistic enough product/prototype that people 
would want to actually talk to you.” 
PM6 also experienced the lack of willingness to invest from private funding 
sources, and summarized that “Without government support and ARPA-E in 
particular, it would be very difficult for us to do this [project]. (...) I don’t think we 
would have been able to come as far along as we are [without ARPA-E]. There 
are certain things I would say we couldn’t have done at all without ARPA-E 
support. So the money has been tremendously helpful.”  
ARPA-E’s essential role in the project’s existence was also explicitly noted by 
PM3, who stated that “Without [ARPA-E], I don't think this project would have 
necessarily got off the ground.” Being part of a venture capital funded firm, PM7 
expressed that “The most beneficial thing [with ARPA-E support] was that we 
could try new ideas, which we wouldn't have been able to do with the VC funds 
[only]”, adding that ARPA-E funding attracted the venture capitalists to provide 
the cost share for riskier projects: “They [the VCs] like us doing the more difficult 
projects, because it helps us to create new openings in the technology, so it is 
also good for the VC. “ 
PM11 elaborated on this issue, noting the structural incompatibility with VC 
funding due to their limited time horizon. He explained that “ARPA-E always 
wants to avoid funding things that can raise money anyway” and that he 
therefore had to substantiate why his project would not be able to get funding 
elsewhere. Having talked to several venture capitalists that ended up not funding 
the project, PM11 explained: “I actually got letters from other VC firms, saying 
this is interesting technology, and we refuse to invest for reason 1, reason 2, 
reason 3. And then ARPA-E could see, “these guys are not lazy about raising 
money, actually we need to invest or nobody will” PM11 then concluded in line 
with PM6 and PM3: “(...) It’s actually extremely important to have an agency like 
ARPA-E, because it doesn’t make financial sense for private investors to come 
in for early stage technologies. (...) If we hadn’t gotten [the ARPA-E funding], we 
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probably wouldn’t be here today. But we did, so a year and a half later, here we 
are.” 
PM10 expressed the same concern as PM11, however from the perspective of 
companies rather than external investors: “There are not a lot of options for this 
kind of high-risk, high-reward type of research funding today. (...) Most 
companies today don’t look out ten years toward what crazy research idea might 
become successful. (...) There are very few entities that will do that.” 
PM&PI9 had also experienced the dearth of investment by larger companies in 
their sector, and noted the funding gap ARPA-E fills in that space: “(…) [ARPA-E] 
is great, because it is providing funding for a specific area that's not going to 
receive a lot of private development. (...) There are not a lot of the big-eye 
companies investing in this sort of technology. I think, if anything, the big-eye 
companies are pulling their investments out of this sort of technology.” 
PM2 elaborated on the importance of ARPA-E in overcoming the market failure: 
“ARPA-E fills an important void in the science and engineering space. It is 
possible to get state of the art money to do pure science. But in this space, it is 
hard to get significant money to do innovation. (…) When you walk through the 
display at the Energy Summit, there are just hundreds of really exciting things 
happening. And that is the magic of ARPA-E, that they have been able to fund 
these things. They're targeted, but still they're ’out there', they're long range. And 
in that energy technology space, the industrial engineering space that you're 
examining, that money doesn't really exist anywhere. Companies do not invest 
at that level, and government tends to put a lot of money in pure science. (…) If 
it wasn't for ARPA-E, [our project] would never have happened.” 
PM5, PM8 and PM13 elaborated on the difficulties of finding government funding 
outside ARPA-E suiting the risk profile of their projects. PM5 said he experienced 
that “(...) a lot of the other government agencies (...) didn't seem to be willing to 
take the risks in terms of both successes and failures”, while PM13 thought that 
“(…) it would be difficult to get funded otherwise [without ARPA-E], because they 
are in this kind of little borderline crazy ideas, (...) a little too high risk for other 
areas of DOE to fund, certainly [the U.S. Department of Agriculture] and [the 
National Science Foundation]”.  
While applauding the funding ARPA-E provides for the early development stage 
of his project, PM11 remained cognizant of funding challenges awaiting between 
the ARPA-E support and actual commercialization: “As far as raising ten times 
as much money as I have now to do initial manufacturing, that’s going to be 
really hard, whether or not I’ve got the ARPA-E money, and that’s going to be the 
biggest barrier [to commercialization]. For a lot of these companies, like mine, it 
costs a ton of money to be able to manufacture on scale bigger that just a lab 
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with a dozen people in it. The challenge of raising that funding is independent of 
having support from ARPA-E or not.”  
6.1.1.2 Willingness to invest and take risks if ARPA-E invests  
While remarking that it would be infeasible to fully fund their projects using 
venture capital or internal funds, PM11, PM&PI9, PM10 and PM7 provided 
interesting perspectives on an apparent willingness from private entities to 
commit funding knowing that they are investing alongside funding from ARPA-E. 
PM11 probably contributed with the most explicit example of receiving 
investment contingent on ARPA-E support: “I got a letter from the VC firm that 
ended up investing in us, and it said: “If these guys actually win the ARPA-E 
grant, and we can complete our technical due diligence and it looks good, then 
we'll put in more than enough money for the cost share.” And they did.”  
PM&PI9 discussed the notable impact resource constraints have on the ability 
and willingness to take on high-risk projects using only company funds: “We're a 
small company, and we have limited funds. And so, we have to be very strategic 
about what we apply those funds to. We do make calculated risks on new 
technology, or more risky technology, but typically we don't fund that ourselves - 
or we fund it at a very, very low level. We definitely use public funding for 
projects such as this.” PM&PI9 continued this argument when asked about the 
primary benefit of receiving ARPA-E support: “(...) the main benefit [with 
ARPA-E] is that it funded something that we would not have invested in 
ourselves. (...) We did [the project] here specifically because ARPA-E funded it. “ 
PM10 indicated a similar situation for his firm: “It is on higher side of the risk 
spectrum, for [the company] to entirely fund this magnitude of funding for a 
three-year project. (…) [The company] would perhaps have funded a small 
portion of this [project], but I don’t think it would have been enough to address all 
the technical questions. Perhaps the risk tolerance, if we had missed some of 
the early goals, would have probably been lower.” 
6.1.2 Cost share difficulties 
The discussions on the cost share revolved around three main themes; the 
funding challenge it presents in itself, how to meet the cost share even though 
resources are scarce and whether or not the cost share is necessary.  
Introducing this topic, PM11 eloquently pinpointed the incongruity of requiring 
cost share, concluding that: “[The cost share] is something I don’t think ARPA-E 
handles particularly well. In the proposal you have to prove to ARPA-E why they 
need to invest, because no one else wants to invest. But then technically they 
require that you already have the cost share.”  
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6.1.2.1 Market failure and duplication issues with federal funding 
When discussing the cost share, we noted that the reasons our interviewees 
provided for why the cost share is challenging seemed to overlap with the 
reasons for why it is hard to raise capital for the high-risk projects ARPA-E funds, 
directly linking it to the results on the market failure and funding challenge itself 
as discussed in previous sections.  
The rules on duplication of federal funding sources (section 4.1.1) were also 
challenging for some of the project teams, which had enough internal resources 
to provide the cost share, but weren’t allowed to use them because of deriving 
that income from the federal government.  
PM2 acknowledged that providing the 20% cost share can be fairly effortless for 
private companies if they already have the resources. However, for universities 
and laboratories which may not have those funds at all, providing the cost share 
can be challenging if they are federally funded: “(…) even if I had the funds, my 
funds all come from government one way or another so I couldn't use them to 
[provide the cost share], it wouldn't count. (…) So we had to get a partner [that] 
provided the 20% cost share.”  
Following PM2’s concern, PM5 explained that duplication issues can be a 
relevant issue for private companies as well, especially when company policy 
restricts outside investment: “We actually won other awards and had to turn 
them down [because of the cost share]. It's terrible. (...) We have internal money 
that we can spend at the company, but that money is generated from 
government contracts [and] cannot be used for another federal program”. 
PM2 then connected the cost share to the challenge of raising funds for high-risk 
projects in general: “It is a substantial commitment. On a project that is such a 
state of the art, big-leap, high-risk, that's the thing that becomes challenging in 
ARPA-E. (…) [the industrial partner] wouldn't think of that kind of investment on 
that long range, high risk… that is unusual for them. That's probably the biggest 
challenge in ARPA-E, that you have convince two people who have money that 
you have a good idea, the industrial partner who is going to use it down the 
road, or if you're a small company you'll have to convince your investors to do 
that. Then you have to convince ARPA-E.” PM4 expressed the same sentiment: 
“The same reason that you need ARPA-E funding is the same reason why it is 
really hard to pull off those cost shares.” 
PM8 presented a similar argument as PM4: “It is a lot of work [to come up with 
the cost share]. Having it be matched 4-to-1 by the government helps a lot, but it 
still a lot of work, because all of these projects are - by definition - pretty risky 
and long-term bets. (…) I think the constraint on us mostly has been the cost 
share requirement, which is challenging.”  
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PM13 also added the disadvantage of not having any pre-existing industrial 
network, indicating a weak network failure: “If it's a project that you are 
interested in, and you want to send in a proposal, you need 20% cost share. If 
you don't have any established contacts with industry, trying to get that from 
industry is difficult.” 
6.1.2.2 Solving the cost share challenge 
When discussing how to provide the cost share, issues faced by the respective 
interviewees revolved around duplication of federal funds, finding someone to 
provide the cost share in time and especially ways to provide the cost share in-
kind, i.e. without having to come up with cash.  
Following their issues with duplication and company policy preventing outside 
investment, PM5 explained that one of the ways they used to get around it is to 
“work with a university and they can help cover some of that cost-share. They 
have multiple streams of money that they can leverage. They can just say: "Well, 
we just use the federal stuff here" and they can trade around. They can work 
their magic and they do a great job with that.” 
PM11 outlined a different workaround on the duplication issue using state grants: 
“While the federal government doesn’t want to give out two different grants for 
the same [project], that’s not the case with state money. So had the timing been 
right, I could have gone to a State of California agency, the California Energy 
Commission does a lot of grants with new technologies (…) These are small 
grants. People use those grants as cost share. It’s not enough money for them 
to use the grant for anything practical, [but] a few hundred thousand dollars is 
enough for the cost share for 2-3 million from the federal government. (…) State 
grant money does not count as duplication. It might as well be a private source, 
as far as the federal government is concerned.” 
PM11 also highlighted that while ARPA-E technically requires the cost share to 
be in place when announcing the award, the agency can exercise some 
flexibility on that timing: “ARPA-E will bend the rules now and then and give you 
more time to raise the cost share. And if the program gets delayed before it 
starts, by six months, it's OK. The program doesn’t start on day one anyway. (...) 
Before actually working out the contracting, they make the public 
announcements about who is getting the awards. Then you are basically publicly 
married, and you have to find a way to work it out. But theoretically we should 
have already had the cost share money in our bank account by the time they 
make that public announcement. In our case, we didn’t. Not everybody does.” 
Several of the interviewees went into detail on in-kind cost sharing, in terms of 
providing the cost share through the depreciation of assets, paying below-
market salaries for the project team or supplying services at a discount. PM11 
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summarized the incentive behind meeting the cost share requirements in-kind: 
“So what some people will do is effectively [to] find non-cash assets that can [be] 
provided as cost share to get away with it.” PM12 expanded this notion after 
highlighting the discounted services option: “It was just a matter of finding the 
right thing that satisfies the requirement of cost share.” However, PM12 added 
that, while there is no cash involved, “(…) you have to show that you actually 
contributed 20% of the ‘cash', even though cash doesn't move around. That is a 
big challenge.” Interestingly enough, PM11 highlighted that intellectual property 
costs that normally would reach a USD15,000 funding limit in the ARPA-E 
contract, such as patenting costs, count towards the cost share (ARPA-E, 2012), 
elegantly bypassing the funding restriction on intellectual property while meeting 
the cost-share as well. 
After discussing whether it makes sense to allow in-kind cost sharing, PM13 
explained the rationale: “If you try get cash from a company, that's really difficult. 
If they can use their infrastructure, it is OK. Because otherwise you have to find 
that someplace else, maybe you rent it. That would be expensive, so it is real 
cost-share. It is just that it is not cash.” 
6.1.2.3 Is cost share good? The value of accountability 
Leaving the challenges associated with the cost share aside, both PM3 and PM6 
elaborated on whether it is something an agency like ARPA-E should retain. 
PM6 had no issues with the government wanting companies to share the risk, 
stating that “(…) the company has to be OK with providing its own cost share. 
That doesn’t give me any heartburn. If I'm the government, and the company is 
not willing to share the risk, it sounds like they’re not in the game.” 
PM3 made a more philosophical point on accountability to explain why he thinks 
the cost share is important: “I think that accountability is good for people, for 
companies. There is a conversation we had today in our ARPA-E meeting, "is 
the cost-share good?" Even ARPA-E balances this question, because it is not 
about the money, it is about accountability. I mean, their prerogative is to do the 
best thing for the technologies. They are making a choice to force companies 
have ‘skin in the game' because they believe it will be better for the projects. 
There is all that about accountability, and I think that having that is good.” 
 
6.1.3 Promoting a portfolio of technologies 
Besides the primarily financial part of ARPA-E’s funding role, PM3, PM7 and 
PM13 touched upon its potential role as a promoter of technology ecosystems 
(cf. sections 2.5.1, 4.1.1), whether complementary or interdependent in nature. 
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PM3 explained his perception of being part of a deliberate ecosystem conceived 
by his Program Director: “When our Program Director developed the program, 
he looked at the big picture: “What do we need to do for natural gas to be 
adopted, and what are the major problems?”, so he had already created that 
narrative for us. It forces upon us to see where we are in that landscape. We are 
part of [A], some are part of [B], some are part of [C] (...) they have done a really 
good job of developing a narrative that we are all going to then regurgitate and 
pitch and find out where we are. I think that is really important, and they've done 
a great job of that. Now I know "where am I in this ecosystem, what else needs 
to succeed? What is my competition, how far [from commercialization] are 
they?" Not on a specific level, but just on a technology level, like [technology X] 
compared to [technology Y].” 
PM7 was more specific, as his technology is directly dependent on another 
being developed: “All new technologies are dependent on other technologies, 
that is the problem. (…) We've got to make [a device with specific capabilities], 
and then you don't have a [material with the needed properties] to do that”, 
noting that “[Handling this issue] is something that ARPA-E did very well. They 
looked at all of these [technological] areas, and in each of these areas they had 
groups that are working.” 
PM13 connected this aspect of ARPA-E to the Program Director, who “(…) could 
see that if we fund these [projects], we get a very good complementary set of 
projects. (…) It is not only selecting projects because they're good, also because 
they fit well together as a program. (…) [the projects] can complement each 
other, so we can see ideas from different groups that (…) maybe two years from 
now, we are at a stage where we [can] collaborate. So that is something that the 
Program Director could see.” 
6.1.4 Project application, screening and selection process 
This section is focused on the process of applying for ARPA-E grants and the 
selection process as perceived by the applicants. The interviewees highlighted 
the two-step selection process and their thoughts on being able to reply to 
reviewers’ application comments. Additionally thoughts on the effect of the 
applicants’ proposal writing skills were discussed, along with the project 
application timeframe.  
The application process was summarized by PM6: “You submit a whitepaper, 
you are encouraged or discouraged, you submit the full proposal, you get 
reviewer comments on the full proposal, opportunity to respond, and then they 
decide.” PM6 further commented: “On multiple levels that seems to me to be a 
good structure. The agency has lots of opportunity to evaluate the merits of the 
proposed work.”  
42 
6.1.4.1 Two-step selection process  
The two-step structure of the application process was praised by the 
interviewees, as it reduces the risk of wasting a great deal of time if the proposal 
is outside what ARPA-E is looking for in the particular FOA. One interviewee, 
PM1, even claimed that she would not have applied if she had to go straight to 
writing the full proposal: “I think [the application process] is very effective, to 
have a pre-proposal, which doesn't take so much work to do, and then you get 
notified whether you are encouraged to submit a full proposal or not. That is a 
model that I absolutely endorse, because I never would have written a full 
proposal.”  
PM4 was of a similar experience, explaining why: “The full proposals take so 
long, that you really want to have a short concept paper, because if they can just 
tell you this isn't (...) sometimes it is not even that your idea is bad, so much as it 
doesn't fit into that piece of funding as there are certain structures around that. I 
think not having to go through the 100+ hours that it takes to put together a full 
proposal makes the concept paper very appealing.”  
PM8 supports PM4’s statement regarding the workload that would be wasted if 
not being granted an award, but also debates whether the process of only 
submitting a pre-proposal first might negatively affect the thoroughness of the 
selection process: “It saves you the trouble if they aren't interested in the pre-
proposal. I think it is good in that sense, since the proposals take an enormous 
amount of effort to put together. On the other hand, you never know what the 
screening mechanisms is for the pre-proposals, and it is possible that the 
volume of pre-proposals they get is so large that the screening is not very in 
depth, and that you could be tripped up by not having the right keyword” 
When PM10 applied for ARPA-E funding this mechanism was not in place. He 
described how he experienced the application process when the full proposal 
had to be submitted directly: “We had to write about 60 pages of material in 
about a month, with supporting financial statements. Mostly ‘going in blind’. And 
so it’s a fair amount of time and effort involved. I would say we spent the better 
part of 2-3 weeks more or less full-time doing this. Not just me, but a small team 
of us. Since then [ARPA-E has] have made it more efficient. Now they have a 
two-stage process.” 
In order to elaborate on the workload required by a full proposal, we include 
PM11’ explanation, which matches most of the comments of the other 
interviewees as well: “I worked full time for probably three and a half weeks on it. 
And full time for me is not 40 hours a week, it’s a lot more. So this is probably 
between two and three hundred hours of work by one person on an application”. 
PM11 explained that “one of the reasons it took so long time was because I had 
never done it before, and I did it by myself. It also took longer for me because 
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we have a new [product]” and further: “So I had a harder story to tell. It took up 
more space, it was longer. That is fine. It was worth doing it obviously, we got 
the grant. The other thing is, that level of detail would be required for someone 
to honestly evaluate if we were making stuff up or not”. PM1’s team had even 
used a professional proposal writer to help them with the formalities and format 
of the proposal to increase their chances, although they had taken on most of 
the writing themselves. 
6.1.4.2 Response to comments 
ARPA-E is systematically trying to avoid misunderstandings in the review-
process, as evidenced by the thorough review process highlighted by PM12: “So 
officially [ARPA-E has] a two-step screening process. Within this time period, 
[the] 6-7 months review period, I think we had at least 10 conference calls with 
them, just to try to make sure that they understand what we were talking about.” 
PM13 pointed out that ARPA-E, and now even other DOE agencies, offer the 
opportunity to “(…) argue, respond to the comments, and that's not only for show 
I realized. They really take that into account, the Program Director and his team, 
(…) and make the decision based not only on the reviewers' comments, but also 
on our response. I think in both our projects, our response to the reviewers’ 
comments have been really important. (…) Sometimes the reviewers just didn't 
get it.” PM13 also highlighted that the response mechanism could be essential 
for getting the award if there is one dominant person that influences the rest of 
the review panel.  
PM8 debated the actual influence his response had on ARPA-E’s decision, but 
appreciated the opportunity to respond. The initial peer review responses to his 
proposal didn’t seem to have considered it with proper rigor, and had been 
dismissive as a result: “We had the opportunity to respond to it, which we did. 
(…) it is hard for me to know how useful it was, but I was glad to have the 
chance to respond.” PM7 added that ARPA-E would challenge the content of the 
proposal as well, not just clarify potential misunderstandings. 
6.1.5 Critical award size 
An unexpected detail of the funding role that emerged in some of the interviews 
was the importance of the size of the award itself. We did not predict this result 
in advance, and therefore find it important to report. 
PM6’s support of this notion seems like a proper introduction: “(...) [ARPA-E] are 
more willing than most agencies to take big swings. They have more money, and 
that matters.” 
PM1 went into somewhat more detail, appreciating size of ARPA-E’s 
commitment in both funding and timeframe: “Maybe we could have found other 
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resources to build this, but just the sheer size of the award made it possible to 
create a momentum and an infrastructure (...) Essentially having them express 
their confidence that we could try something that was risky, and give us a big 
chunk of money to really give us the opportunity to do it. It could have been easy 
to make the mistake of saying "This is risky, so we just give you a little bit of 
money, and if you get something done, then we'll give you a little more", but I 
think that it is a critical activation energy, or a critical threshold.”  
PM11 presented thoughts in line with PM1, linking the size of the award directly 
with the potential achievements resulting from the funding opportunity: “The 
most important benefit is that ARPA-E is giving us enough money to succeed or 
fail. Whereas I said an SBIR is usually a small amount of money, we can't get 
much done. (…) Without ARPA-E it would have been impossible to raise that 
much money, all at once, to do it. That is a huge benefit. (…) I don’t need to 
worry about going out and asking for money every six months. So I get to focus 
on making [technology] that work.”  
PM2 put this into perspective by comparing the award size to the costs of 
performing applied research with the ambitious goals of ARPA-E: “It is relatively 
easy to get a couple of hundred thousand dollars, which in a laboratory like this, 
pays for half a year of somebody's time. That's good, but it doesn't make the 
kind of projects we are talking about happen. So ARPA-E is really the only 
money in the energy space that allows you to do those big jumps with enough 
money to really make progress.” 
 
 Legitimator role  6.2
 
While ARPA-E is still a young agency, our interviewees claimed that it is able to 
act as a legitimator. In this section, we have reported the recurring elements 
highlighted by the interviewees with regards to the legitimizing effects they may 
have experienced from receiving the ARPA-E award. We have grouped these 
results into three themes: The apparent risk reduction provided by being vetted 
and approved by ARPA-E, incoming interest from being associated with the 
ARPA-E name, and its value when reaching out. In some cases, the 
interviewees reported to not have seen much difference. 
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PM3 provided a frank conclusion on the legitimizing effect of ARPA-E, 
summarizing the opinions provided by most of our interviewees: “(…) [ARPA-E] 
legitimizes you, you can leverage that. They give you exposure for free.” 
6.2.1 Risk reduction through ARPA-E vetting 
How ARPA-E’s detailed proposal process and its two-stage review process had 
affected the risk and uncertainty perceived by parties that may have interest in 
investing in the project was brought up by some of the interviewees. 
PM7 pointed out that the vetting process ARPA-E employs is important, as it 
gives financial investors such as VCs a better understanding of the technical 
merits of the project: “I do think what ARPA-E projects do is it helps VCs to in a 
way have ideas vetted indirectly. Now, VCs are good businessmen, but they may 
not know all the technologies, and they are not sure whether they are funding 
the right groups. When you get a project from ARPA-E, they know that it has 
been checked out by people who know the area and so on. So that has been 
good for us” 
The awardees also get the legitimacy of the DOE, since ARPA-E is a DOE 
agency. PM4 highlighted that this makes it easier to pitch new ideas: “You get 
the funding for the unusual idea, but you also get the legitimacy of being 
supported by the Department of Energy. Especially because ARPA-E is so well 
thought of in the U.S. right now, it means that you can take this unusual idea and 
people will automatically assume that what you're saying is something that has 
some backing to it, especially because they are vetting us throughout the 
process.” 
PM11 relates the legitimacy brought on by being awarded funds from ARPA-E to 
his project’s ability to raise money from VCs. When his funding award was made 
public, PM11 suddenly saw renewed interest from a VC that had previously 
rejected the investment opportunity: “We heard you got the money from [another 
VC], would you rather have us invest instead?” PM11 elaborated: “That is what 
the ARPA-E name gets you. ARPA-E is believed, regardless of any other faults it 
may have, that they have such good technical expertise, that if they make an 
investment in something, it's actually interesting. So investors will look at us just 
because we have ARPA-E next to our name.” Despite this added legitimacy, 
PM11 also implied that the actual technical diligence a VC would go through 
before investing would be similar regardless of having support from ARPA-E: 
“The data I would show that VC would be data that I would have had to provide 
to them whether or not I got the ARPA-E program.” 
PM10 had had a similar experience, albeit with strategic partners: “This has 
been extremely valuable for us”. PM10 explained that “Early on, when we were 
still (…) writing the proposal for ARPA-E funding, there were a lot of people who 
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just dismissed our ideas as cranks. Almost calling us cranks. (…) It was even a 
challenge to get a [product] manufacturer to partner with us”. PM10 further 
explained that “as soon as we got ARPA-E funding, the floodgates for the 
[product] manufacturers opened. Which was very interesting to me. In fact 
literally hours after we got the funding announcement, the other [product] 
manufacturer sent me an e-mail“. 
Another potentially legitimizing factor brought up by PM12 and PM5 was the low 
share of applicants that actually were granted funds by ARPA-E, and that people 
remained cognizant of this fact. PM5 explained: “It was less than 1% that got 
funded, and people knew that. As a consequence people knew, if they selected 
you, then whatever you working on must have been really good“. 
6.2.2 Visibility  
The publicity and the visibility projects get from external parties by being granted 
an ARPA-E award was noted by all of our interviewees to some extent. For 
some, the visibility has resulted in new partnerships or other valuable 
connections.  
The case of being granted an award was expressed by PM1 to have “(…) been 
huge, and bigger than I expected”. The private company involved in her project 
saw a lot of new inquiries. PM1 pointed out that people seem to read the news 
of who get an award, even graduate students who apply for a job at the 
company. “The private company that is in our project, (…) they have gotten a lot 
of new inquiries (…) I think it has been very big for their business. It has been 
very big for me personally, and for members of our team, because it turns out a 
lot of people seem to read these news items of who got an ARPA-E award. I had 
no idea. For example, there are graduate students who apply to our department 
saying: “I would like to work with you, I’ve heard about this very cool ARPA-E 
project that you doing!”.” 
PM&PI9 experienced that being granted ARPA-E funds helped them with “(…) 
publicity in terms of having other people interested.” They also received inquiries 
from firms and researchers that saw the press release or other statements at the 
ARPA-E website. 
According to PM3, ARPA-E had actively made his project more visible for 
venture capitalists and industry professionals by advertising for the project: 
“[ARPA-E has] done a good job of advertising, so all of the major manufacturers 
have come knocking on our door. (…) The exposure is great, I think they do a 
good job of exposing projects to the various follow-on opportunities that are out 
there. They put your name on the call list of venture funds and of large 
corporations, and that is helpful”. 
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While PM8 received attention from investors, peers in related companies and 
from press who were interested in knowing what they were working on, he also 
stressed that it was too early to determine if the interest could translate into real 
partner opportunities for his project. 
PM12’s project got more recognition after being granted ARPA-E funds, “but not 
as much as we thought”. He received some calls and congratulations in the 
beginning, but also highlighted that people forget it after a while. PM12 said 
ARPA-E does more than other research agencies “because they tend to 
publicize all the information about the projects they are funding. It is a little 
different, for example DARPA, they don't publicize all the projects, it is a secret. 
So you don't get much public recognition”. However, PM12 felt that ARPA-E’s 
website could be more organized: “ARPA-E has their own website to pitch the 
technology, but there is just way too many things going on on the website.”  
PM5 said that his firm was approached by several other companies with varying 
interests, such as selling sub-products to use in the final product, scaling the 
product, partnering, licensing or buying the technology if it was successful. PM5 
also considered both the positive and negative effects of this added publicity: 
“There are two sides on every coin, if you are an ARPA-E awardee it is really 
good, you go out and get publicity and they give you publicity too, they feature 
you at the shows, they have this little thing on the website. The other aspect of 
that is that, if you don't want publicity, it is hard to be stealthy, and in the 
commercial world there are a lot of projects (…), where companies like to [stay] 
’under the radar' for several years before they actually make their appearance. 
So it's kind of the double-edge side of that, you are going to get publicity, but 
whatever you're doing is not going to be that secret anymore“. PM5 concluded: 
“ARPA-E definitely has a lot of good, I would say PR, at least right now, it may 
be changing over time, but for now it is kind of this new poster-child of a new 
way of doing business.”  
PM13 said that being a part of ARPA-E as a high-risk, high-reward project led to 
a lot of attention, as ARPA-E awards were in high regard. Overall he thought this 
had been positive for the project, as investors, industry and other researchers 
had contacted them, but he however pointed out that the publicity could be both 
positive and negative: “In this day of age if you get media-attention, people see 
some interesting projects, some industry reads about it, and there could be 
YouTube-video about it, people can get information. It can really generate a lot 
of good interest, bad interest too of course. (…) that's another thing that can 
backfire on you.”  
PM6 thought that the effect of added visibility generated from having an ARPA-E 
award would have a more decisive impact on smaller firms rather than projects 
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within a large company: “If we were a standalone company I think it would have 
a more decisive impact, than it does as a small piece of a larger company”. 
In addition to the above comments, many interviewees highlighted the added 
visibility and interesting opportunities generated at the annual Energy Innovation 
Summit, as detailed in section 6.3.3. 
6.2.3 Credibility 
According to our interviewees, ARPA-E not only helps their projects become 
more visible, but also gives them credibility when contacting external parties, 
e.g. other firms in their industry. Some interviewees from larger organizations 
also highlighted an increased internal credibility towards management. We 
highlight the statements dealing with these factors in the following sections.  
6.2.3.1 External credibility: Value in networking 
The benefits of being related to ARPA-E were commented on by 5 of the 
interviewee, highlighting the usefulness of leveraging the ARPA-E name in 
outgoing networking activities.  
PM12 felt that ARPA-E recognition helped the project getting credibility and 
when reaching out to other parties “(…) because people out there know how 
competitive this thing is (…) getting this project funded by ARPA-E really helps 
me get credibility in this area that is for sure. When you say I've got this ARPA-E 
funding, people go ’oh, wow’.” 
PM8 pointed out the value of the ARPA-E ’stamp of approval’ when reaching out 
to other entities, for a young and small organization such as his: “It gives us a 
legitimacy that we wouldn't otherwise have in a lot of folks’ eyes - it is a ’foot in 
the door', and that's been really valuable for us.”  
PM10 also stated that ARPA-E “gives you a lot of credibility once you get the 
funding”, which is something he leverages directly in conversations: “I’ve learned 
that I have to make that clear up front: “We have an ARPA-E award on this”.” 
When contacting other companies within the same industry PM&PI9 had also 
used the award as a pitch: “We have got ARPA-E funding, I want to talk to you 
about the project (...)”. While appreciative of the publicity, PM&PI9 did draw its 
actual impact in question, since a lot of companies in their industry are start-ups 
that might be more willing to listen anyway. PM&PI9 thought the same was true 
with academic researchers who “(…) are pretty willing to talk to you, and pretty 
willing to help with your issues. I have contacted a lot of researchers at 
universities, and for the most part, they are really open.” She further explained: 
“I've never actually had an issue, nor do I know of anybody who have had an 
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issue contacting another researcher with a problem, and then having them not 
be helpful.” 
PM11 commented on how the ARPA-E name was valuable in networking, 
despite being a fairly young agency: “Basically, having the ARPA-E name is 
really valuable for networking. Rightly or wrongly, ARPA-E has gained a lot of 
credibility technically, in spite of not being a very old agency. It basically opens 
doors for us”. 
PM2 related the credibility of ARPA-E to its political story of improving the energy 
security, improving the climate and creating jobs, concluding that: “I think the 
outcomes [of ARPA-E] have been good, and perhaps more importantly, the 
political story on it has been well accepted by everyone”. However, PM2 did not 
share the view of PM11 on the value of the ARPA-E name in a quality context: 
“ARPA-E is new enough that it doesn't have a reputation yet for producing 
products. So it doesn't create that kind of ’stamp of quality’. What it did do in its 
early years was it got a lot of venture capitalists connected to a lot of technology 
people, and there was a lot of interest there. They did a good job of that (…).” 
6.2.3.2 Internal credibility 
According to PM13, PM10 and PM6, ARPA-E did not only influence external 
parties, but could also help legitimize the project within the context of larger 
organizations. 
PM13 explained that it had helped him raise the cost share: “[My institution] has 
said they would provide that [cost-share] for ARPA-E projects, so they have 
provided the 5% cost-share because it is an ARPA-E project.”  
PM10 highlighted the appreciation of his award by the management of his firm: 
“[My company] has had an energy program going on for about 2-3 years, so 
ARPA-E has been on [our] radar for a while. In fact, we were the first project to 
be awarded ARPA-E funding [here], so [our] management was pretty pleased by 
that.” PM6 expanded on the internal credibility in a larger company: “(…) it is a 
great stamp of approval. (…) internally, it is also very helpful. I've seen this 
before in different contexts, (…) [if] you go off and win a government contract, 
particularly from a prestigious agency, it gives you more credibility within the 
company. So it's really both internally and externally, very helpful.” 
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 Network role 6.3
 
In this section we present results connected to the networking role of ARPA-E. 
The recurring topics discussed by our interviewees were how and the extent to 
which ARPA-E facilitated networking with parties outside ARPA-E, and how 
ARPA-E connected projects within ARPA-E and facilitated collaboration between 
projects where synergies could be made. In addition, our interviewees 
highlighted the annual Energy Summit hosted by ARPA-E as an important topic. 
6.3.1 External networking role: Connections to experts, industry 
and potential customers 
All of our interviewees had some experience with ARPA-E’s role of networking 
the projects with external parties, typically commenting on its efforts to connect 
them to industry, customers, researchers, potential strategic partners, regulators 
or other entities within the DOE. Around half of the teams we spoke to had 
positive experiences with ARPA-E’s external networking efforts. PM10 provided 
a suitable conclusion corresponding to the general impression: “Not all 
connections will work out. So I would say ARPA-E connections in general tend to 
have a higher hit rate than the average networking event.” 
6.3.1.1 Connections with industry 
PM5, PM1, PM11, PM4 and PM8 had experienced that ARPA-E helped them 
connect with industry, indicating that these connections related positively to 
commercialization efforts and provided resources external to the project.  
PM5 felt that ARPA-E mainly connected the project with industrial entities, and 
associated that with ARPA-E’s focus on getting the products commercialized. 
PM4 explained that ARPA-E introduced her to relevant big companies to talk 
about commercialization. PM8 was of a similar opinion: “They are making 
connections for us where they have good ones to offer, and (...) helping to 
brainstorm on potential companies to approach even if they don't have personal 
connections there. They are definitely engaged in that, and it is very important to 
them that we have that plan in place.” 
PM1 perceived it as helpful ARPA-E had industry contacts it encouraged them to 
connect with: “They have contacts from people in private industry, and they'll say 
"You should call so and so at whether it is at Siemens, or ABB, or Alstom", or 
whoever, "Here is your contact person", so we can go straight to the right 
person. I think that have been really helpful.”  
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PM11 noted that not all of the connections gave concrete results, but highlighted 
that ARPA-E made a good effort to help the project get in touch with the people 
they needed: “If we need introductions in industry, whether it is a strategic 
partner to help us make some little lab equipment, or get some material, or to do 
the market development, the business development. They make these 
introductions when I need them. Not all of them pan out, but they are definitely 
doing work to try to help us there.” PM11 also pointed out that ARPA-E’s ability 
to connect the projects to relevant industrial entities depended on the Program 
Director’s previous experience in that industry, arguing that Program Directors 
with academic backgrounds (such as university professors) would be unlikely to 
have similarly large networks to leverage. 
PM2 had a somewhat different opinion on the usefulness of ARPA-E in finding 
industrial partners for the projects, and stated that ARPA-E hadn’t helped his 
project at all in getting the industry connections they had. He explained what he 
thought was the reason for this, underpinning the importance of personal 
relationships: “ARPA-E would like to be able to help with things like that, but it is 
so dependent on personal relationships that it is very hard to de-personalize 
technology. When you guys talk to me about this technology, you have a general 
idea about what I'm doing, right? But you don't know if I can pull it off, and if you 
had USD3m to invest in me, you'd be [thinking] "I don't know if I want to invest 
my three million dollars there, do I want to spend it somewhere else?" It is a lot 
of one-on-one, and you have to have experts, spend a lot of time, and ARPA-E 
has a hard time, they can't send out a brochure and convince somebody to 
spend millions of dollars doing something. So, it is still individuals working with 
that.” 
6.3.1.2 Connections with customers 
Two of the interviewees, PM7 and PM11, talked about ARPA-E in relation to 
getting connections with customers. Both of them saw limitations in the extent to 
which ARPA-E could reasonably facilitate such relationships. PM11 commented 
that even though many of the people in ARPA-E have useful connections they 
could introduce the project to, it would be outside their responsibilities to perform 
the business development work of establishing customer relationships: “A lot of 
the people in ARPA-E are coming from industry, so they can make connections 
for us. They don’t really have a lot of leverage, basically to get us real resources. 
They are not going to do the business development work. That is our job to do. 
But I would say they a provide support role just for meeting people. And that’s 
helpful.” 
PM7 pointed out that customer relationships had to be built by talking to the 
customer one-on-one, and explaining how the technology works. He didn’t 
believe that was something a government agency or any third-party could do, 
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because the developer would have to be there to control and tailor the flow of 
proprietary information according to the needs of the particular customer.  
6.3.1.3 Connections with experts 
PM1, PM&PI9, PM4 and PM12 commented on ARPA-E’s efforts to help them 
identify and connect with experts if they met challenges they were unable to 
solve with their internal competencies.  
PM4 explained that they had met difficulties finding experts on a specific material 
they needed, something they didn’t have in-house, but upon asking ARPA-E for 
help, they would connect them to someone. 
PM&PI9 were of a similar perception: “If I had any issue that was really blocking 
something that we wanted to do, they were very willing, and probably able to 
make the connections for us.”  
PM12 pointed out that even though the ARPA-E team was knowledgeable in the 
basic science of what he was working on, they didn’t possess the level of 
expertise necessary to help them with technical challenges. Similarly to PM&PI9, 
the ARPA-E team was nevertheless very helpful in suggesting experts the 
project could contact to get advice or technical suggestions. PM1 also 
expressed this opinion. 
6.3.1.4 Other connections 
Some of the interviewees also talked about other types of entities ARPA-E were 
bringing into a networking process. PM10 mentioned that the technology they 
were developing would need to be approved by regulatory bodies, which were 
following the development process and had representatives present in the 
program conferences. PM3 went into more detail: “As the technology develops 
we will be working in parallel with the certification bodies. ARPA-E has done a 
pretty good job of, during their annual meeting especially for this project, trying 
to bring those people into the loop, the companies that write certifications and 
the government entities that approve them” 
PM10 commented on ARPA-E’s efforts to facilitate the funding hand-off by 
connecting the project to other government funding sources: “There are actually 
some related programs going on in DOE and DOD. And so we’ve got initial 
connections to those people. We had initial discussions. In fact in January when 
we had the [program name] annual meeting, they arranged a closed-door 
meeting for us with government Program Directors from various DOE and DOD 
agencies. (…) It is still too early to talk about a crystal project follow-on.” 
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6.3.2 Internal networking role: Knowledge sharing in the ARPA-E 
project portfolio 
A large majority of the interviewed projects mentioned the efforts ARPA-E 
undertakes to connect the projects in its portfolio. Recurring topics included how 
leveraging complementarities among the projects could create synergy effects, 
the role of the Program Director in facilitating connections between the projects, 
and experiences regarding the program conferences.  
6.3.2.1 Synergy effects between ARPA-E projects: sharing 
complementary knowledge  
Eight of our interviewees the interviewees highlighted that the efforts made by 
ARPA-E to connect different projects together had created opportunities to share 
experiences or help each other where they had complementary competencies. 
PM&PI9 pointed this out during the interview: “They did a good job on 
networking, bringing people together - maybe they have similar problems, similar 
solutions or helping each other out with solutions.” 
PM7 experienced that when his project needed a special design for a 
component, ARPA-E had introduced him to another ARPA-E project that was 
developing that specific technology and advised him to contact them. The 
connection worked out very well, and he pointed out that he would never have 
gotten in touch with that project if it wasn’t for ARPA-E.  
PM4 and PM12 also talked about how many of the various ARPA-E projects are 
complementary and can be connected to a larger ecosystem of technologies: 
“There are a lot of other ARPA-E projects, they connect us to any projects they 
think might complement our technology, because a lot of the technologies are 
just one piece of a larger system. That has been really great, to build up a whole 
community of scientists in this space. It is especially encouraging when you 
realize how enabling your technology might be for someone else.” (PM4) 
“When we have a technical challenge, if we don't have any experts within the 
team, we just call ARPA-E and ask for help, so they get us hooked up with the 
experts they have in-house or within their projects. They constantly talk about 
how all the different projects that are independently moving forward can actually 
be unified to make it larger.” (PM12) 
6.3.2.2 The role of the Program Director in facilitating connections 
Three of the projects pointed out the central role of the Program Director in 
facilitating helpful connections and interactions between projects. As PM13 
explained: “So we have these different performers, and then after a while you 
meet them at different venues, the big summit and so forth. And after a while you 
start collaborating, and much of that is facilitated by the Program Director. (...) 
54 
since [the Program Director] has an overview of the entire [program], they see 
what other groups are doing, and they see where you can have synergies, 
where you can work together.”  
PM3 had experienced helping another project upon request by the Program 
Director: “[The Program Director] often comes to meetings and pitches problems 
that [other projects are] having, and we've actually helped solve one of the 
problems that one of the groups was having, because our expertise is in a place 
that they didn't necessarily have. We're happy to do that, I think that the 'rising 
tide will float us all' in that area.” 
In a similar vein, PM2 explained how the Program Director would help other 
projects solve issues they were bound to encounter by knowing about issues 
other groups had encountered before. PM2 exemplified how his project had 
solved a challenge that others in his program were likely to meet as well, and the 
Program Director had then asked the other projects how they had planned to 
deal with that particular issue, essentially sharing knowledge without revealing 
any critical information. 
6.3.2.3 Program conferences 
One of the efforts that were brought up by many of our interviewees was the 
biannual program conferences that ARPA-E Program Directors arrange for 
projects within the same programs. 
PM2 describes these events as a valuable arena to share knowledge and helpful 
insights: “Something that has been incredibly valuable is that little cadre of 
people who got funding in the [program name] program would get together twice 
a year. We talk about each other's projects, we'd have dinner together, we'd just 
chat, "what is the problem, what are we doing, how are we solving that", that 
was incredibly useful because you created this little ’user group' of people who 
had a shared set of challenges, working with a similar set of rules and had sort 
of established themselves” 
PM&PI9 also highlighted the efforts made by ARPA-E to have the projects share 
experiences and potentially help each other at the program conferences: “I think 
they were working very hard, trying very hard, especially in those meetings twice 
a year, to have those twelve groups in one room, and say "Do you have a 
problem, or does anybody have a solution? (…) Help each other out." They were 
doing very well there, I think.” 
The close relationship built through these meetings was highlighted by PM3: “I 
see the people who are running all the projects [the Program Director] funds 
every year, twice a year. So I know all of those guys, I know all of the projects 
[working on the same area of technology] that are funded through ARPA-E. I 
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know the project leaders by name. We have had some friendly technical 
relationships with several of the groups, and I think that's facilitated pretty well by 
[the Program Director].” 
Contrary to the other interviewees, PM5 expressed that there were limited 
potential for real outcomes of interacting with other the projects due to issues of 
propriety knowledge and intellectual property: “I don't think there was any 
conversation with any of these performers that gave me enough insight to come 
back and actually solve a hard technical problem that I was working on. And to 
really go that deep of a dive can get very (...), I think very proprietary.” PM5 
elaborated: “You get the connections with other technologies, like it seems like 
they are doing, but it may be harder to protect your IP then, if you're doing that. 
Basically it's great to share stuff, at the same time people only share ‘so much’, 
because of potential IP [issues]. Because of that, I just feel like (...) if you don't 
really share that much it is really not that valuable.(...) as far as I know there is 
not a lot [of collaboration between projects], and a lot of that revolves around IP. 
(...) I am sort of new to the whole commercial world, and I didn't realize how 
complicated some of this things could be. The lessons that we learn, may 
actually help somebody else's project, but for some reason, you can't tell them.” 
PM1 also brought up the potential issues of sharing delicate information, noting 
that ARPA-E doesn’t force the projects to share information with others: 
“[ARPA-E] are very explicit about how we should have a plan for managing our 
intellectual property, and we can file patents and [so on], so we have no 
requirement to share things. There is certainly encouragement to have collegial 
collaboration, but I've not felt any pressure to reveal anything that I would not 
want to reveal.” 
Another aspect related to these conferences is that they are mainly relevant for 
projects in focused programs. For some projects in Open FOAs, there are not 
necessarily any related projects, and in those cases the potential benefits of 
having complementary projects within ARPA-E may be unavailable. PM8 
detailed this matter: “We were part of the Open FOA. When they have (...) 
awardees that are all part of a [focused] program, they have these regular get-
togethers and they all share results. It is not really relevant for us, because we 
are in this open group, and the other people that were funded in the open group 
are all working on these very disparate technologies.” ARPA-E is however trying 
to work around this problem whenever possible, as he continued explaining: 
“That said, (…) there is a new program that has been funded that does overlap 
more with our area. I don't think they've had any of their meetings yet, but last 
time that our Program Director was out here, he was saying maybe it would be 
good to invite us to attend those meetings, just so we can network with the other 
folks in that program. So they are looking for those opportunities, I think.” 
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6.3.3 ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit 
Several of the interviewees brought up the ARPA-E annual Energy Innovation 
Summit as a positive networking event organized by ARPA-E.  
PM10 described the basics of the Summit: “As part of our contract we are 
required to attend the summit every year. (…) At the Summit they have a lot of 
high-level overview talks, and then there is this industrial exhibition kind of thing, 
which they call the technology showcase. Every awardee is required to have a 
booth, and then they also open that up to other companies that don’t have 
awards, but most of the people who are there are awardees. And they invite a lot 
of industry people, so it’s a good two-day window to show off your technology to 
everyone” 
The Summit was regarded by many as an opportunity to give their projects 
exposure, highlighting the incoming interest from people approaching their 
booths, as PM11 explained: “Over the course of three days a hundred people 
are going to come up to me and ask: "Hey, what are you about? I heard about 
you, what’s going on?" And some of them will be interesting.” The same was true 
for PM&PI9: “We had to man the booth, but it is fun to talk to people, have 
people come up that are interested in your program”.  
PM13 was of a similar opinion, highlighting the industry-specific interest: “I think 
it is fun, it's so many representatives for industry there, and they get interested.” 
PM11 also brought up this point, highlighting its potential importance for the 
future success of his project: ”All these other guests from industry are going to 
come and see you, and it’s basically (…) [ARPA-E is] forcing you to get out of 
your daily routine and make connections that will help you be successful later. 
It’s an investment for ourselves to go to these things.” 
ARPA-E also tries to attract venture capitalists to the Summit, as explained by 
PM&PI9: “[ARPA-E] really gear it towards having Venture Capital there, (…) a lot 
of the companies for the other programs are really trying to get funding for their 
technology, and I think that is a good forum for those introductions.” 
PM11 mentioned that they had experienced getting interest from investors 
through the Summit, and PM12 commented that ARPA-E invited potential 
customers to the Summit to facilitate to talk about potential cooperation.  
PM7 saw the Summit as an opportunity to connect with the other ARPA-E 
projects he could possibly work with: “[At the Summit] you can see all the 
projects everyone are doing. That gives you a pretty good idea of with whom you 
want to interact with.” 
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PM8 experienced the Summit as an event where one could actively make useful 
connections: “[The Summit] was a good networking opportunity for us. Our 
Program Director definitely went out of his way to find people that he thought 
would be useful to us and sent them over to us to make connections, which we 
also really appreciated.” 
 
 The role of the Program Director 6.4
 
In this section we present results related to the role and qualities of the Program 
Director. The two main topics discussed by the interviewees were the 
importance of the Program Director having a certain level of industrial 
experience and academic expertise in the general technology area of the 
projects and how the empowerment of the Program Directors affected the 
projects.  
6.4.1 Experience and expertise of the Program Directors 
The importance of the Program Directors having some level of experience and 
expertise relevant to the technologic field of the project was highlighted by a 
large majority of our interviewees.  
PM3 succinctly summarized the opinion of our interviewees: “Our Program 
Director, for example, he has a PhD, he ran a start-up [and] got a bunch of 
money, similar to us. He knows how it is to have a budget, have milestones, 
spend the money.” 
6.4.1.1 Expertise and experience as a prerequisite for fulfilling the 
Program Director responsibilities 
PM13 was one of the interviewees that commented on the importance of having 
an experienced Program Director: “We've been lucky. Maybe we all have. Our 
Program Director (…) is extremely knowledgeable (…) That is important, 
because otherwise it is difficult for them to be authoritative.” He followed on by 
saying their Program Director had a relevant background in their field of 
technology, noting: “That is almost a given, because they pitch for the DOE and 
Congress. And if they don't have the credibility, nothing would come out of it. So 
it is very important that the Program Directors are knowledgeable.”  
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PM3 also connected the competency of the Program Directors to the decision of 
awarding funding: “[Our Program Director] gave us the money because he felt 
that we had a rigorous physics argument (...) and he appreciated that because 
he is from that particular background. I think you have to have a Ph.D. in some 
technical field to be a Program Director at ARPA-E.” 
PM11 said that having the right background was crucial for the personal 
credibility of the Program Directors: “Without that [level of expertise] it would be 
really hard for us to have confidence in any feedback they give us.” He also 
added that the industrially experienced Program Directors usually have useful 
networks in addition to the scientific expertise: “We’ve gotten some really 
technical people, but they also have pretty good industry connections. (…)There 
are definitely people at ARPA-E that are professors. (…) Technically they may be 
fantastic, but they are not going to have the same industry connections as the 
personnel that we happen to be working with.” 
6.4.1.2 Program Director’s support of projects 
While most interviewees found it important that the Program Directors had a 
certain level of expertise in the technology area of the project, they weren’t 
experts, but were still able to provide some level of support in the technology 
development process. PM11 noted: “They have worked in the industry before. 
They get it. They don’t know the details because we are the ones making new 
things here, but the feedback they give is generally on target.”  
PM6 thought that the Program Directors having a certain level of technical 
expertise created a better foundation for having a useful dialogue: “We certainly 
don't rely on their expertise to solve our problems. We are the experts, we will 
solve our problems. However, having them have some level of expertise I think 
puts them in a stronger position to dialogue with us. To understand the 
significance of what we are doing, and also understand that ’such and such' an 
obstacle is a small obstacle, versus a large obstacle, or vice versa. So I would 
say it's helpful having that technical competence.” 
PM12 also perceived that a high level of technical knowledge was helpful, even 
though they weren’t experts. He added on that the Program Director would 
suggest people to talk to if they needed technical expertise: “All the folks over 
there [at ARPA-E] have a PhD in engineering or science, so they know all the 
basics. But they are not particularly experts in the area we are pursuing here. 
But I quite often call them and ask, "Do you know somebody who knows this 
stuff well?" so I can get a quick feedback or technical suggestion. They actually 
give us a couple of names quickly. That has been very helpful.” 
PM10 explicitly found it useful that the Program Director had a more general 
insight in the technical area of the project: “Both of [our Program Directors] had 
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worked on [relevant] technologies before, and have PhDs. So they had expertise 
very relevant towards what the program was about. (…) At the same time they 
were sort of outsiders, because their expertise was in [specific technology], and 
not necessarily in management of [specific technology]. And that has also been 
useful. Because often for a breakthrough, you need someone who is not in the 
daily grind of things.” 
PM2 related the technical insights of the Program Manager to his ability to 
perform his responsibilities in managing the projects: “I think [our Program 
Director] is a good example of somebody who knew enough about the process, 
and knew enough about chemical engineering to be a good manager and 
advocate and evaluator. He would listen to all of these things, and say "that 
makes sense, that doesn't make sense" and bring good things forward.”  
PM2 then connected the level of experience to the risk of having the Program 
Director steer or micromanage the project too much: “I have seen some other 
programs within ARPA-E where the Program Director knew too much, and 
walked in with a really specific idea of what he thought that area should look like. 
[ARPA-E] basically focused the entire program on one very high-risk aspect of 
the approach that they could take, and it was one that the Program Director was 
familiar with and liked a lot. (…) That isn't necessarily good, so what you want to 
have are people that are really competent, but not necessarily world experts in 
that area.” PM&PI9 had personally experienced that lack of technical contributed 
to the Director forcing the development process in a direction they didn’t 
perceive as viable, because the ARPA-E team didn’t really appreciate the 
difficulty of what they expected them to do. Results on the broader issue of 
ARPA-E representatives possibly exercising undue influence on the projects are 
presented in section 6.5.1.3. 
6.4.2 Responsibilities of the Program Director 
Several interviewees brought up the empowerment of the Program Directors, as 
discussed in 3.4 and 4.2.1.2, and how it is related to their motivation to help the 
projects succeed.  
The level of investment the Program Directors put in supporting and driving the 
projects towards success was highlighted by some of the interviewees. PM13 
related this to the fact that the Program Directors stand responsible for the 
projects they choose: “ARPA-E is very involved in the projects; they support it 
not only financially, but also management-wise. Some people would call it 
micromanagement because they're really involved. [This is] because they [the 
Program Directors] pitched for their projects. So the Program Director for our 
program, pitched for the concept of this program at DOE. I think there are 10 
performers in this program. If all of them were to fail, it would be a failure for the 
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Program Director and the whole team. So they want all the projects, at least 
most of them, to work, so they are very involved.” 
PM8 found the empowerment of the Program Directors as a positive 
characteristic, as this enabled a deep level of involvement when combined with 
their expertise: “The thing that I think is best about [ARPA-E] is the quality of the 
Program Directors, and the freedom and flexibility that they are given to use their 
own technical judgment in advancing the projects. 
PM5 had also taken notice of the passion and drive the Program Director had for 
his projects, and found it different from other government agencies: “[Our 
Program Director and Scientific Advisor] love what they're doing, and they like 
working on the cool technology, but I've never seen anybody work so hard as 
those guys. It is very different for a government agency as well.” 
 
 Management and support of projects in ARPA-E 6.5
 
6.5.1 Support and monitoring: A part of the project team 
In this section, we present the major topics emerging from our discussions about 
ARPA-E’s monitoring and support regime. This was an important subject for our 
interviewees, who devoted a quite significant amount of time to describe their 
impressions and experience with ARPA-E in this context. Particular interest was 
given to ARPA-E’s initial negotiation of the project, the use of milestones and 
their part of the project planning and negotiation, the quarterly reporting and 
reviews, the project management style and interaction with the ARPA-E teams, 
as well as overhead issues and time constraints associated with these 
characteristics. 
6.5.1.1 Acceptance and negotiations before final commitment 
The process of negotiating the project deliverables and milestones before final 
approval of the project was discussed fairly extensively by some of our 
interviewees, as we reveal in this section. 
PM11 highlighted that the negotiation was split into two parts; the technical goals 
and the budget, both of which would be decisive for the funding award. For the 
negotiation of milestones PM11 had used the technical objectives from the 
proposal as a basis. He also experienced that ARPA-E didn’t just approve the 
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milestones and the budget, but also contributed to make it more accurate: “Then 
you go through all the parts of the budget you submitted. They’ll say "We have 
already funded 20 [similar] companies. You guys forgot this thing, put it in.” or 
“We don’t think you have enough personnel on that project, it’s a hard project, so 
put more people there" and you don’t get all that done in one day in person. 
They usually say “go figure this out”, and within a week or two, you got it worked 
out and send it back to them, and they say “Yes, this makes sense”.”  
The negotiation process of the milestones was given considerable attention by 
our interviewees. PM10, PM11, PM8, PM13 and PM5 felt that ARPA-E had 
pushed for more aggressive milestones, while both PM1 and PM12 saw the 
negotiations oriented towards practical feasibility. 
PM10 summarized the process neatly: “During the award negotiations they 
made us come up with a list of milestones for every quarter. (…) You go through 
a negotiation with them as towards how the milestones should look like and what 
they should be at different phases of the project. They push you to make them 
quantitative and aggressive.” PM5 made a similar statement. PM11 elaborated 
on the last point, stating that “ARPA-E will drive us to set impossibly hard 
milestones, because they know we are going to work really hard. (…) We're only 
going to get two thirds of it done. But if we had started with less ambitious goals, 
we would only have gotten two thirds of that done. Because you get complacent, 
it's human nature. So they’ll come in and they will try to negotiate you to 
basically an impossible amount of success.”  
In PM13’s case, the negotiations had ended in milestones that were too 
aggressive and which were renegotiated later. PM13 said it was “(…) quite an 
ordeal to reach an agreement [on the milestones] and after a while we felt like 
we basically gave up and let them win. (...) You could renegotiate, which we 
have done. We think they were a little bit too high.” 
Knowing that ARPA-E could push for more aggressive goals, PM1 did not want 
to promise too much initially, and then experienced that ARPA-E adjusted the 
proposed milestones in a more feasible direction: “[ARPA-E] might push us to do 
a little more in some areas.(…) In our case they actually encouraged us to 
promise less in one of the performance areas. That was interesting; they really 
wanted to help us make realistic promises.” She also highlighted that the 
negotiations “took a long time, there were many iterations back and forth.” 
Having proposed a very ambitious proposal, PM12 experienced the same push 
towards realistic goals as PM1: “We requested 36 months, but they [ARPA-E] 
cut it down to 24 months by cutting 50% of what we proposed.(...) What they did 
is actually very, very helpful, because we were over-enthusiastic. (...) I think they 
want to make sure that things actually happen. Because of the research money 
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situation in the U.S., professors at university tend to over-promise to attract 
money. (...) So they try to make it realistic, something that is practically possible.” 
6.5.1.2 Milestones and project evaluation 
The overall impressions on the use of milestones were comparable across the 
group of interviewees, although some reported somewhat mixed experiences 
with regards to the flexibility exercised by their Program Directors on non-critical 
milestones. Missing’ go-no-go’ milestones however, are generally considered a 
reason for suspension or cancellation of the project, and some highlighted that 
ARPA-E actively aborts non-performing projects, with PM&PI9 currently being 
suspended. Others also highlighted that the milestones, deficiencies aside, can 
be useful for coming up with accurate budgets and even as a supporting tool for 
managing their projects later on. 
Milestone flexibility 
Another frequently discussed matter along with the milestones, was the flexibility 
exercised by the Program Director in altering them underway. Ten interviewees 
expressed that, given appropriate justifications, ARPA-E had been flexible with 
regards to changing the milestones, e.g. by pushing deadlines, switching 
milestones around or removing irrelevant milestones altogether. Some also 
mentioned that ARPA-E acts proactively on changing the milestones by 
periodically assessing their relevance against the end goal of the project. Due to 
an overwhelming amount of material on this subject, we include only a selection 
of material in its original form in this section in order to maintain brevity. 
PM1 explained the flexibility exercised by ARPA-E in a clear fashion, largely 
equivalent to the statements of PM6, PM10, PM11 and PM7: “There was one 
milestone that we realized about half a year into it that it did not make sense. 
When we had written it, none of us realized that to do A, we really needed to do 
C first. And in one of the on-site visits we just said: "You know what, we need to 
do C before we can do A, can we push A back to month seventeen?", and they 
said "sure". And we did not go through a formal re-approval process. My sense 
is that they are flexible when it comes to [changing milestones because] we had 
a good reason.” PM2 added to this by explaining that ARPA-E had no qualms 
when he changed some milestones in order to better align with the overall goal 
of the project. PM3 highlighted the predominant focus on success: “I have a set 
of milestones that I agreed on with my Program Director at the beginning, but if I 
think that they should change, I talk to him, they change. (...) They're very 
flexible. They just want to see success.” 
PM10, PM11, PM5 and PM8 added to this flexibility by highlighting that their 
ARPA-E teams were flexible in terms of assessing the continued relevance of 
the original milestones. PM10 was “(…) a little concerned promising milestones 
for three years at the outset. But they [ARPA-E] have shown flexibility at the end 
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of the year review as to whether the milestones that you promised at the start 
still make sense one year in, based on what you’ve learned. So they’ve shown 
some flexibility on renegotiating at the end of the year. That’s useful. Because in 
a three-year high-risk, high-reward project, things are bound to change as you 
learn.” The same was true for PM11. PM5 made a statement in a similar vein, 
explaining that his ARPA-E team would alter milestones if new discoveries 
prompted a different direction. PM8 expressed gratitude for having a Program 
Director that proactively reassessed milestones: “We proceeded pretty much 
according to the original plan, but it has always been something that our 
Program Director has been careful about asking each time we meet, “do the 
milestones that we laid out still make sense? Do we need to make changes to 
these based on where things stand and what you've learned?” So I appreciate 
that flexibility”. PM8 also added that his project even includes reassessment of 
the milestones as one of the end-of-year milestones.  
PM5 highlighted that ARPA-E would try to alter the level of support depending on 
how the project was meeting the milestones, giving a few examples pointing to 
its networking role (reported in section 6.3.1.3): “The whole program is really 
milestone-driven, so you have some target at the end, but then they have tiny 
checkpoints and targets along the way. Depending on how we were hitting or not 
hitting those targets, would really change the level of support that they would 
need [to provide]. (…) They were like: "Okay, if you're not quite getting all the 
way there, what do we need to do differently? What kind of targets would make 
sense for this? If you're not hitting these targets, can they be achieved with 
getting another partner on board? (...) Is it something that has scientifically 
figured out first? When you understand that, then you can go into you 
engineering tweaks to actually make that work"  
As one of the two interviewees who expressed concern over the lack of flexibility 
in the milestones and review process, PM4 indicated that her milestones didn’t 
always match the actual timeline in her project, and that she did not see much 
flexibility in that regard: “I think the main constraint has been the scrambling for 
milestones occasionally, when the timeline isn't really matched up with what it 
would optimally be. That has been a little bit hard, it'll be a milestone that is kind 
of far out, and you can always stretch your time to that milestone, and then the 
next one will be really compressed. I mean that might just be the event flow of 
any company, but sometimes it would seem nice if you could move the 
milestones a little bit around. (…) Luckily, I think our initial milestones were 
framed in such a way that it hasn't been grossly off. It has just been some times 
we wished we could've pushed them one way or another.” In line with PM5, PM4 
also added that “if you miss something, it is not so much as they take away your 
funding, they try to give you extra resources so that you can get back on track. 
They try to connect you to the right people.”  
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The other project team having issues with flexibility was PM&PI9. Discussing 
this matter in retrospect of being suspended from ARPA-E support, they 
highlighted opportunity cost as well: “I think some of the drawbacks are that, 
despite being a little bit flexible, it wasn't flexible enough for us to really get the 
full benefit of what the technology potential could be. We are private company. 
[Receiving ARPA-E support] is not necessarily just funding, it is opportunity cost 
for us. [The Principal Investigator] could be working on something else with his 
time, even though we are getting funding, him working on this project means that 
he is not working on another project. No more do we want to work on a project 
that is a dead-end, just to prove out some sort of hypothesis that we had. That is 
not our business model. (…) We were in that middle ground of “well, it is 
working, just not as well as we hoped”. It would have been nice if we had some 
flexibility to try some other things that maybe could've gotten us to that goal.” 
‘Go, no-go’ milestones and funding cut-offs 
While most of our interviewees had the same impression of flexibility on 
milestone changes, seven interviewees emphasized ARPA-E’s firm attitude 
when it comes to the critical milestones, the ’go, no-go’ decision points, and the 
end goals of the projects. 
After emphasizing his appreciation of ARPA-E’s flexible approach, PM7 
moderated his comment somewhat by highlighting the result orientation: “They 
are flexible about micro-tasks, but they are focused about the end-goals. So you 
just set up that you've got to do this, that they won't change. You can take 
different paths, but you've got to go there.”  
PM1 eloquently stated that “There are ‘go, no-go’ milestones along the way, so if 
you can’t meet certain performance criteria they might cut you off.” PM10 
corroborated PM1’s statement: “At the end of the year they have some defined 
’go, no-go’ milestones. If you don’t meet those there is the possibility that your 
project might need major renegotiation, or that it might be cancelled.” PM3 
articulated a similar view, and both PM10 and PM2 gave examples on ARPA-E 
cutting funding for non-performing projects. 
The best example of funding being cut off was however provided by PM&PI9, 
which had been suspended from their program relatively recently: “(…) we're on 
probation, we're suspended from ARPA-E, because we didn't meet milestones.” 
PM&PI9 explained that after having struggled to meet critical technical 
milestones due to unforeseen scientific issues and probably staying too long on 
the same course, both ARPA-E and themselves came to the conclusion that 
pursuing the project further would be a waste of time and effort, suspended the 
project and cut funding, referring to the opportunity cost argument highlighted 
earlier. 
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PM13 connected this accountability factor to ARPA-E’s public reputation: “If you 
don't make your ‘go, no-go’ decision points they cut the funding. (…) And that's 
part of why ARPA-E has such a good standing at Congress, because Congress 
doesn't like if the taxpayers’ money [is being wasted] (...), but here you see that if 
it probably doesn't work, they cut the funding.” 
Evaluation of milestones, project planning value 
To conclude the discussions on milestones, PM4 and PM10 shared their opinion 
on the usefulness of the milestones as well as highlighting their potential value 
as a supporting tool in managing their projects.  
PM4 succinctly opined that “I feel like there might be too many milestones, it 
would be nice if you could have some big milestones along the way, but you 
could fill in all the pieces as you go. Especially in the early stages. (…) there are 
a lot of milestones along the way. (…) If you can't ever change those milestones, 
maybe means that you're working to meet specifications that aren't your optimal 
pathway to the end goal. So that has been a little bit frustrating some times.”  
PM4 then elaborated on the usefulness of planning with milestones: “I think it is 
useful for a project to descope, I don't think we could have figured out what the 
budget was going to be without figuring out what the milestones were going to 
be ahead of time. Even if the timeline of when those milestones happen would 
change, I think the detail of which we set up our milestones was correct for the 
project, and the budget ended up being correct too. I think if you just say “oh, I 
think it will cost this much”, I'm not sure you get there as efficiently.”  
PM1 even highlighted the milestones’ value in project management: “[The 
milestone negotiations] left us with a pretty detailed plan that was helpful for 
managing the project; I think it is a helpful reference for managing the project. 
The intent is to help us be organized and succeed.” This notion was also stated 
by PM10: “I definitely had doubts about (...) the usefulness of a full list of 
milestones for three years. But in retrospect, it is actually useful. I will probably 
appreciate them even more after I'm done with the whole project. But, yes in 
retrospect you tend to appreciate those as project manager.”  
6.5.1.3 Project management style 
The project management style employed by the various ARPA-E teams was 
another subject that was given considerable attention in our interviews, usually 
discussed in close relation to the reporting and review format. Our interviewees 
had several opinions in common, especially with regards to the openness and 
flexibility of their relation to ARPA-E staff, as well as the ’non-bureaucratic’ nature 
of the ARPA-E teams’ involvement. Many connected their management style to 
their experience and professional and technical capabilities, and characterized 
them as a highly involved party, almost as part of the team, having a strong 
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desire to see projects succeed. There was some variance in perception, 
however, which is reflected in this section. Some interviewees also commented 
on the balance between active and passive direction from the ARPA-E team.  
Summarizing the general perception of most of the interviewees, PM3 shared 
his thoughts on ARPA-E’s motivation for the resource-intensity of the review 
process: “I think that underlying it all, they want to see market success. ARPA-E 
needs its projects to win, in order for it to continue to look good and to succeed 
and to continue to get funding.” 
Open, professional relationship 
PM1 described the professional relation with her ARPA-E team as open, yet firm: 
“They keep the tone of the relationship were much like they want to help us (…) I 
think they are open minded about if we have to change something in the 
milestones, but they are not inviting feedback [on the review frequency], it’s 
more like: "How is May 26th for a visit day, and plan us being there from 9am to 
3pm."  
PM7 commented on the approachability of the ARPA-E team: “The reviews are 
fairly (...) it is not like we have a ’fight’ with them, it is collaborative. (…) It is very 
open. At any time, if I am really in a crisis I can call them and get some 
response. That is very unique.” 
PM8 highlighted the strong relationship and the empowered Program Director as 
one of the primary benefits of receiving ARPA-E support: “(…) the relationship 
with the Program Director, which is a more close relationship than it is with other 
funders, has been really valuable in making connections, being able to talk 
openly about different potential technical paths and business paths, and get the 
support from the funder that, even if we want to change direction fairly radically, 
if we can make the case to him, then he can make the case to [the ARPA-E 
Director], and we can be funded to do ’that', instead of this. Knowing that we 
have that level of support has been really valuable.” PM8 concluded: “The 
monitoring has been much more hands-on than for any of the other government 
funded projects that we've had. It is good, I think.”  
PM4 explained how the positive experience exceeded her expectations: “When 
we started, we were worried about (...) them just making sure we're spending the 
money correctly and that we're doing everything right. I was a little worried about 
them being more of an oppressor. Instead it has been more of a partnership 
where they've been helping us. I don't know if everyone in ARPA-E has that 
experience, but we definitely had that with our particular team. (…) As the 
project developed and we created a relationship with them, (…) it has become a 
lot easier to work with them, because we aren't worried so much about telling 
them [about issues], we just tell them everything, and they help us out with 
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whatever they can.” PM6 elaborated on the open atmosphere in the review 
meetings: “When they've come here, they've typically spent five hours, reviewing 
progress with us. We're I would say very open with them, and I think they've 
appreciated that. You know, "here is what we have accomplished, here are some 
achievements, here are some setbacks, and here is what we're doing to catch 
up". It’s been good.”  
PM10 said that “Both [Program Directors] have been extremely good to work 
with. I actually enjoy the discussions on an intellectual level. (…) it’s not like they 
just give you the money and they are harshly judging at the end of the quarter. 
They actually work with you to make sure that the award is used smoothly, [with] 
the right level of questioning at the end of each quarter and challenging us 
intellectually. It’s been very good.” PM13 described a similar open relationship as 
PM4 and PM10, and elaborated: “(...) the further the projects have evolved, the 
more we see the benefit of this management [style], because they have an 
oversight that we do not have. My feeling in the beginning was that it was 
stressful, but we got used to it, and it actually works to your advantage after a 
while.”  
PM3 stated that “They [the ARPA-E team] are not entrenched in the bureaucracy 
of the government at all. They're very much on our side. (...) I think it is great that 
our Program Director feels like he is an advocate for our start-up, and that he 
benefits and is incentivized to have us win.” This impression of little bureaucracy 
was appreciated by PM12 as well: “I feel like they are a little different from other, 
traditional, government funding agencies. (…) I don't feel like I am dealing with 
government. It is very flexible and very helpful. One of the best government 
agencies I've ever dealt with.” 
Part of the team: Hands-on involvement in the development of the project 
When asked about the quarterly review and reporting process, the interviewees 
gave coherent answers on the quarterly reporting format, indicating a very 
detailed and standardized process for the written reporting of technical and 
financial status. With regards to the quarterly technical review meetings, there 
were some differences in the specifics of how they were executed in terms of 
varying the frequency of on-site reviews opposed to web or phone-conference 
based reviews. In this subsection, we expand on this context by reporting on the 
managerial style applied by the ARPA-E team. 
PM10 probably made the most sophisticated summary of the value of the 
intensive project management methods employed by ARPA-E, despite some 
annoyances in going through the various forms and details: “[The review and 
reporting process] is actually extremely valuable, because it forces you to think 
bigger, pause, and look back on what you did in the quarter, and it’s a good way 
to document things. It’s kind of a mixed blessing. I would say I find it useful to 
68 
have this quarterly [reporting] (...) In an ideal world we would get money from 
somebody, and they would just “forget” about us for three years then after three 
years they would ask what happened. But in the practical world, no. I don’t think 
it is too bad. I’ve heard of other funding agencies that require monthly reporting, 
which I think can get a little overwhelming. At that point you might spend half you 
time just reporting. I think quarterly is kind of a sweet spot.” PM10 also 
highlighted the project management value of the monitoring process: “It also 
helps me, because I lead a large team. (...) these quarterly reviews help me 
steer the team as to what is expected. It is very easy to get lost in the daily 
details, and lose sight of [objectives]. [Having the due dates of the report and 
review come up] kind of energizes the team around the short-term goals.”  
While personally liking the involved, hands-on management style, PM1 reported 
that “Some colleagues [on other ARPA-E projects] view it as being perhaps 
overly micromanaging or intrusive (…) I think it's more involved than some other 
agencies, it is a very ’hands-on style'. So far, I find it constructive. (…) I like to 
think that they are erring on the side of being very pushy in the beginning, but of 
course their intention is to help us succeed.”  
PM8 also commented on the high involvement in ARPA-E compared to other 
government programs: “(…) most of the other [government] programs don't have 
this level of involvement. Often the Program Director is overseeing a huge suite 
of different programs as well as doing their own research or their own policy 
work, and so it is really just a ’side thing' where there is a decision made to fund 
[the project], and they will read the reports and stamp your payment requests, 
but not really dig in at the level that the ARPA-E teams are. Certainly, this 
quarterly, in-person monitoring is something that is much more resource-
intensive than in the other program we've been in.” 
PM2 explicitly pointed out the impression of having ARPA-E as part of the team: 
“With ARPA-E you felt very much like you're part of a team. They're not just 
monitoring you, they're knowledgeable. The people who manage it, (…) they 
know about how to do these things. They know what the other teams are doing. 
They would say "this has been an issue for the other projects, how are you 
dealing with this? How is your formulation of approaching this problem?" There 
was real feedback.” PM5 highlighted the management style as particularly 
insightful and supportive, as the ARPA-E team would leverage their own 
industrial experience in technical discussions and ask: “what are the issues 
you're encountering, and do you have ideas of how to tackle those? If you don't, 
let's discuss it. Where you do have ideas, let's discuss them and see if there's 
anything that we can help or advise on.” 
Continuing PM2 and PM5’s impressions of useful discussions, PM12, PM7, 
PM11, PM8 and PM6 highlighted the benefits of having the ARPA-E team as ’full 
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partners’ in this context. While the actual results of the technical discussions 
varied, they appreciated that the ARPA-E team would occasionally ask the ’right 
questions’ and make suggestions that sometimes proved fruitful. 
PM7 and PM12 made similar appreciative comments about having the ARPA-E 
team as part of the project and the value of being asked the right questions, as 
PM12 highlighted: “They are very, very goal-oriented, and they really help us (…) 
to make sure we are on track, and we get closer to what we think is successful 
completion of the project. (…) they ask the right questions, and sometimes we 
get a technical suggestion from them. So it is a great experience. I am very 
happy to be working with them. (…) Other agencies (...) they don't say that they 
are part of this team, but the ARPA-E guys, they all say "we're all in the same 
boat". I think that is a very nice thing to hear.”  
PM8 and PM11 explicitly connected the management style to the technical 
capabilities of the ARPA-E team, as PM11 summarized: “[The in-person reviews 
are] actually probably the most helpful, because face-to-face they can 
understand things. I can explain and we can have this back and forth 
conversation about things they don’t understand in the quarterly report. (…) 
They have enough experience in our field of work that they’ll make suggestions 
that turn out to be useful. Some suggestions they make are good, some of they 
are not. (...) Occasionally we will get a pretty good idea from them. And that’s 
where it really pays off to have real experts doing this sort of job.”  
While not reliant on their technical support, PM6 made a similar statement: 
“Their style of operating is different, and I find it to my liking. The program 
officers want to be full partners in what you are doing, rather than just receiving 
reports [performing] ’pro-forma’ reviews. They're really engaged, and I think 
that’s helpful. (…) I wouldn’t say that they have helped to solve our problems by 
giving us pointers, we came up with that ourselves, but the discussions with 
them have been very positive and beneficial.”  
PM&PI9 on the other hand communicated a somewhat different perception of 
the nature of the review meetings than the other interviewees, experiencing a 
regime more towards monitoring than two-way interaction, indicating a mismatch 
of technical capabilities, as previously highlighted in section 6.4.1.2: “When [the 
ARPA-E team] came out, it was more monitoring, we would just give them a 
report on what had happened since the last time we had talked to them, and if 
they had suggestions, they would make them at that time. (…) I think [the 
project] was a little bit outside of their expertise. I mean, they had some 
suggestions some times. When you get to this high level, it is pretty detailed. 
You can't be an expert at everything.” 
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Undue influence: Making suggestions without instructing 
One of the emerging topics related to ARPA-E’s involvement in the projects was 
the balance of ARPA-E making suggestions while avoiding giving active 
instructions. PM5 gave an example of how the ARPA-E team would make 
suggestions if his project had run into issues: “[ARPA-E would say] “Maybe you 
should talk to companies about the design [of a specific component]?” It has to 
be generic, they can't just say: “Go talk to this company”. They would say: 
“Maybe you can find a company that could [help solve a specific technical 
problem]. You can take it from there and figure it out”.”  
PM11 also discussed this issue: “I don’t know all the laws that go into why these 
things are the way they are, but for whatever reason they’re not allowed to tell us 
what to do. It is deemed as sort of an undue influence of the activities of the 
projects, and that can cause problems somewhere in the government 
bureaucracy. I don’t know the details. So they are limited in the amount of quasi 
technical or consulting support they can give us.” 
PM6 mentioned that he believed that “(…) there are projects where as a 
consequence of the interaction between the ARPA-E Project Director and the 
team, the project has gone off in a significantly different direction. We have not 
done that. There have been tweaks to technical approach and so on, but our 
basic thrust has remained unchanged.”  
Interestingly enough, PM&PI9 speculated whether active direction could have 
been partly at fault for the under-performance and eventually the suspension of 
their project. After seeing that the planned approach was not viable, PM&PI9 
had proposed a different way of reaching the end-goal of the project: “From the 
beginning, what happened was that we tried something risky because they 
wanted something risky. And if [the first technologic path] had worked out, we 
would possibly use it for other things too. It didn't. I also feel like we wanted to 
abandon earlier with [the first technologic path], and [the ARPA-E team] really 
pushed us to stay the course with it and see if we could figure it out, because 
they really wanted that [result of succeeding in the first technologic path]. That 
sort of pushed us to stay on it for a little bit longer before really insisting that we 
needed to go to something that we could do.” 
PM&PI9 even highlighted that they had taken a different approach already 
before being awarded support due to feedback from ARPA-E representatives 
during the application process: “Our first application actually targeted [X], and 
then (...) during the application process (…) they [ARPA-E] actually had some 
comments that they thought [X] wouldn't be a good [way to reach the target], so 
we actually changed that to [Y].”  
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6.5.1.4 Technology-specific time constraints 
While appreciative of some milestone flexibility, PM5, PM&PI9 and PM13 
highlighted some of the rather technology-specific time constraints they had 
faced in developing technology where each iteration of testing and development 
may take several months, which might not suit a process driven by milestones 
and quarterly reviews very well. PM5 highlighted that “(…) some of the targets 
might be six months of testing, which you can't do it in a quarter. It means if you 
are going to hit the target for the next quarter, you actually have to start both of 
those the previous quarter, and it is going the entire quarter. If something fails 
during that process, then you already know you're not going to hit that target. It's 
pretty tough because [this device is] meant to [operate for] long periods of time, 
and if we going to [test that], it's going to take a very long time.” PM&PI9 made a 
similar argument, highlighting that catching up with the original timeframe of the 
project within the duration of their three-year project was very challenging when 
things went wrong for their time-intensive technology. 
PM&PI9 pinpointed the perceived inutility of a quarterly frequency for 
technologies where the iterations can take extended amounts of time, 
highlighting that quarterly reviews “(...) may be good for other projects, but [for 
this particular technology] not always a lot happens in twelve weeks. Sometimes 
we were struggling with what we were going to report that was going to be 
different from the last time they visited us.” 
PM13 on the other hand referred to the issue with not having time to pursue 
observations that might work better than the original one: “(…) here you can't do 
that because when we are branching into unchartered territories, we lose time. 
So here we have to ignore that, and then focus on our milestones. (…) We felt 
that we don't have time to follow up on interesting things that might benefit the 
project, because we are hunting for our milestones all the time. It works, but I 
think we would have benefitted from a little (...) I guess more time.” In this 
context, PM13 suggested that no-cost extensions could be valuable for 
technologies having inherent time constraints with regards to the time each 
iteration takes: “[It would be nice to have] the ability to have an extra year, even 
if it's not funded, if something takes longer because you have to wait for [each 
cycle of this time-intensive development].” 
6.5.1.5 Reporting overhead issues 
The negative side effect of a high involvement model is that it can include 
significant overhead. Several interviewees said that reporting overhead was 
relatively high, especially with regards to the financial side. Some teams find this 
to be very stressful, especially academics and small companies without access 
to dedicated accounting infrastructure. The overall opinion seemed to be that 
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this is a slightly sub-optimal part of the deal, but still worth it given the size of the 
awarded grants and support enabled by ARPA-E. 
PM8 summarized the tradeoff of the monitoring overhead on one side, and the 
support on the other: “Initially, I was worried a bit, because (...) the amount of 
reporting overhead was really high (…). So I was apprehensive initially, but I 
think having worked with them now for a year, that hard push is offset on the 
other side by a deep engagement with what we are doing, and a real desire to 
advance it. It is a tradeoff that's worth it for us, for sure. I've been impressed by 
the agency.”  
With a fairly long experience with ARPA-E, PM2 commented on its change over 
time: “ARPA-E has slowly gotten more bureaucratic during its existence. We 
were one of the first sets of projects in the door, and now the ones who are 
starting out [have to deal with more paperwork], and more rules (...) I don't think 
that is a big deal either way. You just have to recognize that it is government 
money, and their people have expectations of the amount of control that's going 
to be exercised over that.” PM7 expanded this notion: “In the beginning ARPA-E 
did not have a very tough audit group. Now it has a much tougher audit group. 
That is the main change I've seen. Technically they have been the same, their 
attitude has not changed.” 
PM5 commented on the financial issues associated with having additional 
administrative tasks introduced during the course of the project: “They didn't 
have a lot of rules. So that's why they were able to move fast. As the project has 
gone on (…), they've started to impose more rules and more structure that is 
slowing things down. I could see that by the end of the project, there was more 
hoops you had to jump through, and things you had to fill out that had nothing to 
do with technically succeeding on the project, it was just satisfying some 
government audit or form (…) In general it became more difficult because (...) 
they are basically adding more work and more scope to the project, but there 
was no increased amount of funding. That made it pretty difficult because (...) 
when I inherited the project it was already sort of over budget, so I had a pretty 
tight budget to begin with.” 
While they did not have issues with the high involvement reporting, PM&PI9 
added that the overhead might be different for organizations without support 
functions such as dedicated staff for running the financial side of the reporting. 
Along with PM1, they highlighted that some of their academic counterparts in 
other projects felt that the process was intrusive: “I felt a very strong involvement 
from their part, and I didn't see that as something negative. In some of the 
academic groups, it was like "oh, it was so much work!" I think they were 
probably a little bit harder on them. (…) The advantage we have is that we have 
our accounting system close by, and we can take decisions quicker on that. (...) 
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We heard from other academic teams, who took a very long time. With them, 
there was a little bit more irritation, I'd say. That they were being ’harassed' by 
the ARPA-E team. We didn't have that.”  
PM12 elaborated on this point: “One thing that is a little challenging for those are 
in academia is, it is so well planned, detailed, at a very detailed level. So all 
these students working on this project, they have been under constant stress, 
because the review comes up every quarter. (…) If that motivates them, that 
would be a benefit, but that is kind of the thing that I have a little mixed feelings 
about. But, because of the nature of ARPA-E, I think I can live with that. It is not 
a pure science project.” PM12 also highlighted the contents of the quarterly 
reporting: “It is really extensive reporting, including all the financial reporting. 
They also track us in terms of the money that we spend. This extensive quarterly 
report also includes all the [technical issues]. We have to be really honest with 
them.” 
When it comes to the level of detail required on the financial side, some of the 
interviewees gave conflicting answers. PM1 highlighted for example that “One 
thing they [ARPA-E] have been pretty good about is not second guessing 
particular travels, we have a travel budget and I don’t think we have to be super 
specific in "which trips are you going to take to charge to this account?" We have 
had other funding agencies, in particular in California, where they scrutinize 
every airline ticket and every hotel, and say "really, are we supposed to pay for 
this, where did you go, why did you have to go so far?", and we did not have that 
issue at all.”  
In direct opposition with PM1, likely due to having a better overview over the 
financial side of the grant, PM&PI9 reported that “I have to say that our 
Accounting department is not happy with this grant, and they are very happy 
that it's probably going away. It was a very high burden. (…) Typically with 
grants, and I think this is the [reason] why the academics were so upset, is that if 
you get a grant from NSF, they wire you $150,000. You spend it over six months 
to twelve months, you submit your technical report at the end, and that's it. This 
is like, you're reimbursed. So every month, we had to submit [a description 
detailing the employees], the hours that they worked, our travel receipts, with the 
alcohol subtracted. Here was the flight cost, and the hotel. Every detail. And they 
would come back commenting: “you exceeded the limit on your dinner”. (…) For 
other grants, you'd put in your budget proposal, $2000 for travel, and they'd take 
you at your word that you're going to spend $2000 for travel. (…) [The 
accounting department] spent quite some time and energy, and money, in 
basically financially running whatever they wanted. The [level of] financial 
requests, or the justification of the budget, was very high. That was a little bit of 
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a downside for them. We didn't have to deal with it.” (emphasis added to reflect 
original emphasis in the interview) 
In support of PM&PI9, PM11 explained: “The Department of Energy is extremely 
cautious about making sure all the money goes to exactly what we say it does. 
So we close our books with our accountant the way a much bigger company 
does.(…) They are very careful about this stuff. I don’t know if that would be 
necessary in another situation, but for DOE it is. So we are sending in really 
detailed financial statements quarterly. (...) Before we get paid there is a pretty 
detailed financial review, to make sure we are honest. Which is fine. If we 
weren’t, then that would be a problem. I guess we find this to be a little bit 
burdensome, because we are a smaller company. A big company or big 
university has dedicated staff for all of that.(…) I can't afford one person to be 
doing the budget for us. So I’ve got a guy who is in here a few hours a week, 
covering the books, and it's good enough.”  
PM11 elaborated on this side of the process, concluding that while it is the 
primary hurdle to working with ARPA-E, it is worth it given the support: “ARPA-E 
was set up as a new [entity], but within the framework of the federal government. 
So the process for accounting, for contracting, for getting paid, for doing even an 
application like this, are really burdensome for a small company. All of that is 
really hard. But my philosophy has been [that] it is still a great deal. Yes, there 
are ways to make it more efficient for relatively untrained, but well-meaning 
people running small businesses in order to get paid to invent things, to avoid 
doing bureaucratic work rather that technical work. There are ways to do that. 
But that is a small price to pay to actually have the resources to get to do 
something. Can things be better? I would say yes, logistically, but the amount of 
support we are getting. You can't complain.” 
6.5.2 Commercialization focus: Bringing the technology to market 
Almost all of our interviewees discussed ARPA-E’s Technology-to-Market efforts 
and commercialization focus, as discussed in section 4.2.2.2. The most 
prevalent topics were the Technology-to-Market plan and associated milestones, 
the early focus on commercialization and the next stage development after 
leaving ARPA-E, the support provided by the Technology-to-Market team and the 
varying usefulness of this support according to the type of organization 
responsible for the project.  
6.5.2.1 Early commercialization focus 
Some interviewees emphasized how ARPA-E pushed for thinking about 
commercialization already when developing the project plan at the onset of the 
project. PM1 explained: “One of the things that they really pushed us to do, was 
to start thinking about [the commercialization] process now, and don't start 
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thinking about it when you are ready to sell the products. (…) We have to report 
on our thinking and we have had to have meetings and conversations with 
people in industry who would be prospective buyers of this equipment. (…) So 
there is actually a lot of preparation work that they prompted us to do, which is 
good.” 
PM13 agreed: “One thing that you are not used to in other [research programs] 
is the importance of having a tech to market outlook from day one, and the 
business model from day one.”  
PM11 felt that pushing for much Technology-to-Market work at the beginning of 
the project would be inefficient use of resources, because his project was at 
such an early stage of development: “We are doing the T2M activities already, 
but what we find is that because it's such an early stage technology, even our 
ability to labor in a time efficient way for our staff to do T2M, it would be so much 
better if we already had a little bit more traction on the technology side.” He had 
however found a solution to this issue: “ARPA-E has the rule that 5% of the 
money for the program got to be spent on T2M. We anticipated that, so when we 
proposed our budget for the whole three years we said we were going to hold it 
back, and we are allocating a lot of money to do testing with customers in the 
third year.” 
PM10 was of a similar opinion in the beginning, but realized the value of starting 
early as his project progressed: “When I started on the project, I was 
questioning, “Shouldn’t all of this [Technology-to-Market work] be loaded into the 
third year?” Then [ARPA-E] steered me into having some milestones in the first 
and second year, and in retrospect I’m grateful for that. Because it is really 
valuable to talk to stakeholders early on as well, to get an early sense of what 
they are interested in.” 
6.5.2.2 Technology-to-Market plan and milestones 
PM10 commented on the incorporation of Technology-to-Market plans as a 
milestone in the deliverables of the project: “[Technology-to-Market] is actually a 
defined task within our task and milestone sheet. There is one task just called 
Technology-to-Market. That includes things ranging from cost performance 
modeling analysis, to filing Intellectual Property, to follow-on commercialization. 
(…) That also includes talking to OEMs, [analyzing] markets [etc.].” 
PM8 brought up how ARPA-E pushed the project to develop Technology-to-
Market plans concerning the hand-off to other funding sources, and commented 
on why this was critical to ARPA-E: “They don't want to be funding things that 
are a dead-end, so we are definitely developing our plans around that. What our 
[ARPA-E funding] will get us to (…) is an advanced, high-performance prototype, 
but still not a real product. How do we bridge that gap? (…) There is a lot of 
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effort that goes into trying to plan that and prepare for it. (…) [ARPA-E] wants to 
see those plans, and that is one of the things that they milestone (...), the 
definition of that plan and identification of all of the sources of strategic support 
that are required to get there.” 
6.5.2.3 Technology-to-Market team and support 
Several of the interviewees commented on the support they had received from 
ARPA-E’s Technology-to-Market team. PM1 concisely described the role of the 
Technology-to-Market advisor assigned to the project: “[He] is specifically the 
expert on commercialization, on this technology transfer. He has a lot of ideas 
and suggestions.” 
PM6 elaborated on his positive impression of the Technology-to-Market team: 
“This Tech-to-Market [effort] that ARPA-E is doing, I think is a good thing. 
They're taking it seriously, and the people that they brought on are people with 
(…) genuine industrial experience and I think understand what one is up against 
to be successful commercially. Our interaction so far has been very positive”. 
PM6 specified that he had received useful support from the Technology-to-
Market advisor: “We had a very good discussion with him shortly before the new 
project started, which was frankly very helpful.” 
For some of the interviewees, the Technology-to-Market team from ARPA-E had 
proved useful in getting industry or customer relations, as PM11 explained: “The 
person that does the business development, the Tech-to-Market for us, she was 
formerly a senior scientist in a [relevant] company. Before that, she was working 
as a chemist for 30 years at a big chemical company. [If we say] "we are doing 
this new chemical synthesis, and this is what we are seeing so far", she can 
chime in and say: "Talk to those guys if you need that polymer.” It is really helpful 
to have that kind of support and in person setting.” 
PM12 similarly had experienced that the Technology-to-Market advisor assigned 
to his project had been helpful in creating connections with customers: “He 
basically introduces us to potential customers he believes will be a good match.” 
PM1 was also of a similar opinion, saying that the Technology-to-Market team 
gave both feedback on planned outreach and suggested contact possibilities, 
something she viewed as useful. 
Overall, PM8 found the support for commercialization very useful, as his project 
didn’t have enough resources to take care of that all on its own: “We are a small 
team that is very technically focused and (...) we don't have the luxury of having 
very much of a market focus yet. Having some of that support from ARPA-E's 
side has been really useful. They push hard on that side of things as well, which 
helps us keep focused on those important questions.”  
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Contrary to the others, PM13 and PM10 had found the Technology-to-Market 
function to be partly lacking. PM13 had worked with two different ARPA-E 
projects, and in the first project there weren’t any support for commercialization, 
which was something he had missed. This was however rectified in his second 
project. PM10 noted that his project currently doesn’t have a dedicated 
Technology-to-Market advisor from ARPA-E, although his previous Program 
Director had taken on this role as well: “That being said, the first Program 
Director, before he became the [Name of program] Program Director, he was a 
technology to market senior advisor. So he was kind of the tech to market 
person himself.”  
6.5.2.4 Needs for Technology-to-Market support 
Judging by the opinions of our interviewees, there seems to be a variable need 
for a dedicated Technology-to-Market support according to the type of institution 
responsible for the project.  
PM&PI9 assumed university researchers would have greater use for 
Technology-to-Market support: “ARPA-E is so involved, they have all of these 
workshops where (…) they talk about commercialization, they talk about IP, they 
talk about freedom to operate. A lot of university researchers are just (...) that's 
not their realm, they have no idea [about it]. I think it is good in that they are 
ensuring that university researchers are really focused on [the commercial 
aspects which should be considered prior to acquiring a piece of research].” 
PM&PI9 added that ARPA-E probably adjusted the Technology-to-Market 
support according to the needs of the projects: “We probably had less pressure 
on Tech-to-Market [activities], just being a private company, than universities 
did.” 
PM6, being from a larger organization with several different R&D projects, 
believed that made them less dependent on Technology-to-Market support than 
start-ups or universities: “We are a smaller part of a larger organization, and we 
spent a lot of time thinking about commercializing our products before we joined 
the ARPA-E team. ARPA-E funds a lot of university efforts, and they fund 
companies that are just getting started.” 
PM3, having founded a start-up company for his project, believed on the other 
hand that start-ups would be more incentivized to focus on commercialization, 
especially when located in an entrepreneurial local environment: “[Our 
Technology-to-Market person] is really great, but that is not as important for us 
since we're right in the bubble here, we come from ’start-up'-land. A lot of the 
people that they fund are working in universities or national labs, and they are 
less incentivized or nested in an environment, a culture that supports spinning 
out ideas into companies.”  
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7 Discussion 
In this chapter we use the theoretical and empirical foundation we presented in 
Chapters 2 and 4 to analyze and interpret the results of our interviews, as 
presented in Chapter 6. This chapter therefore presents how the results 
correspond to or diverge from the relations we anticipated using the theoretical 
and empirical background, as highlighted in Figure 2 in section 4.3. 
Given the rather complex structure of these relations, this chapter follows the 
same overall sequence as Chapter 4 and 6 in order to maintain tractability. We 
therefore leave the overarching review of the effects with regards to the research 
question to the end of the chapter.  
 
 Funding role 7.1
In section 4.1.1, we argued that ARPA-E fills the funding gap arising from the 
market failures presented in section 2.2. This topic was given considerable time 
by most of our interviewees, who elaborated on the existence and probable 
causes of this funding gap. The results from these discussions gave a fairly 
coherent conclusion: Government support and ARPA-E in particular had been 
vital for the existence of their projects, whether or not they were organized in an 
established organization, small firms, start-ups, national labs or academia. We 
therefore find support for the assumption that the funding gap for high-risk 
energy technology innovation projects is indeed an issue that needs 
government intervention, and that ARPA-E is acting as an enabler for the 
existence of its projects, and is therefore acting in the funding role. 
Complementing our assumptions regarding the cost share, some interviewees 
also highlighted an increased willingness from private entities to invest and take 
risks when the risk is shared by ARPA-E. We therefore suspect that risk sharing 
with ARPA-E might be attractive for private entities, but leave the 
investigation of this inference to future research. 
In the following sections, we analyze the secondary aspects of this role, relating 
to the portfolio approach to funding, program design and screening process. We 
also present analysis on the award size, since it emerged as a highly important 
topic. 
7.1.1 Cost share and duplication 
We reasoned that the very same reasons government intervention is needed to 
overcome the funding gap, could for some organizations give rise to issues with 
raising the cost share in ARPA-E’s model. This notion found support in several 
interviewees, who had encountered troubling issues when raising the cost share. 
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The primary issue was the funding challenge, which for smaller firms and start-
ups seemed to be of particular importance. Our impression is therefore that the 
cost share model can moderate the effect of the funding role in 
overcoming the funding challenge. 
In that context, we also highlighted that funding duplication restrictions could be 
an issue for entities deriving most of their income from federal sources. For 
interviewees in national labs or companies deriving a large amount of their 
income from government contracts, this was indeed indicated as a substantial 
hurdle, as they could have covered the cost share using in-house funds, but 
weren’t allowed due to the duplication rules. This leads to the consideration that 
the duplication challenge can moderate the effect of the funding role in 
overcoming the funding challenge. 
7.1.2 Market orientation, portfolio approach 
We proposed that using targeted FOAs to fund related technologies could help 
promote self-supportive technology systems, increasing the chance of projects 
being adopted, consequently reducing challenges of structural rigidities. PM3, 
PM7 and PM13 discussed ARPA-E’s role as a promoter of technology 
ecosystems, and all three seemed to appreciate this aspect of their respective 
programs. Whether this will translate into increased chance of adoption in the 
market is inconclusive based on the information in the interviews, and we 
cannot say whether the portfolio approach in fact reduces challenges of 
structural rigidities. However, this approach to funding did present useful 
opportunities for collaboration, as further analyzed in section 7.3.5.  
We argued that the market oriented approach to program design and project 
screening could lead to a project selection with increased alignment towards the 
market, reducing systemic failures. While our interviewees confirmed ARPA-E’s 
focus on commercialization even before finalizing the award (see section 7.5.2), 
we were not able to obtain any useful information on whether the market-
oriented program design and screening process contribute to increased market 
alignment. We therefore cannot say whether the market-oriented program 
design and project screening contributes to reducing systemic failures.  
The young age of the agency and having only one alumnus in our interviewee 
sample is a clear limitation here, as there simply isn’t much of a track record to 
analyze in this context.  
7.1.3 Application process 
Achieving the purposes of the funding role was also argued to be facilitated by 
having an attractive application process with a low barrier to apply, as a short 
pre-proposal reduces the upfront risk of wasting resources on a dead-end full 
application. We predicted that this two-step application process could increase 
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the number of interesting applicants for ARPA-E programs by lowering the effort 
needed for the initial application. This is obviously hard to answer on the basis of 
qualitative data, and is left to future research. 
Additionally, our interviewees explained that the effort needed to compose a full 
proposal was substantial; PM1 had even hired a professional proposal writer to 
help. However, they did not indicate that the resources required to compose the 
full proposal was a deterrent for continuing the application process after being 
encouraged to apply. An obvious limitation to this observation is that we have 
only interviewed people who did go through with the application, and as such 
lack insight into why some applicants, if any, didn’t submit a full proposal despite 
being encouraged to do so. We can only speculate whether the attractiveness of 
the two-step process might have offset the deterring aspects of the full proposal. 
7.1.3.1 Two-step application process 
Limitations aside, our interviewees applauded the two-step process. PM1 
explicitly said that she would never have applied if she had to write a full 
proposal directly. Other interviewees appreciated the process, but did not state 
that they wouldn’t have applied if they had to write a full application 
directly. PM10 received his award prior to the two-step application process, and 
referred to it as more efficient than “going in blind”. We therefore summarize that 
while the results have a positive connotation, we only have circumstantial 
evidence which indirectly suggests that the two-step process may increase 
the number of applications pre-proposal lowers the barrier to apply. We do 
however maintain that there is sufficient agreement among the interviewees to 
conclude that the two-step application process is well liked by applicants, 
even though more in-depth research would be needed to conclude whether it 
has a meaningful effect on the number of applications. 
7.1.3.2 Response opportunity 
In connection to the previous section, we argued that giving the applicants the 
opportunity to respond and elaborate on comments from reviewers would reduce 
the risk of rejecting suitable applicants due to reviewers’ lack of understanding. 
PM12, PM13, PM8 and PM7 gave appreciative answers on the opportunity to 
clarify misunderstandings and explain their concepts further if needed for the 
understanding of ARPA-E’s review panel and the Program Director. While we are 
limited to one side of this story with regards to whether this saved any of the 
interviewees from having their projects rejected, it seems like a useful 
mechanism to reduce the risk of wrongful rejection, especially in PM8’s case, 
who had initially received dismissive reviews characterized by little rigor. 
Consequently, we therefore maintain that the opportunity to respond to 
reviewers’ comments positively influences the existence of the projects. 
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7.1.4 Award size 
Lastly, in addition to the results covering the anticipated characteristics of the 
funding role was the unexpected attention our interviewees gave the size of the 
award itself. PM6, PM1, PM11 and PM2 explained the critical importance of the 
size and duration of the financial commitment from ARPA-E, in that the kind of 
high-risk, ‘long-leap’ goals ARPA-E wants its projects to have would be infeasible 
to actually realize with too small or too time-constrained grants. We therefore 
understand that the committed award has to be large enough to explore the 
full potential of the technological idea, and consequentially include in our 
framework that a sufficiently large award size positively influences the 
outcomes of high-risk energy innovation projects. 
 
 Legitimator role 7.2
This section is related to the legitimator role presented in section 6.2, with the 
proposed factors that could impact the projects from section 4.1.2. Most of the 
interviewees described ARPA-E’s efforts in legitimize them in providing visibility 
and credibility. We therefore find support for that ARPA-E takes a legitimator 
role. We describe this finding in the following sections, where we analyze 
ARPA-E’s role in providing credibility and increased visibility, and the proposed 
secondary effects of increased abilities to successfully connect with other parties 
and raise additional funding or other resources. 
7.2.1 Credibility through ‘stamp of approval’ 
We argued that ARPA-E’s program design and its competitive and diligent 
selection process would reduce the risk perceived by external parties. We also 
argued that ARPA-E’s ‘stamp of approval’ and associated publicity would 
increase credibility and visibility of the projects. Many of our interviewees 
highlighted being associated with the ARPA-E name and the competitiveness of 
the selection process as important for their credibility and legitimacy towards 
investors or strategic partners. While noting the external credibility, PM2 was the 
only interviewee to disagree on the ‘stamp of approval’, at least in a quality 
context. However, PM2’s project is almost done, and his comment was made in 
retrospect to when ARPA-E was freshly established and had little reputation. 
Overall, we therefore still believe that ARPA-E’s program design and 
competitive screening process with diligent vetting contribute to reduced 
perceived risk in its projects for potential investors and strategic partners, 
and increases the credibility of the projects. 
PM3, PM4 and PM7 also connected the credibility to the ongoing vetting process 
through the monitoring process, i.e. holding the project teams accountable by 
terminating funding for underperforming projects. This leads us to believe that 
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ARPA-E’s ongoing vetting through reviews contribute to the credibility of 
the project. 
7.2.2 Increased visibility and credibility 
We argued that the publicity garnered by the funding award and presence at the 
Energy Innovation Summit would increase the visibility and credibility of the 
projects. This was supported to various degrees by our interviewees, who 
claimed that being associated with the ARPA-E name through the 
announcement and being present at the Energy Innovation Summit was helpful 
for publicity and making new connections. The visibility and credibility from the 
award had in some cases also led to renewed interest from external parties who 
had previously rejected partnering with or investing in the projects. PM6 
highlighted that the value of being associated with ARPA-E was likely to be 
higher for smaller firms than his own. We argue that this could be the reason 
why not all projects had the same opinion about the usefulness of the publicity. 
The majority of the interviewees nevertheless opined that ARPA-E recognition 
helped the visibility and credibility of their projects. Some interviewees also 
highlighted the internal credibility winning an ARPA-E award had given them. We 
therefore consider our assumptions supported, and believe that being 
supported by ARPA-E increases the credibility and visibility of the project, 
both internally and externally.  
Having increased visibility was pointed out to be a potential issue for firms 
wanting to pursue ‘stealthy’ strategies. Nevertheless, none of our interviewees 
highlighted this as something they wanted instead of the visibility.  
7.2.2.1 Increased ability to connect with external parties 
We also argued that a secondary effect of this credibility and visibility would be 
an increased ability to successfully connect with external parties. Our 
interviewees highlighted increased incoming interest in connecting due to 
visibility and smoother connections when leveraging the ARPA-E award in the 
initial pitch. Combined with the support for the previous inference, we therefore 
conclude that the legitimacy provided by being associated with ARPA-E 
increases the project’s ability to connect with external parties. 
7.2.2.2 Increased ability to raise funding or other resources 
Lastly, we argued that the increased credibility towards prospective investors 
and strategic partners could positively affect the projects’ ability to raise funds or 
other resources. However, as few of our interviewees have finished the project 
or reached its final stages, few could go into detail about how credibility had 
affected negotiations or resulted in concrete results from efforts to secure follow-
on funding. Nevertheless, some interviewees made this connection when talking 
about how they raised their cost share as either funds or in-kind support from 
83 
other entities, as reported in section 6.1.1, along with the previously highlighted 
increased interest from other investors and strategic partners wanting to commit 
funding or partnering following the award announcement. The internal credibility 
helped some projects securing internal funding for the cost share. The overall 
positive support for our assumption therefore lead us to conclude that the 
increased credibility from being associated with ARPA-E increases the 
project’s ability to raise funding and resources from external and internal 
sources. 
 
 Network role 7.3
In this section we analyze and discuss the proposed effects of the networking 
role on the projects, as presented in section 4.1.3, compared to the results 
presented in section 6.3. Almost all of our interviewees reported that ARPA-E 
made efforts to facilitate networking both towards external parties and internally, 
we find support for the overarching assumption that ARPA-E takes on the 
networking role. We elaborate on this finding in the following sections. 
7.3.1 External networking facilitation 
We suggested that ARPA-E can connect the projects to external parties by 
facilitating networking activities. Our interviewees supported this notion, and had 
experienced that ARPA-E facilitated network building towards industry, 
customers, researchers, potential strategic partners, regulators or other entities 
within the DOE. Since around half of the interviewees had spoken positively of 
these efforts, we argue that the external networking facilitated by ARPA-E 
has the potential to increase the projects interaction with external parties. 
However, our interviewees also diverged somewhat on the actual level and 
benefit of the networking facilitated by ARPA-E. We believe this may be linked to 
the industrial network of the Program Director, and argue that the network of 
the Program Director moderates ARPA-E’s ability to facilitate the project’s 
interaction with external parties, which we will revisit in section 7.4. 
We argued that the ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit could spur interest for 
the technologies being developed within ARPA-E’s programs and facilitate 
connections with external parties. Our interviewees seem to be of a similar 
opinion, as the event was seen as a way to gain visibility and interest from 
industry and investors, and was highlighted to be a good arena for actively 
making useful connections. PM10 also claimed ARPA-E-facilitated connections 
to have a higher hit rate than average networking efforts. Combined with the 
above support, we therefore infer that networking facilitated by ARPA-E 
increases the projects ability to connect with external parties.  
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We also proposed that the networking efforts towards investors could help 
mitigate challenges of securing later stage funding. While this notion was not 
disproved explicitly, it was not confirmed by any of the interviewees either. We 
therefore cannot say that the ARPA-E efforts to increase networking with 
external parties led to an increased ability to raise additional funding. 
However, we did see support from PM10 for the proposed networking facilitation 
to potential follow-on funding sources within the government. While it is unclear 
whether it will result in an actual follow-on funding agreement, we infer that 
ARPA-E increases the opportunities of finding follow-on funding by 
facilitating networking with other potential sources for later-stage funding 
within the government.  
7.3.2 Market alignment: Introductions to industry and customers  
We proposed as a secondary effect that ARPA-E would improve the projects’ 
ability to align the technology development towards the needs of the market 
through connections with industry and customers. Overall, the results were 
indecisive on this matter. According to the interviewees, ARPA-E had put a good 
deal of effort into connecting the projects to industry actors, and some of these 
connections proved useful. Despite their usefulness, it is unclear whether these 
relationships had enabled the project team to better align its technology 
development process towards the needs of the market. A limitation to this study 
and a potential reason for the lack of clarity on this issue may be that most of the 
interviewees were far from ready to commercialize their products at the time of 
the interview, and it would hence be hard to evaluate the actual outcomes of 
these relations in a longer-term perspective. Even in retrospect it would be hard 
to prove that early industry interactions actually had a positive impact on the 
adaptation of each technology to the market. We therefore elaborate on earlier 
conclusions that introductions made by ARPA-E to industry actors and 
customers are helpful, but also that we cannot say whether ARPA-E 
networking efforts translate into increased alignment of the technology 
development with the market. 
7.3.3 Limit to networking: ARPA-E cannot build relationships 
An aspect we didn’t consider in section 4.1.3 was that while ARPA-E could 
facilitate introductions to potential customers and industry partners, it would still 
be limited in creating prosperous relationships. Among our interviewees, there 
seemed to be a common perception that the extent to which a third party such 
as ARPA-E could facilitate the creation of such relationships would be limited. 
Despite useful introductions, they claimed that fruitful relationships had to be 
built up through personal interaction between the potential partner or customer 
and the actual developer of the technology. An important reason for this was 
thought to be that the customer or partner needs to be able to trust that the 
developer can actually deliver the technology on one end, and the need for the 
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developer to control and tailor the flow of proprietary information according to the 
needs of that particular customer on the other end. We therefore deduce that 
ARPA-E facilitates introductions to potential customers or partners, but the 
actual customer relationships or strategic partnerships have to be built by 
the project team themselves.  
7.3.4 Networking as a means to provide technical assistance   
ARPA-E’s efforts to provide its projects with access to outside expert knowledge 
if they met technical challenges during the development process that were 
outside their expertise is an aspect to the networking role which we did not 
explicitly anticipate, despite touching upon it in section 4.2.2.1. This was brought 
up by our interviewees, who had experienced that ARPA-E had helped them 
identify and connect with both external experts and other ARPA-E projects 
possessing the technical competencies they needed. It hence seems that 
ARPA-E supports the technical development process of the projects by 
connecting them to the experts they need. This also connects to the abilities 
of the ARPA-E team to provide relevant support to solve technical challenges, as 
we discuss in section 7.5.1. 
7.3.5 Internal networking: Realizing synergies in the program  
We reasoned that funding similarly focused projects within each program creates 
opportunities for exploiting synergies between the projects. Many of the 
interviewees agreed to this notion, highlighting that the efforts made by ARPA-E 
to connect different projects together had created opportunities to share 
experiences or help each other where they had complementary competencies 
by being part of a portfolio of related technologies. Especially the program 
conferences were viewed as good opportunities to share experiences and help 
each other out with technical challenges, since projects within the same program 
sometimes faced similar technological challenges. Some of the projects in Open 
FOAs did however report limited opportunities to exploit synergies due to the 
lack of related projects. We therefore deduce that the focused program design 
creates opportunities for exploiting synergies between projects, which 
ARPA-E actively encourages and facilitates. It is however unclear to which 
extent such interactions could help the development process of the projects, 
since issues of proprietary knowledge and intellectual property naturally limits 
the project teams’ willingness to share information.  
We also argued that the potential to exploit these synergies would be facilitated 
by the overview the Program Director has by being responsible for all the 
projects within a program. PM13, PM3 and PM2 supported this expectation, and 
highlighted that the Program Director knows what challenges the different 
projects have, and has insight in who might potentially be able to solve them or 
how other projects have solved similar challenges. We argue that we see 
86 
support for our suggestion, and expand on the previous conclusion that the 
Program Director has a central role in facilitating the exploitation of 
synergies between the projects in his portfolio. 
 
 The role of the Program Director 7.4
In this section we analyze and discuss the proposed effects of the Program 
Director on the projects, as presented in section 4.2.1, compared to the results 
primarily presented in section 6.4. The three primary areas of interest for our 
interviewees was the importance of the Program Director’s level of relevant 
experience and expertise for the technologic field of the project, and how these 
capabilities were related to the credibility he embodied and his ability to manage 
and support the projects in his portfolio. Additionally, the effect of having 
empowered and hence motivated Program Directors could be perceived as 
either supportive or constraining to the projects.  
7.4.1 Experience, technical expertise and the effect on ARPA-E’s 
funding and legitimizing capabilities 
In section 4.2.1.2 we argued that the Program Director’s freedom to designing 
programs and managing the project portfolio required a high level of experience 
and expertise, and that this would further add on to the legitimacy of the agency.  
Our interviewees indicated that the Program Director’s ability to perform his 
responsibilities was dependent on him having the necessary relevant experience 
and expertise. They claimed that these qualifications were needed in order for 
him to have credibility both in designing the program and in selecting and 
managing the project portfolio. We therefore consider this assumption 
supported, and that the Program Director needs relevant experience and 
expertise to credibly perform his responsibilities.  
We had also claimed a direct influence from the Program Director on the funding 
role. Amidst circumstantial support from other interviewees, PM3 explicitly made 
the connection between the Program Director’s technical competence and the 
decision to fund his project. We therefore retain our position that the Program 
Director’s experience and expertise influences the effectiveness of 
ARPA-E in the funding role. 
By connecting the Program Director’s capabilities and credibility to his 
responsibilities in the screening process, we similarly asserted that the 
capabilities of the Program Director should influence the legitimating role of 
ARPA-E. None of our interviewees made this connection explicitly. We did 
however find support for the screening process’ contribution to ARPA-E as a 
legitimator (section 7.2.1). Combined with the previous finding on the funding 
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side of this connection, we argue that this supposition to be circumstantially 
validated. We therefore infer that the Program Director’s experience and 
expertise affects ARPA-E’s ability to act as a legitimator, while noting that 
the properties of this relationship needs further investigation and validation by 
further research. 
7.4.2 Program Director accountability and empowerment 
We argued that the Program Directors are incentivized to see their projects 
succeed since the performance of their projects essentially determines the 
judgment of their own achievements, and that this would lead them to encourage 
their projects to target ambitious goals and put a lot of effort in driving the 
projects forwards. Our interviewees indicated that the Program Directors indeed 
worked very hard to make the projects succeed due to this responsibility, which 
is also highlighted by the analysis in section 7.5.1 below. This support leads us 
to conclude that the Program Directors are motivated by being held 
accountable for their projects’ performance, and therefore try to support 
them to the extent they can.  
We also supposed that this high level of involvement and empowerment of the 
Program Director could affect projects both positively and negatively. Some 
interviewees appreciated the freedom the Program Directors were given to use 
their own technical judgment in advancing the projects, and the high level of 
support this resulted in. Others however noted that if the Program Director had a 
very specific idea of what direction the project should take, he could potentially 
micromanage the project or force it to pursue an unsuccessful path. We 
therefore imply that the approach to management chosen by the Program 
Director can affect the performance of his projects, both in terms of their 
potential for success or eventual demise. We expand on the management 
style of ARPA-E in section 7.5.1. 
7.4.3 Technical support enabled by technical expertise and 
industry experience  
In connection to the above, we suggested that the technical expertise of the 
Program Directors would make them better able to assist the projects in the 
technology development process. This notion was supported to various degrees 
by the interviewees. While several interviewees found it important and 
appreciated that the Program Directors had a certain level of expertise in the 
technology area of their projects for management purposes, they didn’t think the 
Program Directors were knowledgeable enough to provide solutions to technical 
challenges on a regular basis. However, they did emphasize the importance of 
having Program Directors who understand the significance of the different 
challenges their projects met, having enough technical insight to properly 
evaluate the developments made and generally have a good dialogue with the 
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project team. We therefore consider our suggestion to be supported, and that 
the technical expertise of the Program Director is a prerequisite for him to 
be able to properly manage the technical aspects of the projects in his 
portfolio. We return to the managerial style of the ARPA-E teams in section 
7.5.1. 
In section 4.2.1.1 we proposed that the Program Director’s ability to connect his 
projects to relevant industry actors depends on his own existing network. The 
interviewees supported this notion, expressing that the way the Program 
Director helped the projects solve their technical challenges often was by 
leveraging his network to connect them to experts in the particular field, as 
previously discussed in section 7.3.4. PM11 highlighted that Program Directors 
from academia might not have the same industrial network to leverage as a 
Program Director that had worked in the industry. This can therefore be a reason 
for the somewhat diverging answers regarding the perceived level and benefit of 
external networking facilitated by ARPA-E, as most of the interviewees had 
different Program Directors. Nevertheless, we consider this idea to be 
supported, and conclude that the pre-existing network of the Program 
Director is a decisive prerequisite for the level of technical support the 
projects can expect to receive, and subsequently their ability to solve 
technical challenges.  
 
 Management and support of ARPA-E projects 7.5
7.5.1 Support and monitoring 
In section 4.2.2.1, we highlighted various aspects related to the monitoring 
regime and interaction between ARPA-E officials and the awardees in the course 
of managing the projects, which we believed to affect the projects in various 
ways. Our interviewees devoted substantial attention to these aspects of being 
an ARPA-E awardee, as shown by the results in section 6.5.1. 
7.5.1.1 Collaborative, high-involvement management approach  
We first argued that the high-involvement approach taken by the ARPA-E team 
increases their ability to assess the needs of the projects. Our interviewees did 
not explicitly comment on that aspect directly, but almost all of our interviewees 
revealed this indirectly through elaborations about the open and collaborative 
nature of their relationship with the Program Director and the rest of the ARPA-E 
team. They found them to be good to collaborate with, using expressions such 
as ‘full partners’ or ‘part of the team’ to describe their relationship. Our 
interviewees also told us that they had received support from ARPA-E on various 
issues they had in response to the discussions in these meetings. We conclude 
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that our interviewees support the notion that the high-involvement approach 
taken by the ARPA-E team increases their ability to assess the needs of 
the projects. 
We further elaborated this topic by anticipating that the ARPA-E team would, 
through the mentioned in-person review meetings and continued contact, be 
able to help the projects with technical issues and facilitating networking support 
according to their needs. Having different needs obviously yielded somewhat 
different answers from the interviewees in terms of what they emphasized, but 
the overarching theme was positive. 
Technical support 
In terms of the technical support provided by the ARPA-E team, almost all of the 
interviewees reported positive benefits, ranging relatively widely between some 
having seen little benefit besides appreciating meaningful technical discussions 
with their ARPA-E team, to a few having received suggestions or advice 
contributing to solve technical issues as a result of these interactions. PM&PI9 
was the only group to report a real lack of technical understanding in the 
ARPA-E team as a hurdle for their project, and consequentially gave an 
impression of the review process more as being straight monitoring rather than 
collaboration. Overall, we still argue to have found support for the notion that the 
insights the ARPA-E team have in the needs of the project increase their 
ability to provide proper technical support on the basis of their own 
expertise, on the condition of having the requisite technical expertise.  
Our interviewees did however emphasize that that even though the ARPA-E 
team assigned to the project had a general insight in the technologies of the 
different projects, they didn’t possess the level of expertise necessary to really 
help them with technical challenges. This does however lead to an interesting 
facet that we had not anticipated explicitly, which is how the ARPA-E team would 
help provide relevant technical insight by facilitating network connections to 
relevant experts external to the agency when their own expertise was 
insufficient, as suggested by the analysis in section 7.3.4 and 7.4. We therefore 
elaborate on the previous finding, and conclude that the insights the ARPA-E 
team have in the needs of the project increase their ability to provide 
proper technical support on the basis of their own expertise or by 
introducing the project to relevant experts. 
With regards to the networking role of the ARPA-E team in the review setting, 
these efforts are primarily covered by the analysis of the networking role, section 
7.3. 
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7.5.1.2 Risk of undue influence  
Tied into the above aspects of the high-involvement management style and the 
role of the Program Director (section 7.4), was the anticipated risk of the project 
underperforming because of too much intervention, micromanagement and/or 
lack of flexibility from the Program Director in particular. This topic was touched 
upon by five of our interviewees. PM5 and PM11 explicitly said that the ARPA-E 
team was limited in how they could give advice or suggestions in order to avoid 
issues of exercising undue influence on the projects. PM6 and PM2 spoke of this 
happening in a circumstantial fashion. Perhaps most interestingly, PM&PI9 gave 
the impression that undue influence had in fact been an issue in their project, 
and was the reason for its underperformance and subsequent suspension. We 
therefore conclude that undue influence through specific instructions and 
micromanagement from the ARPA-E team may lead to underperformance 
or failure of the project. 
7.5.1.3 Monitoring regime: Milestone negotiations and flexibility 
We suggested that various aspects of the milestones would be of high 
importance for the projects. We highlighted the importance of finding the right 
balance between aggressiveness and feasibility in the initial determination and 
negotiation of the milestones and having a sufficient amount of flexibility to 
change the milestones underway if e.g. technological discoveries leave existing 
milestones redundant or in conflict with the overarching goals of the project.  
Negotiations: ARPA-E push for aggressive, yet feasible milestones 
With regards to the negotiations, we proposed that the awardees would have to 
be careful to balance feasibility against setting tough milestones. Negotiating the 
milestones was indeed the primary process for agreeing to the technical goals, 
but the impression we were left with by our interviewees was somewhat different 
than the one-direction push for aggressiveness we expected from ARPA-E. The 
overall opinion among our interviewees was that ARPA-E seeks to push for 
quantitative and aggressive milestones in order to aim for large leaps, as 
expected in 4.2.1.1, but also that ARPA-E seeks to make the milestones 
feasible to deliver. Only one interviewee, PM13, had experienced that the 
milestones in his project was set too aggressively, and had to be formally 
renegotiated later. We believe that the reason for this variation may have been 
that PM13’s Program Director had exercised his role somewhat more strictly 
than the Program Directors for the other projects. 
Milestones: Flexibility to change the plan, not the goals 
We also suggested that exercising flexibility to change milestones during the 
course of the projects would be an important managerial factor, and that the 
performance of the project with regards to the end-goal could be troubled by 
being bound to a development plan with milestones of little relevance. For our 
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interviewees, a large majority appreciatively expressed that ARPA-E had been 
flexible in changing milestones in terms of deadlines, altering their order or 
removing them, given better alternatives for reaching the overarching goals of 
the project. Some even reported that the milestones had been useful as a tool 
for managing their projects, and others reported that the ARPA-E team had 
proactively urged them to reevaluate milestones as part of the review process. 
PM4 and PM&PI9 were the only interviewees reporting concern over too rigid 
milestones, although PM4 didn’t express any major adverse effects on her 
project from having less flexibility than she wanted. For PM&PI9, the exploration 
of the full benefit of the technology potential in their project had been 
constrained by the limited flexibility.  
Also, potential funding cut-off for failing to meet agreed ‘go, no-go’-milestones 
was generally accepted as a reasonable accountability factor, where ARPA-E 
remained firm. PM13 even connected this point to ARPA-E’s good reputation in 
the Congress, as the ‘go, no-go’ milestones allow it to cut funding for 
underperforming projects. We therefore conclude that ARPA-E exercises 
reasonable flexibility with regards to changing milestones in order to 
reach end-goals, but will terminate non-performing projects. In broader 
terms, we argue that our assertion from section 4.2.2.1 has been supported, and 
that reasonable flexibility should be exercised to allow deviations from the 
initial milestones in order to allow the project to prosper and reach its full 
potential. 
Technology-specific time constraints 
We reasoned in section 4.2.2.1 that the inherent constraints on time and 
resources to overcome unexpected challenges or pursue interesting 
technological paths could impair the potential of reaching the end goals of 
ARPA-E’s projects. PM5, PM&PI9 and PM13 highlighted this in a technology-
specific context. These three projects had time-intensity in common, with each 
iteration of development and testing taking far longer than many of the other 
projects due to the technology-specific constraints. PM5 and PM&PI9 therefore 
suggested that the model driven by quarterly reviews perhaps wasn’t the best fit 
for technologies requiring long testing cycles. We therefore imply that projects 
with time-intensive iteration cycles might require a monitoring frequency 
adapted to the inherent timing constraints of the technology. 
PM5, PM&PI9 also emphasized that if anything goes wrong in these cycles, it is 
challenging to catch up within the duration of the project. PM13 explained that 
the time restriction prevented him from pursuing discoveries that could have 
improved the project, and suggested that this concern could be alleviated by 
allowing non-cost extensions. We investigated some of the special terms and 
conditions attached to ARPA-E’s cooperative agreement (ARPA-E, 2013c), 
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where Clause 13 states that a one-time, no-cost extension is allowed at the DOE 
Contracting Officer’s discretion, but does not alter the schedule of the technical 
milestones and deliverables. We were unable to retrieve earlier versions of this 
document, and can therefore not conclude whether this clause also applies for 
projects predating this document. Regardless, we do not have the impression 
that this clause is commonly exercised. We therefore conclude that the fixed 
duration of ARPA-E’s projects can constrain the ability to maximize the 
innovation potential in time-intensive energy technology. We also agree 
with PM13, that there should be an opportunity to push the funding forward into 
a non-cost extension year if cycles take longer than expected, and that the R&D 
spending in the project therefore moves slower as well. 
Reporting overhead  
Lastly, we intuitively suggested that the frequent monitoring might be considered 
cumbersome and intrusive for some groups, especially academic researchers, 
and that the administrative overhead associated with reporting could be a 
significant burden for smaller organizations lacking financial reporting 
infrastructure or dedicated staff, such as start-ups or small firms.  
The first point was directly brought up by PM12, leading an academic team, and 
anecdotally mentioned by PM1 and PM&PI9 with reference to academic teams 
in their respective programs, suggesting that ARPA-E’s frequent monitoring 
and reporting schedule is considered cumbersome and intrusive by some 
project teams with academic backgrounds. 
In terms of the reporting overhead, it was mostly focused on the substantial 
administrative work required by reporting, which could otherwise be used for 
development work. PM11 even characterized this as the primary hurdle of 
working with ARPA-E. This concern was also raised by PM8, who like PM11 run 
a small start-up. Most of the larger organizations (universities, national labs and 
more established companies) having dedicated accounting departments and 
financial reporting systems did not share this concern, although some found the 
administrative overhead somewhat annoying. We therefore argue that our 
assumption from 4.2.2.1 has been supported, and conclude: The 
administrative overhead associated with reporting is a challenge for 
smaller organizations without dedicated resources for reporting, such as 
start-ups. 
7.5.2 Commercialization focus  
In section 4.2.2.2, we highlighted how ARPA-E incorporates commercialization 
focus in its project, and proposed how these aspects would influence the 
projects. Almost all of our interviewees shared their thoughts on this matter with 
us, as seen in section 6.5.2. 
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7.5.2.1 Effect of Technology-to-Market support for market alignment 
We argued that the Technology-to-Market efforts would positively impact the 
projects’ ability to adapt their innovations to the needs of the market, especially 
through connecting with and understanding industry stakeholders and potential 
customers. Overall, our interviewees appreciated the early commercialization 
focus and the Technology-to-Market support provided by ARPA-E, although 
PM13 and PM10 found it partly lacking in their projects in terms of dedicated 
staff. They did not indicate any need for that to be resolved, however. In terms of 
the networking aspect, we refer to the analysis in section 7.3, which indicated 
that the projects have benefitted in terms of increased connections with industry, 
experts and prospective customers. Some interviewees reiterated these aspects 
in the context of Technology-to-Market support as well, indicating that some 
market alignment is happening as a result of ARPA-E’s support, providing 
circumstantial support for our proposal. Overall, we therefore believe that the 
early focus on commercialization combined with ARPA-E’s Technology-to-
Market efforts forces the project team to consider commercialization 
throughout the project and align to stakeholders, while noting that we do not 
have explicit support for the notion that the Technology-to-Market support 
enabled alignment of the technology development itself. We therefore conclude 
that we cannot say whether the Technology-to-Market activities enable the 
project to adapt its technology development to the needs of the market.  
7.5.2.2 Variable need for Technology-to-Market support 
Complementing this finding was our anticipation that the need for Technology-to-
Market support could vary with the stage of technical maturity in the project. Our 
interviewees did not give this topic much attention, but PM11 thought it was 
slightly premature to schedule much Technology-to-Market work early in his 
project due to its technological state. While this notion may have some merit, we 
question it as an indication of variable need for Technology-to-Market support 
according to the technological maturity, since PM11 also voiced appreciation for 
the Technology-to-Market support he had received. We therefore cannot say 
that the overall need for Technology-to-Market support is dependent on the 
technical maturity of the project. However, we do still believe that it is highly 
likely that the content of this support is specific to the needs in each project. 
We also expected that the need for a Technology-to-Market support function 
might vary depending on the project team in charge of the project. Judging by 
the opinions of our interviewees, there seems to be a variable need for a 
dedicated Technology-to-Market support among the projects in this context. The 
interviewees highlighted that private companies probably had less need for 
Technology-to-Market support due to inherently being market focused, also 
indicating that larger firms would need the support even less than smaller 
companies and start-ups. They also anecdotally pointed out that awardees 
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connected to research centers, universities or laboratories have a greater need 
for this support, and consequentially higher potential effects of this support on 
their projects. Despite being mostly supported by anecdotal evidence, we still 
believe that the commercialization support is especially useful for project 
teams without much commercial experience, such as university 
researchers or first-time entrepreneurs. 
 
 Contributions to theory: Analytical conclusions in 7.6
connection to the research question 
The preceding sections in this chapter led to a set of findings on the effects 
various design characteristics of ARPA-E have on the projects. Figure 6 below is 
an updated version of Figure 2, illustrating the factors in our framework after 
accounting for the empirical findings from our interviews. Drawing on these 
conclusions, we answer our research question by analytically implicating how 
different design characteristics of such a government research agency can affect 
the innovation process of the individual projects it supports. 
The most crucial aspect of a research program aiming at promoting innovation of 
new energy technologies is to provide funding for technologies that do not have 
other funding options due to the funding gap arising from market failures. 
Without such provision of funds, the project will therefore not exist, and the 
technology will not be developed. The program design and project selection 
process is hence important to ensure that the right projects get funded. In this 
regard it is also important that the committed award is large enough to explore 
the full potential of the technological idea. 
Another aspect of the program design and project selection process that might 
prove important for the selected projects is the impact it can have on their 
credibility and visibility. Given that the screening process of the program is 
commonly perceived as competitive and diligent, the projects that get selected 
will be associated with a positive connotation, a ‘stamp of approval’, contributing 
to reduced perceived risk for potential investors and strategic partners. This can 
positively impact the project’s ability to raise funding and resources.  
By being granted an award that is regarded as prestigious, the project can 
leverage this credibility in its interactions with external parties. External 
networking can also be facilitated by the agency itself, for example by hosting 
networking events in order to increase the visibility of the funded projects, 
attracting incoming attention. It can also facilitate networking through direct 
introductions to e.g. potential strategic partners and customers in order to 
increase the projects ability to connect with external parties. The agency can 
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additionally support the technical development process of the projects by 
connecting them to experts in industry or academia.  
A research agency can also facilitate networking between the projects in its 
portfolio. Given that there is a subset of projects with complementary 
competencies or similar technical challenges, such networking can provide the 
opportunity to exploit synergies between the projects and share relevant 
experiences.  
Support for technical challenges and commercialization can increase the 
project’s ability to solve its technical challenges and improve its chance of 
success in the market, respectively. These measures can be provided directly 
from the research agency. Such activities, including the networking efforts 
mentioned above, are facilitated by having a high-involvement approach to 
project management, as this increases the agency’s ability to assess the needs 
of the individual projects, hence equipping it with an understanding of what 
support to provide. A hands-on management approach with clear goals can 
further help motivate and drive the project forward, given sufficient flexibility and 
freedom for the project team to make their own decisions based on superior 
technical insight. Allowing changes in the plan given reasonable technical and 
commercial considerations can enhance the prospects of accomplishing the end 
goals of the project. If such flexibility is not provided and the project is at risk for 
being micromanaged, this undue influence exercised by the agency may further 
lead to the underperformance and potential failure of the project. A hands-on 
management style also implies frequent monitoring of the projects, something 
that can be viewed as cumbersome and intrusive for the projects, and prove a 
substantial overhead problem for smaller organizations without dedicated 
resources for reporting.  
The capabilities of the agency officials interacting with the projects can affect all 
of the above factors, given that an empowered and embedded model akin to that 
of ARPA-E is studied. The industrial and entrepreneurial experience and pre-
existing network of the Program Director and his team directly affect the 
effectiveness of networking facilitation and commercialization support. 
Additionally, the technical expertise of the Program Director and his team is an 
enabling factor for the management of the technical aspects of the projects. 
These capabilities may also improve the credibility of the agency’s vetting 
processes both before and during the support period, which in turn contributes to 
added credibility for the individual project. Given that the agency takes a high-
involvement approach, we therefore deduce that the extent to which the projects 
can receive any worthwhile contributions as a result of this model is dependent 
on the experience and expertise of the agency officials, whether the agency is 
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designed akin to ARPA-E with a single empowered Program Director for each 
focus area or as a dedicated team of agency officials.  
 
Figure 6 - Analytical relations of the discussion 
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8 Implications 
 Implications for policy 8.1
In this chapter, we present the areas policy makers should give particular 
emphasis when designing support agencies intended to support early-stage, 
transformative high-risk innovation projects within energy technology 4 . We 
discern their order of importance in a policy context by relating the overarching 
themes of the analytical conclusions in Chapter 7 to the mitigation of the failures 
we presented in Chapter 2. 
An important restriction in this regard is that we are not implying that a research 
support agency is better than other configurations of policy instruments, as that 
discussion is beyond our scope and consequently impossible to answer on the 
basis of our research. These implications are therefore only considered valid in 
the context of policymakers having already decided to create an agency with this 
intended purpose. That said, we did not find any indication that an agency is a 
suitable policy instrument for mitigating challenges of structural rigidities, in 
which case the policymaker should investigate alternatives to the agency 
outlined in this section. 
8.1.1 Market failure 
The primary inhibitor of the discussed kind of innovation projects is arguably the 
various market failures culminating in a lack of funding for the targeted projects. 
This permeates our results, as is evident by the relations linked to the existence 
of the project. Albeit obvious, these aspects are by far the most important 
contributing factors in mitigating the discussed market failures. Policymakers 
should therefore devote significant attention to how the agency awards its 
funding and how it facilitates the hand-off to the private side for later-stage 
development and commercialization. 
8.1.1.1 Awarding funding 
Perhaps the most obvious way to mitigate the capital market failure is to fund 
worthwhile innovation projects that no other entities will fund due to their risky 
nature. Complementing this implication is the importance of the award size. The 
monetary commitment has to be large enough to allow a complete assessment 
of the potential inherent in the targeted technology, i.e. enough to succeed or fail 
on a sufficiently large scale to prove or disprove the concept properly. We argue 
                                                     
4 Unless explicitly noted otherwise, we refer to this kind of project as “the targeted 
projects”, “the projects” or similar, whereas the supporting entity is referred to as “the 
agency” or similar in Chapter 8. 
98 
the lowered risk from a technologically proved concept should enable other 
entities to carry the technology forward to market, and issues on a 
manufacturing scale should therefore be left to other entities. Failures on a 
manufacturing-type, capital intensive scale could also harm the prospective 
support entity, as the losses associated with failed projects should be small 
enough to be made up for by the positive effects of successes in the eyes of the 
general public.  
Maximizing the chances of identification and selection of the best projects is 
important in order to perform this role effectively. We therefore imply that an 
attractive application process is important in this regard and suggest a 
configuration incorporating the features of pre-proposals and response 
opportunities, as further detailed in previous chapters.  
8.1.1.2 Ensuring follow-on funding for successful commercialization 
In addition to funding the initial development of the targeted projects, we argue 
that securing the hand-off to follow-on funding is crucial for successful 
commercialization, given that the agency’s role is not to replace private industry. 
To avoid confusion, we clarify that we also include continued internal funding in 
our discussions on follow-on funding for the project, for organizations who 
possess the requisite resources to carry the project forward themselves. We 
have found two primary precursors for enhancing the project’s own abilities to 
identify and act on opportunities to raise resources; its credibility and visibility, 
and its ability to connect with external parties.  
The design of the agency should actively contribute to building its credibility by 
incorporating a sufficiently stringent level of technical diligence and rigor in the 
screening process to build a solid reputation in relevant industry and investor 
environments. The agency should leverage this credibility to facilitate networking 
the projects with appropriate investors, strategic partners or initial customers. It 
should also act as an advocate of its projects, garnering publicity in order to 
facilitate the identification of the project for similarly appropriate entities. While 
further validation is required, we suggest that this should provide additional 
opportunities to hand the projects over to the private side. These aspects also 
directly contribute to the mitigation of systemic and weak network failures. 
The competitiveness of the screening process can provide additional credibility 
for the selected projects if the agency is successful in attracting a large number 
of candidates, which we reason is dependent on its reputation. While not a 
design consideration, we therefore emphasize that policymakers should remain 
cognizant of maintaining the reputation of the agency itself. 
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8.1.2 Mitigating systemic and weak network failures 
Mitigation of systemic and weak network failures is a secondary purpose the 
agency can have. The primary way the design of the agency can contribute to 
fulfilling this purpose is to incorporate efforts increasing the projects’ alignment 
with market needs. While further research is needed to validate our inference, 
the agency should provide extensive commercialization support to achieve this 
goal, especially for awardees lacking previous commercialization experience.  
8.1.3 Secondary support and internal alignment to intended goals 
In addition to the above mentioned factors, we have identified a multitude of 
factors moderating the projects’ abilities to reach end goals in the analytical 
conclusions in Chapter 7. These factors should be applicable as guidance for 
the specific considerations practitioners should have in mind when designing the 
specifics of the support agency, but are considered secondary to the discussion 
in this section. 
In order to promote the alignment of the agency’s intended purpose and the 
interests of its staff, we build on the fundamental aspects of a principal-agency 
theory problem (Braun & Guston, 2003), where the principal is the policy maker, 
and the agent is the person or team in charge of the agency. In order to 
maximize the effect of incentives to perform as intended, we suggest that the 
policy maker opts for a model where one person is in charge and responsible for 
each funding effort. This person is hereafter referred to as the Director. We 
therefore recommend an accountability model where the Director is directly 
responsible for the supported projects and held accountable for their subsequent 
performance, i.e. their ability to reach the overarching end goals: later stage 
hand-off to private market forces and ultimately commercialization. In order to 
ensure symmetry and fairness in this model, the Director should also be directly 
responsible for the final funding decision. 
We argue that this alignment is likely to incentivize and embed the Director into 
promoting and ensuring the quality of any non-financial support provided by the 
agency, in order to ensure the success of ‘his’ projects. Combined with having 
the executive power in the funding decision, this implies a need for prerequisite 
capabilities within both relevant technology and commercial efforts, as 
highlighted in Chapter 7. 
This combination of technical and commercial excellence suggests that the 
design of the agency should incorporate an employment model targeting leading 
professionals from relevant industry and academia in order to build teams with 
comprehensive understanding of both the commercial and technological aspects 
of developing new innovations.  
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In order to align incentives in the projects with the goals of the agency, and in 
turn the intentions of the policy maker, a cost share model should be considered 
to hold the project teams accountable. However, we emphasize that it important 
for the policy maker to carefully determine the required cost share in order to 
minimize additional issues of market failure in providing the required cost share. 
In-kind cost sharing seems like a reasonable way to ease this burden on the 
projects, while achieving the intended accountability. 
8.1.4 Summary 
In this section, we have presented the most important themes policy makers 
should consider when having chosen to establish an agency to mitigate market 
failures and systemic and weak network failures. We have also recommended 
incorporating accountability into the internal organization of the agency on the 
basis of our analytical results on positive effects such an agency can provide 
throughout the life of the project, from its initial identification through to its hand-
off to private forces.  
While we have presented design considerations particular for the energy sector, 
we remark that these implications might also apply to agencies aiming to support 
high-risk, long-leap innovation within other industries characterized by similar 
fundamental conditions, i.e. other complex, established, legacy sectors.  
 
 Implications for theory and future research 8.2
The contributions of this thesis are twofold. We have introduced and developed 
an integrative framework of interlinked factors consisting of the design 
characteristics of a research agency on one side, and their effects on the 
projects it supports on the other. The design characteristics affecting the 
innovation process of the projects were found to be related to the program 
design and project selection process, as well as the approach taken by the 
agency to manage and support the projects. Adding on to this system, we have 
included aspects of the design of the agency moderating its ability to deliver the 
mentioned effects. These aspects were found to stem from the organizational 
structure of the agency and the personal qualifications of the managing officials 
in the agency.  
As a foundation for this research we have also developed a cohesive portfolio of 
rationales for government intervention in energy sector innovation, and related 
this to the roles a research agency can take on to mitigate the identified 
challenges to innovation in this space. We believe this framework can be a 
useful tool for future researchers embarking on investigating other research 
agencies.  
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Resulting from our implications are several avenues for future research. Since 
our contribution is a qualitative study of only one agency, the results proposed 
above should be further explored using quantitative methods in order to seek 
validity for our conclusions. To achieve that objective, this study could also be 
replicated using other agencies as a subject. Such studies will also have the 
potential to identify design characteristics not incorporated by ARPA-E, and 
subsequently determine their effects.  
Furthermore, future research should investigate and quantify the impact of 
efforts made by ARPA-E to increase the technologies’ chance of commercial 
success, such as Technology-to-Market support and network facilitation to 
potential customers and other stakeholders in industry, in order to uncover 
whether and to what extent these measures actually translate into increased 
alignment with the market. Similar investigative attention should be given to the 
relation between the projects’ ability to raise follow-on funding and networking 
activities towards potential strategic partners and investors.  
The potential benefit of having targeted programs with related projects is another 
area of exploration. We did not find conclusive results on whether targeted FOAs 
promoting self-supportive technology systems could translate into increased 
chance of adoption in the market, and suggest this as a potentially interesting 
area for further research. Furthermore, the effects of internal networking 
activities should be given additional attention in order to determine the actual 
value of this aspect, and to ascertain how considerations of proprietary 
knowledge affect the level of knowledge transfer between projects. 
Another avenue for exploration is the impact the Program Director has on the 
funding and legitimating role of the agency. In particular it would be interesting to 
examine the requirements to technical expertise and commercial experience, as 
policymakers seeking to utilize a similar management model as ARPA-E will 
need to find suitable candidates for this position.  
A more overarching question that could be interesting to investigate is the trade-
off between the benefits of having a hands-on approach to project management 
and the resources this model requires in both in the agency and the supported 
projects. While ARPA-E’s high involvement in the project have been claimed to 
benefit the projects more than constrain them, it is unclear whether this actually 
is a favorable balance. Other agencies with different organizational models 
should therefore be investigated in order to permit comparisons. 
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9 Limitations 
In this chapter we present the key limitations to our study, divided into issues in 
the theoretical foundation and various underlying aspects of the sample and 
methodological validity.  
 
 Theoretical and empirical foundation 9.1
The framework developed in Chapter 2 might not be exhaustive. Additional 
rationales might exist for government intervention in the energy sector and the 
potential roles a research agency can take on to mitigate the challenges to 
innovation that we have not considered. In our empirical foundation, we may 
have made assumptions or accepted previously published material that might 
not be accurate and comprehensive. This could have impacted the area of 
inquiry brought on to our interviewees, potentially resulting in an incomplete 
picture of the effects of the processes between ARPA-E and its projects.  
 
 Sample  9.2
The primary source of data was semi-structured, open-ended interviews with 
Project Managers and Principal Investigators from 13 different projects in 
California. The majority of these projects are located in the vicinity of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, which is one of the most vibrant entrepreneurial 
environments in the United States, having the largest concentration of national 
labs, research laboratories and research universities, as well as the highest 
density of VC firms in the country (Institute). Being embedded in this 
environment might affect the reported effects of having ARPA-E support, as the 
environment itself might have contributed substantially to the positive effect of 
non-financial aspects of the ARPA-E support. In this context, we emphasize 
potentially enhanced outcomes of networking in particular, and stronger 
perceived effects of legitimizing aspects of the award. The interviewees may 
therefore have reported a more positive impression of ARPA-E efforts than what 
is experienced throughout the rest of the country. Conversely, the high 
‘commercial awareness’ ingrained in the entrepreneurial culture in the Bay Area 
may also have reduced the perceived need and benefits of having 
commercialization support.  
Due to the relatively young age of ARPA-E, there simply is little track record to 
analyze some of the situations mentioned in Chapter 7. Our interviewee sample 
contains only one awardee that has gone through a full cycle of support. This 
single instance is arguably a limiting factor in providing support for qualitative 
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longitudinal analysis of the support throughout the lifetime of the project. This 
weakness is further exaggerated as ARPA-E itself changes with time.  
In Chapter 7, we highlighted that we had only interviewed projects that had 
received the award. This positive bias is a limitation in assessing the negative 
aspects of ARPA-E’s application process, as none of our interviewees decided 
not to apply after being encouraged to do so. Additionally, we cannot be 
absolutely sure that most the projects we interviewed would be unable to 
eventually raise funding on their own without ARPA-E.  
We intended to interview strategically important representatives from ARPA-E, 
but we were unfortunately not able to conduct interviews on record with neither 
any of ARPA-E’s Program Directors nor any other ARPA-E representatives. This 
might be an issue for corroborating our interviewees’ opinions, and is inherently 
limiting our results to only one side of the relationship between ARPA-E and its 
supported projects. This input could further strengthen our triangulation as 
mentioned by Yin (2014), since it appears that the Program Director is a central 
factor in ARPA-E. 
Another limitation to this study is that we try to find the factors that influence the 
projects’ ability to commercialize their technology and products a relatively long 
time before the intended execution of these events. It would also be challenging, 
if not impossible for the project teams to track, delineate and evaluate all their 
interactions, and in retrospect judge whether these relations had produced an 
advantage that would not exist otherwise. 
 
 Limitations for validity 9.3
An important limitation to our implications for policy is that we cannot be sure 
that ARPA-E’s high-involvement, high-responsibility model is better than other 
choices to organize this support. Other government policy instruments could 
likely replicate or improve on some aspects of ARPA-E. Additional research will 
have to assess ARPA-E’s performance compared to other support entities with 
similar purpose, as this is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
Being an explanatory study, internal validity issues are of particular concern for 
our thesis (Yin, 2014). As a result of our research, we have suggested a casually 
interlinked, complex system of factors. Unintended gaps in our theoretical and 
empirical foundation and/or omitted subjects in our discussions with our 
interviewees may have led to the neglecting of important factors capable of 
impairing the internal validity of our results. For instance, if the risk sharing 
concept of having private investments matched 4:1 by the government accounts 
for most of ARPA-E’s impact, one could envision a policy instrument doing only 
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this, while leaving the organization and configuration of other support 
mechanisms (e.g. commercialization support, networking facilitation) to the free 
market. 
As this study only takes into account the characteristics held by ARPA-E we also 
recognize that our list of design characteristics of a research agency may not be 
exhaustive, and there might hence exist additional characteristics potentially 
impacting the innovation process of the projects supported by a research 
agency.   
105 
10 Conclusion 
A research agency can impact the innovation process of the projects within 
early-stage, transformative high-risk energy technology through characteristics 
related to its program design, project selection process and the support provided 
by an active management model. The organizational structure of the agency and 
the qualities held by its managing officials are seen as important factors affecting 
the resulting effects from its characteristics.  
These findings are especially relevant for policy makers intending to secure 
successful innovation and commercial implementation of new transformative 
energy technologies. We have identified the most important aspects that policy 
makers should give significant attention when creating an agency intended to 
mitigate challenges to innovation in the energy. The most important of these are 
how the agency awards its funding and how it facilitates the hand-off to private 
market forces for later-stage development and commercialization. 
As a secondary purpose of the agency, policy makers should consider 
moderating challenges of systemic and weak network failure by incorporating 
efforts increasing the projects’ alignment with market needs. We also 
recommend incorporating accountability into the internal organization of the 
agency to ensure alignment of the agency’s staff to its intended goals. 
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12 Appendix 
 Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 12.1
As used by ARPA-E (2011, p. 10) in their Annual Report: 
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported 
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated 
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept 
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment 
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment 
TRL 6 System/ subsystem model or prototype demonstration in relevant 
environment 
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
TRL 8 Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration 
TRL 9 Actual system proven through successful mission operations 
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 E-mail and request letter  12.2
12.2.1 E-mail requesting interview 
“Dear [interviewee name], 
We are three Norwegian MSc students from the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology who are currently undertaking our master’s thesis, in 
which we are researching how the commercialization process of innovations 
within new energy technology can be successfully supported by government 
initiatives. ARPA-E has emerged as perhaps the most interesting candidate for 
further research in this space.  
As a result of our research, we hope to be able to understand the importance 
and effects of the different supportive and collaborative efforts undertaken in the 
projects supported by ARPA-E. We further seek to present practical implications 
for innovators based on our findings. We are therefore planning a firm-level case 
study on the subject, in which the entities supported by ARPA-E are of particular 
interest. 
We looked up your contact details on the ARPA-E website, and are wondering if 
you would be willing to be interviewed as part of this research. The interview 
should take no longer than 45-60 minutes, and we are hoping to schedule an 
interview between mid-March to mid-April at a time and place of your 
convenience. We are based in San Diego during this period, and are flexible 
with regards to the location of the interview. 
Our work is supported by The Research Council of Norway, please see the 
attached research letter from Special Advisor Birgit Hernes for more details. 
Before you agree to the interview we can confirm that: 
• The interview will be held in English. 
• With your permission will the interview be recorded. 
• A transcript of the interview will be sent to you for review and revision. 
• If preferred, your anonymity will be maintained at all times and no 
comments will be ascribed to you by name in any written document or 
verbal presentation. Nor will any data be used from the interview that 
might identify you or your company to a third party.  
• You will be free to withdraw from the research at any time and/or 
request that your transcript not be used. 
• A copy of the interview questions will be sent to you before the interview.   
• We will write to you on completion of the research and a copy of our final 
research report will be made available to you upon request. The project 
scheduled for completion in mid-June 2014. 
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We sincerely hope that you will be able to help us with our research and thank 
you for taking the time to consider our request. If you have any queries 
concerning the nature of the research or are unclear about the extent of your 
involvement in it please contact us at torstber@stud.ntnu.no.  
 
We look forward to your reply. 
 
Kind regards, 
Nora Fredheim Johnsen, Iver Roen Velo and Torstein Berteig 
 
[Attachment: Request letter from the Research Council of Norway]” 
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12.2.2 Request letter from the Research Council of Norway 
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 Interview topics 12.3
 TOPICS (MAIN TOPIC IN BOLD)  
How is ARPA-E supporting your project? Has this support changed 
throughout the duration of the project?  
How is your project monitored/managed by ARPA-E? How do you perceive 
this/these process(es)?  
How did you perceive the process of setting milestones and deliverables 
in the proposal? How flexible has ARPA-E been following the initial planning?  
How would you describe your relationship with the ARPA-E team assigned 
to you? Has this relationship changed throughout the project? How important do 
you feel it is that the ARPA-E team has a certain level of knowledge and 
experience in your area of technology and in how to bring that technology to 
market?  
What is your assessment of the market potential for your technology? 
Have you made any plans or taken any action with regards to bringing 
your technology to market? Do you receive any support from ARPA-E in this 
regard?  
How does ARPA-E assist you in terms of networking/connecting with other 
parties? What advantages/disadvantages have you experienced from 
participating in these activities?  
How has being awarded ARPA-E support influenced your project's 
recognition in terms of interest from potential partners, prospective 
customers and/or private investors?  
What attracted you to apply for ARPA-E support? How did you perceive the 
process of applying for ARPA-E support?  
Do you have any influence over what kind of support ARPA-E provides as 
the project progresses? Are you asked to evaluate the support provided to you 
by ARPA-E on an ongoing basis?  
Overall, what do you see as the most important advantages/disadvantages 
of being a recipient of ARPA-E support? Do you have any suggestions for 
improvement or for new support functions?  
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 Description of ARPA-E programs 12.4
As described on the APRA-E website (ARPA-E, 2014d):  
ADEPT 
Agile Delivery of Electrical Power Technology 
Program Description:  
In today's increasingly electrified world, power conversion--the process of 
converting electricity between different currents, voltage levels, and frequencies-
-forms a vital link between the electronic devices we use every day and the 
sources of power required to run them. The projects that make up ARPA-E's 
ADEPT program, short for "Agile Delivery of Electrical Power Technology," are 
paving the way for more energy efficient power conversion and advancing the 
basic building blocks of power conversion: circuits, transistors, inductors, 
transformers, and capacitors. 
AMPED 
Advanced Management and Protection of Energy Storage Devices 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's AMPED Program, short for "Advanced 
Management and Protection of Energy Storage Devices," seek to develop 
advanced sensing, control, and power management technologies that redefine 
the way we think about battery management. Energy storage can significantly 
improve U.S. energy independence, efficiency, and security by enabling a new 
generation of electric vehicles. While rapid progress is being made in new 
battery materials and storage technologies, few innovations have emerged in the 
management of advanced battery systems. AMPED aims to unlock enormous 
untapped potential in the performance, safety, and lifetime of today's commercial 
battery systems exclusively through system-level innovations, and is thus 
distinct from existing efforts to enhance underlying battery materials and 
architectures. 
BEEST 
Batteries for Electrical Energy Storage in Transportation 
Program Description:  
The U.S. spends nearly a $1 billion per day to import petroleum, but we need 
dramatically better batteries for electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles (EV/PHEV) to 
truly compete with gasoline-powered cars. The projects in ARPA-E's BEEST 
program, short for "Batteries for Electrical Energy Storage in Transportation," 
could make that happen by developing a variety of rechargeable battery 
technologies that would enable EV/PHEVs to meet or beat the price and 
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performance of gasoline-powered cars, and enable mass production of electric 
vehicles that people will be excited to drive. 
BEETIT 
Building Energy Efficiency Through Innovative Thermodevices 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's BEETIT program, short for "Building 
Energy Efficiency Through Innovative Thermodevices," are developing new 
approaches and technologies for building cooling equipment and air 
conditioners. These projects aim to drastically improve building energy efficiency 
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2) at a cost 
comparable to current technologies. 
ELECTROFUELS 
Microorganisms for Liquid Transportation Fuel 
Program Description:  
ARPA-E's Electrofuels program is using microorganisms to create liquid 
transportation fuels in a new and different way that could be up to 10 times more 
energy efficient than current biofuel production methods. ARPA-E is the only 
U.S. government agency currently funding research on electrofuels. 
FOCUS 
Full-Spectrum Optimized Conversion and Utilization of Sunlight 
Program Description:  
High utilization of renewable energy is a vital component of our energy portfolio. 
Solar energy systems can provide secure energy with predictable future costs—
largely unaffected by geopolitics and climate—because sunshine is widely 
available and free. The 12 projects that comprise ARPA-E’s FOCUS program, 
short for “Full-Spectrum Optimized Conversion and Utilization of Sunlight,” could 
pave the way for cost-competitive hybrid solar energy systems that combine the 
advantages of existing photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) 
technologies. 
GENI 
Green Electricity Network Integration 
Program Description:  
The 15 projects in ARPA-E's GENI program, short for "Green Electricity Network 
Integration," aim to modernize the way electricity is transmitted in the U.S. 
through advances in hardware and software for the electric grid. These 
advances will improve the efficiency and reliability of electricity transmission, 
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increase the amount of renewable energy the grid can utilize, and provide 
energy suppliers and consumers with greater control over their power flows in 
order to better manage peak power demand and cost. 
GRIDS 
Grid-Scale Rampable Intermittent Dispatchable Storage 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's GRIDS program, short for "Grid-Scale 
Rampable Intermittent Dispatchable Storage," are developing storage 
technologies that can store renewable energy for use at any location on the grid 
at an investment cost less than $100 per kilowatt hour. Flexible, large-scale 
storage would create a stronger and more robust electric grid by enabling 
renewables to contribute to reliable power generation. 
HEATS 
High Energy Advanced Thermal Storage 
Program Description:  
The projects that make up ARPA-E's HEATS program, short for "High Energy 
Advanced Thermal Storage," seek to develop revolutionary, cost-effective ways 
to store thermal energy. HEATS focuses on 3 specific areas: 1) developing high-
temperature solar thermal energy storage capable of cost-effectively delivering 
electricity around the clock and thermal energy storage for nuclear power plants 
capable of cost-effectively meeting peak demand, 2) creating synthetic fuel 
efficiently from sunlight by converting sunlight into heat, and 3) using thermal 
energy storage to improve the driving range of electric vehicles (EVs) and also 
enable thermal management of internal combustion engine vehicles. 
IMPACCT 
Innovative Materials and Processes for Advanced Carbon Capture Technologies 
Program Description:  
IMPACCT's projects seek to develop technologies for existing coal-fired power 
plants that will lower the cost of carbon capture. Short for "Innovative Materials 
and Processes for Advanced Carbon Capture Technologies," the IMPACCT 
program is geared toward minimizing the cost of removing carbon dioxide (CO2) 
from coal-fired power plant exhaust by developing materials and processes that 
have never before been considered for this application. Retrofitting coal-fired 
power plants to capture the CO2 they produce would enable greenhouse gas 
reductions without forcing these plants to close, shifting away from the 
inexpensive and abundant U.S. coal supply. 
METALS 
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Modern Electro/Thermochemical Advances in Light Metals Systems 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's METALS program, short for "Modern 
Electro/Thermochemical Advances in Light Metal Systems," aim to find cost-
effective and energy-efficient manufacturing techniques to process and recycle 
metals for lightweight vehicles and aircraft. Processing light metals such as 
aluminum, titanium, and magnesium more efficiently would enable competition 
with incumbent structural metals like steel to manufacture vehicles and aircraft 
that meet demanding fuel efficiency standards without compromising 
performance or safety. 
MOVE 
Methane Opportunities for Vehicular Energy 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's MOVE Program, short for "Methane 
Opportunities for Vehicular Energy," are finding cost-effective ways to power 
passenger cars and other light-duty vehicles with America's abundant natural 
gas resources. Natural gas is currently less expensive than gasoline, and 
produces fewer harmful emissions than any other fossil fuel. Despite these 
advantages, significant technological and infrastructure barriers currently limit 
the use of natural gas as a major fuel source in the U.S. ARPA-E's MOVE 
projects are finding innovative ways to break through these barriers, creating 
practical and affordable natural gas storage tanks for passenger cars and quick-
filling at-home refueling stations. 
OPEN 2009 
Open Funding Solicitation 
Program Description:  
In 2009, ARPA-E issued an open call for the most revolutionary energy 
technologies to form the agency's inaugural program. The first open solicitation 
was open to ideas from all energy areas and focused on funding projects 
already equipped with strong research and development plans for their 
potentially high-impact technologies. The projects chosen received a level of 
financial support that could accelerate technical progress and catalyze additional 
investment from the private sector. After only 2 months, ARPA-E's investment in 
these projects catalyzed an additional $33 million in investments. In response to 
ARPA-E's first open solicitation, more than 3,700 concept papers flooded into 
the new agency, which were thoroughly reviewed by a team of 500 scientists 
and engineers in just 6 months. In the end, 36 projects were selected as 
ARPA-E's first award recipients, receiving $176 million in federal funding. 
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OPEN 2012 
Open Funding Solicitation 
Program Description:  
In 2012, ARPA-E issued its second open funding opportunity designed to 
catalyze transformational breakthroughs across the entire spectrum of energy 
technologies. ARPA-E received more than 4,000 concept papers for OPEN 
2012, which hundreds of scientists and engineers thoroughly reviewed over the 
course of several months. In the end, ARPA-E selected 66 projects for its OPEN 
2012 program, awarding them a total of $130 million in federal funding. OPEN 
2012 projects cut across 11 technology areas: advanced fuels, advanced vehicle 
design and materials, building efficiency, carbon capture, grid modernization, 
renewable power, stationary power generation, water, as well as stationary, 
thermal, and transportation energy storage. 
PETRO 
Plants Engineered to Replace Oil 
Program Description:  
The 10 projects that comprise ARPA-E's PETRO program, short for "Plants 
Engineered to Replace Oil," aim to develop non-food crops that directly produce 
transportation fuel. These crops can help supply the transportation sector with 
plant-derived fuels that are cost-competitive with petroleum and do not affect 
U.S. food supply. PETRO aims to redirect the processes for energy and carbon 
dioxide (CO2) capture in plants toward fuel production. This would create 
dedicated energy crops that serve as a domestic alternative to petroleum-based 
fuels and deliver more energy per acre with less processing prior to the pump. 
RANGE 
Robust Affordable Next Generation Energy Storage Systems 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's RANGE Program, short for "Robust 
Affordable Next Generation Energy Storage Systems," seek to develop 
transformational electrochemical energy storage technologies that will 
accelerate the widespread adoption of electric vehicles by dramatically 
improving their driving range, cost, and safety. RANGE focuses on four specific 
areas 1) aqueous batteries constructed using water to improve safety and 
reduce costs, 2) non-aqueous batteries that incorporate inherent protection 
mechanisms that ensure no harm to vehicle occupants in the event of a collision 
or fire, 3) solid-state batteries that use no liquids or pastes in their construction, 
and 4) multifunctional batteries that contribute to both vehicle structure and 
energy storage functions. 
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REACT 
Rare Earth Alternatives in Critical Technologies 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's REACT program, short for "Rare Earth 
Alternatives in Critical Technologies", are developing cost-effective alternatives 
to rare earths, the naturally occurring minerals with unique magnetic properties 
that are used in electric vehicle (EV) motors and wind generators. The REACT 
projects will identify low-cost and abundant replacement materials for rare earths 
while encouraging existing technologies to use them more efficiently. These 
alternatives would facilitate the widespread use of EVs and wind power, 
drastically reducing the amount of greenhouse gases released into the 
atmosphere. 
 
REMOTE 
Reducing Emissions using Methanotrophic Organisms for Transportation Energy 
Program Description:  
The projects that comprise ARPA-E's REMOTE program, short for "Reducing 
Emissions using Methanotrophic Organisms for Transportation Energy," seek to 
enable highly efficient biological conversion of methane to liquid fuels for small-
scale deployment. Specifically REMOTE focuses on improving the energy 
efficiency and carbon yield of biological routes from methane to a useable form 
for fuel synthesis while also examining high-productivity methane conversion 
processes and bioreactor technologies. 
SBIR/STTR 2012 
Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business Technology Transfer 
Program Description:  
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology 
Transfer (STTR) programs seek to stimulate technological innovation and 
commercialization among America's small businesses. SBIR/STTR programs 
are coordinated by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and administered 
by a number of federal agencies, including the Department of Energy and 
ARPA-E. Since its enactment in 1982, SBIR has helped thousands of small 
businesses compete for federal research and development funding and support. 
SBIR-funded small businesses have enhanced the nation's defense, protected 
our environment, advanced health care, and improved our ability to manage 
information and manipulate data. The small-business-led projects comprising 
ARPA-E's first SBIR/STTR program (SBIR/STTR 2012) are focused on 
advancing transformational technologies that reduce barriers to mass adoption 
of electrical energy storage for stationary and transportation applications. 
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SOLAR ADEPT 
Solar Agile Delivery of Electrical Power Technology 
Program Description:  
The projects that make up ARPA-E's Solar ADEPT program, short for "Solar 
Agile Delivery of Electrical Power Technology," aim to improve the performance 
of photovoltaic (PV) solar energy systems, which convert the sun's rays into 
electricity. Solar ADEPT projects are integrating advanced electrical components 
into PV systems to make the process of converting solar energy to electricity 
more efficient. 
SWITCHES 
Strategies for Wide Bandgap, Inexpensive Transistors for Controlling High-
Efficiency Systems 
Program Description:  
The projects in ARPA-E's SWITCHES program, which is short for "Strategies for 
Wide-Bandgap, Inexpensive Transistors for Controlling High-Efficiency 
Systems," are focused on developing next-generation power switching devices 
that could dramatically improve energy efficiency in a wide range of applications, 
including new lighting technologies, computer power supplies, industrial motor 
drives, and automobiles. SWITCHES projects aim to find innovative new wide-
bandgap semiconductor materials, device architectures, and device fabrication 
processes that will enable increased switching frequency, enhanced temperature 
control, and reduced power losses, at substantially lower cost relative to today's 
solutions. More specifically, SWITCHES projects are advancing bulk gallium 
nitride (GaN) power semiconductor devices, the manufacture of silicon carbide 
(SiC) devices using a foundry model, and the design of synthetic diamond-based 
transistors. A number of SWITCHES projects are small businesses being funded 
through ARPA-E's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small 
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program. 
